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Dear Reader, 
Welcome to some refreshed considerations of Kant’s revised Deduction of the Cat-
egories! I hope my elucidations may prove fruitful, whether pro or contra.
– K.R. Westphal
İstanbul, 20 Dec. 2020 1 INTRODUCTION
Concerning Kant’s ‘Deduction of the Categories’, Sir Peter Strawson wrote:
Kant’s genius nowhere shows itself more clearly than in his identification of the
most fundamental of these conditions [of the very possibility of self-conscious expe-
rience] in its most general form … These are very great and novel gains in episte-
mology, so great and so novel that, nearly two hundred years after they were made,
they have still not been fully absorbed into the philosophical consciousness. (Straw-
son 1966, 29)
Building upon Strawson’s insights (also in his subsequent writings), I submit that
my previous studies of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Westphal 2004, 2020) have
made significant further strides in identifying and justifying Kant’s highly original,
profoundly important insights, and demonstrating their crucial importance to the-
ory of knowledge, to philosophy of mind and to cognitive sciences. This brief book
solely addresses Kant’s own ‘Deduction’. By design it is independent of my other
two books, of the commentary genre and debate, and is as lucid and exoteric as
possible. The issues Kant addresses in the ‘Deduction’ pertain directly to issues cen-
trally debated today in philosophy and in cognitive sciences, especially in epistemol-
ogy and in theory of perception, regarding self-consciousness, self-ascription and
perceptual judgment. Yet Kant’s important insights into these issues are clouded by
prevalent misunderstandings of Kant’s ‘Deduction’ and its actual aims, scope and
argument. This edition, fresh and accurate translation and concise commentary aims
to serve these contemporary debates and to refresh continuing scholarship on
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding,
i.e., of the twelve categories, has been widely criticised for failing to demonstrate
that the categories are and must be applicable to particular objects and events we
sense in our surroundings (esp. Guyer 1987, 1992; Howell 1992). Förster (1989a, b)
suggests that Kant’s aims in ‘the Deduction’ (to adopt a brief designation for Kant’s
chapter) are more specific and limited than its critics assume. Bird (2006a, 323) con-
curs, as do I. Hence Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism (2004; henceforth ‘KTPR’)
said only the necessary minimum about Kant’s Deduction. There I suggested (KTPR,
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11) that Kant’s transcendendental deduction requires thorough reconsideration
based upon Michael’s Wolff ’s (1995, 2009, 2017) landmark reconstruction of
Kant’s completeness proof of his Table of Judgments. There (KTPR) I sought inter
alia to provide proper context for such reconsideration of Kant’s Deduction of the
categories. I have found since that still more context is required to reconsider
Kant’s Deduction, which I offer in Kant’s Critical Epistemology (2020; henceforth
‘KCE’), where again I say only the necessary minimum about Kant’s Deduction it-
self.
One fortunate result of this extensive stage setting is to unburden the aims and
scope of Kant’s Deduction! This affords independent consideration of Kant’s De-
duction, without entangling it in further issues Kant addresses elsewhere in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason (henceforth: ‘KdrV ’). Such unencumbered, independent consid-
eration of Kant’s Deduction is the aim of this brief commentary. Kant’s aim in the
‘Deduction’ is to show that not even the minimal, incomplete thought, ‘I think …’,
is humanly possible without using (if implicitly) the categories in some actual context
on some specific occasion to at least formulate a judgment about some (presumptive)
particular(s). Constraints on humanly identifiable particulars are examined subse-
quently, in Kant’s ‘Analytic of Principles’. This basic division of Kant’s tasks has
been chronically neglected in the critical literature.
My elucidations aim to identify Kant’s key issues, reasons and proof in the De-
duction, thus fulfilling critical interpretive obligations incurred by my previous two
books. To provide clarity and focus on Kant’s reasons and reasoning, this concise
commentary sets aside Kant’s first edition (‘A’) Deduction and also interpretive
controversies. I do not discount Kant’s first edition Deduction, but Kant’s success
is secured by his revised (‘B’) edition. Readers interested in the scholarly debates
may consult de Vleeschauer (1937), Bird (2006a) and Motta & alia (2021); experts
will identify views I take on many of those issues. There is now so much commen-
tary responding to commentary that there is insufficient direct engagement with
Kant’s text and issues. What are Kant’s issues is open to scholarly examination, in-
terpretation and debate, but Kant’s carefully wrought text must be the fundamental
basis for all such study, interpretation and debate. Here Kant’s text is central.
One controversial issue should be noted, to set aside. I do not believe Kant’s
Critical philosophy requires his transcendental idealism; neither do I think any of
his arguments for it prove that idealism. My reasons for these strong claims are de-
tailed elsewhere (KTPR). Part of what I highlight (also in KCE) is that Kant often de-
velops parallel yet separable lines of justification for his main theses, and some of
these lines of justificatory reasoning are more cogent than Kant himself appreciated.
This controversial issue can be set aside because Kant’s Deduction addresses issues
of validity which are neutral with regard to transcendental idealism. Setting aside
Kant’s transcendental idealism may seem to Kant’s scholars a very large, tenden-
tious consession, yet my elucidations point out the vast extent to which Kant’s pub-
lished B Deduction is simply independent of Kant’s cherished transcendental ideal-
ism. This should not be so surprising, because Kant’s B Deduction focuses on is-
sues of validity, whereas transcendental idealism concerns issues of ontology and
cognitive process (see below, §2.15).
Regardless of my own views, as an interpretive and critical point it is crucial to
specify the extent to which, or the regards in which, Kant’s Deduction does (not)
require transcendental idealism. My elucidations aim to show how Kant’s Deduc-
tion can (and should) be understood without appeal to transcendental idealism,
which would too easily short-circuit Kant’s issues, aims and reasoning. Why and
how so is indicated briefly below (§2.15) by distinguishing two senses of ‘constitu-
tion of objects’ of awareness. Relevant passages are noted subsequently (§3).
The next section (§2) states plainly and directly key points required to un-
derstand and to assess Kant’s B Deduction. Those seeking grounds for my remarks
should please consult the two indicated books; readers willing to accept my guides,
albeit provisionally, may wish to read Wolff ’s (2017) concise account of why Kant’s
Table of Judgments is ‘precise’ in the sense that none of these judgmental forms is
redundant. §3 presents Kant’s text and my translation of the B Deduction (verso)
together with my elucidations (recto). §§4 and 5 present and respond to two main
Critical questions regarding my elucidation of Kant’s Deduction. §6 provides analyt-
ical contents, including that of Kant’s ‘Deduction’.
I describe my commentary as providing ‘elucidations’: sufficient necessary mini-
mum information to re-consider Kant’s B Deduction to better understand its actual
stated aims, scope, character and success. Sceptical inquirers may regard my elucida-
tions as interpretive hypotheses, to be considered and tested, though such testing
requires scholars also to test their own preferred approach and presumptions. Ulti-
mately such inquiry and re-consideration is necessary also in scholarly debate, yet
that over-grown genre has come to impede such re-consideration. Detailed schol-
arly debate is best suspended for the present, for the sake of refreshed inquiry, con-
sideration and above all reading. Neither is this commentary an introduction to
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; readers seeking such background may consult Buroker
(2006), Bird (2006a, b); or Baum (1986), Haag (2007).
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2 KANT’S B DEDUCTION: BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR ITS UNDERSTANDING
2.1 The brevity of Kant’s designated Deduction (KdrV §26) indicates that much 
of Kant’s aim in the two main sections (Abschnitten) of his chapter on the Deduc-
tion of the categories is to circumscribe his issue, which indeed he does, exactly in 
accord with his cardinal distinction between two distinct, integrated roles played by 
intellect and sensibility within human experience and knowledge (B75–6, 304–5). 
Both roles involve various sorts of combination, conjoining or ‘synthesis’, all of 
which are guided or structured by our most fundamental judgmental forms and cat-
egories. This claim concerns the forms of these various conjoinings! That all these 
forms of combination are guided by the same formal or structural guides (types) 
does not entail numerical identity between any pair of effected (token) conjoinings. 
In particular, Kant’s account of such conjoining or synthesis expressly allows for 
numerically distinct combinations required for sensory-perceptual presentations, in 
contrast to those combinations required for explicitly self-conscious (apperceptive) 
judgments. Kant is quite alert to issues of sensory-perceptual ‘binding’ (as it is now 
called) as well as to issues of information extraction from sensory-perceptual intake 
or indeed from sensory presentation. Sensory-perceptual combination and sensory 
presentation are effected sub-personally by cognitive functioning of the transcen-
dental power of imagination (§24, B151–2, ll. 951–2, 961–77, 980– 91; §26, B162, ll. 
1100–10; cf. A79/B104–5). Integration of conceptual classifications of sensed, per-
ceived particulars and their features, required to form explicit cognitive judgments 
(however tentative, approximate or precise) about them, Kant assigns to under-
standing. (Kant’s contrast between these two functions is my reason for contrasting 
‘intellect’ to ‘sensibility’ just above.)
2.2 A helpful pointer about Kant’s key term ‘transcendental’ is this: In much 
Mediaeval metaphysics, the ‘transcendental’ categories are supposed to pertain to 
any and all even possible being(s). Kant re-assigns the term to designate those a 
priori, formal aspects of human cognisance required for any and all even possible 
human self-conscious thought about or experience of particulars.
2.3 The structure of Kant’s text is complex, yet worth considering. Kant’s Table 
of Contents is presented in outline format by Pluhar’s translation (1996, viii–xvi). 
Kant’s section and §§ titles within the ‘Deduction’ are outlined below in the Analyt-
ical Contents (§6). Consider here these titles and taxonomy. The first division of 
Kant’s ‘Transcendental Logic’ is the ‘Transcendental Analytic’ (in contrast to the 
second division, ‘Transcendental Dialectic’). The first book of Kant’s ‘Transcenden-
tal Analytic’ is the ‘Analytic of Concepts’ (in contrast to the second book, the ‘Ana-
lytic of Principles’). The first chapter of Kant’s ‘Analytic of Concepts’ is Kant’s 
‘Clue to discovering all pure concepts of the understanding’. Here Kant examines 
the Table of judgmental forms, and suggests how that Table can indicate our most 
basic conceptual categories. The second chapter of Kant’s ‘Analytic of Concepts’ 
contains the Deduction; this second chapter is titled ‘Of the deduction of the pure 
concepts of the understanding’. This chapter contains two main ‘sections’, each of 
which is subdivided into numbered §§. The first main section is titled, ‘Of the prin-
ciples of a transcendental deduction as such’; it contains §§13–14. Kant’s second 
main section is titled, ‘Transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the under-
standing’; it contains §§15–27. The penultimate §26 is titled, ‘Transcendental deduc-
tion of the universally possible experiential use of the pure concepts of the under-
standing’. My point in reviewing this taxonomy of Kant’s text is to suggest that 
Kant’s key task in these two main sections of his chapter, specifically §§13–25 and 
§27, is to carefully circumscribe and characterise the exact issues and aims of his
Deduction of the categories (§26). Much of my aim in the following elucidations is
to indicate that this is exactly how Kant proceeds: thirteen §§ of careful stage-set-
ting, one § of proof. §26 states Kant’s Deduction of the categories. Kant has a very
specific, unusual point to make about human apperception; consequently, he must
make clear why this point matters, and why it holds true of us. This requires Kant’s
extensive stage setting (cf. below, §5).
2.4 One challenge of reading Kant’s KdrV is that he examines issues both of cog-
nitive process and of cognitive validity. These two kinds of issues he contrasts by
distinguishing between his ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ deductions (Axvii , cf. B393).
The former concerns how we can sense, perceive, discriminate or judge any particu-
lars at all; the latter concerns the a priori, formal conditions under which alone we
can make any cognitive judgment about any sensed particular(s) validly, by achieving
sufficiently accurate and justified reference to any particular(s) and ascription of fea-
ture(s) to that (or to those) particular(s). By carefully considering basic issues about
sensory binding and information extraction, together with our most basic formal
aspects of judging, to address issues about how it is at all possible for any cognisant
human being to integrate sensory experience over time and through space so as to
be able to judge anything it experiences, Kant constructs a very sophisticated func-
tionalist cognitive architecture (KCE §§30, 43). By identifying these features of cogni-
tive process, Kant identifies much more specifically which issues regarding cognitive
validity require solution, and what philosophical resources may be brought to bear in
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can make a y cognitive judg ent about any sensed particular(s) v lidly, by achiev ng
sufficiently accurate and j st fied reference to any particular(s) a d ascription of fea-
ture(s) to that (or to those) particular(s). By carefully conside ing basic iss es about
sensory binding and information extractio , together with our most basic formal
aspects of judging, to address i sues about how it is at all possi le for any cognisant
human being to integrate sensory experienc  over time and through space so as to
be able to judge anything it experiences, Kant constructs a very sophisticated func-
tionalist cog itive architecture (KCE §§30, 43). By identifying these features of cogni-
tive process, Kant identif es much more specifically which issues regarding cognitive
validity require solution, and what philosophical resources may be brought t  bear in
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resolving these issues of validity (KCE, Chs. 4–8). Issues of process and issues of 
validity run throughout Kant’s Deduction; bearing their distinction clearly in mind 
is required to recognise that Kant distinguishes them, indeed, repeatedly and explic-
itly.
2.5 Kant’s subtle and successful discernment is better appreciated by using two 
diagnostic clues from Ryle. One is to beware of ‘para-mechanical hypotheses’ about 
the mind. Ryle (1949, 19, 23, 64, 68, &c) criticised Cartesian para-mechanical hy-
potheses, but para-mechanical hypotheses run rampant in philosophical psychol-
ogy, also amongst empiricists, materialists, physicalists and indeed most any philo-
sophical account of how the mind (supposedly) works. One example from Kant’s 
Deduction is his lengthy aside about the apparent paradox of self-affection (B152–
6). It overtly concerns process rather than validity; it is a para-mechanical hypothe-
sis because the paradox arises from attempting to model sensory self-awareness on 
our sensory awareness of things other than ourselves, made yet more complicated 
(and para-mechanical) by Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena. 
Accordingly, I have elided it from the present edition, translation and commentary 
of Kant’s Deduction.
2.6 Ryle’s (1932 [2009, 41–62]) second clue is to beware of systematically mis-
leading expressions. Four examples pertaining to Kant’s Deduction are ‘representa-
tion’, ‘cognition’, ‘determine’ and ‘sinnliche Anschauung ’. Kant uses the term ‘Vorstel-
lung’ (representation) as a genus for all sorts of factors pertaining to our cognisance, 
from individual sensations up to the most idealised, comprehensive concepts of 
reason. Always bear in mind Kant’s taxonomy of representations (A320/B376–7). 
Within this taxonomy, Kant typically uses the term ‘cognition’ (in the distributive 
singular) to designate a state of a subject, a ‘perception’, which connects to some 
other object, in contrast to a sensation, a ‘perception’ which only connects (or per-
tains) to a condition of the cognisant subject. Possible reference to objects other 
than oneself is fundamental to KdrV. Recall, too, that Kant (like Leibniz) distin-
guishes between perception and apperception; unlike Hume’s impressions and un-
like sense data, ‘perceptions’ are not automatically objects (or aspects) of self-con-
scious awareness (apperception).
2.7 I render ‘sinnliche Anschauung ’ as ‘sensory intuition’. ‘Sensible’ is not incorrect, 
but too easily suggests sensed qualities of which one is explictly aware, as in sense 
data or Humean impressions. ‘Intuition’ in Kant’s taxonomy indicates directedness 
to some particular(s) other than oneself: sensory intuition concerns direction and lo-
cation, which are neither sensed nor sensory qualities ; most literally, ‘anschauen’ is
looking at something. Kant’s views on human sensibility are complex and sophisti-
cated; assimilating his approach to either Cartesianism or empiricism causes nothing 
but confusion. (See further §5 below; cf. Buroker 1981, George 1981, Falkenstein 
1995.)
2.8 In English, many of the aspects of cognisance Kant designates by Vorstellung 
or the verb, vorstellen, in connection with sensory perception, would be better 
thought of as sensory presentation(s). Kant is a direct Critical realist about sensory 
perception; he rejects indirect, representationalist theories of perception. This holds 
regardless of his transcendental idealism, within his ‘empirical realism’; or regardless 
of either qualification, if his idealism be set aside. (See further below, §5.)
2.9 In English as in German, ‘determine’ (bestimmen) can mean: cause to be as it 
is; yet it can also mean: specify, as in the instruction, ‘Phelps, please determine what 
became of the Higgins dossier!’ In this sense ‘determine’ means to find out or spec-
ify what has happened. In connection with concepts, to ‘specify’ a concept is to 
make it more precise, by providing a more exact, hence more restricted meaning or 
intension (with an ‘s’). Kant frequently uses bestimmen and its cognates in this sense. 
2.10 A fifth systematically misleading expression is ‘analytic truth’, a direct descen-
dant of Hume’s ‘relations of ideas’. Kant repeatedly stresses that all which can be 
known by conceptual analysis, strictly speaking, is whether any specific sub-concept 
is or is not included within some designated concept. Hence ‘analytic truth’ pertains 
only to conceptual content or intension (with an ‘s’), in contrast both to intentions 
(agents’ aims) and to extentions (actual instances of any concept or term). Truth, 
properly speaking, concerns the relation between a judgment or claim, formulated 
using some classificatory concepts, and any particular(s) judged or claimed to in-
stantiate the relevant predicate concepts (in affirmative judgments). Hence truth, 
properly speaking, is never merely analytical; it is always synthetic, because truth 
involves both reference and attribution to indicated particular(s); these cannot be 
contained merely within any concept, they should never be mistaken for mere con-
ceptual content or intension. The convenient tag, ‘analytic truth’ obscures a host of 
distinct, important conceptual, referential, ascriptive and judgmental issues. Even if, 
e.g., anything coloured must be extended (cf. Quine 1961, 32ff ), this is a complex 
hypothetical proposition, which (qua proposition or judgment) may have no relevant 
instances and so may express no truth, even if it may express a significant relation 
between the concepts ‘coloured’ and ‘extended’, and hence a significant (though 
entirely counter-factual, inferential) relation between any possible instances of ‘col-
oured’ and ‘extended’ particulars. The apparent clarity of convenient philosophical
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short-hand may obfuscate! Quine is correct that problems lurk in empiricist notions 
of ‘analyticity’, yet his extensionalist semantics fails to identify and rectify them 
(Westphal 2015, Parrini 2018).
2.11 The key points of Kant’s Deduction concern cognitive semantics; they hold 
independently of Kant’s transcendental idealism, within the domain he calls his ‘em-
pirical realism’. Kant’s Deduction addresses necessary conceptual conditions re-
quired for us at all to think so as to identify any particular(s) whatsoever, so as to be 
able competently to ascribe actual features to it (or to them). Kant expressly con-
trasts accurate attribution of what some particular IS, to however it may merely ap-
pear to some one of us. The contrast is correct, yet even saying of some particular 
that it appears to be such-and-so requires identifying that manifest particular, at least 
putatively. Even this minimal identification involves individuation and characterisa-
tion (however approximate or provisional). These proto-cognitive achievements 
require using the categories in order, as Kant stresses, to think that such-and-so ap-
pears to oneself – to any apperceptive human being, who can use the first person 
pronoun ‘I’ to express any thought, belief, judgment or claim whatsoever.
2.12 Central to Kant’s Deduction are the distinct, distinctive roles of sensory intu-
ition and intellect within human experience: Sensory intuition can only present par-
ticulars to us; thinking can only judge those particulars presented by sensory intu-
ition (B75–6, 304–5; cf. §14, B125, ll. 195–205, B126, ll. 216–33). In the Deduction 
(and elsewhere) Kant expressly distinguishes between mere thought and any, even 
candidate knowing by stressing issues of reference. Thinking a thought requires no 
more than thinking a logically consistent, grammatically complete proposition (in 
Kant’s view, as the content of a judgment one can affirm, deny or reject altogether). 
Knowing something requires, in addition to thought, indicating demonstratively 
(deictically) within space and time some particular(s) about which one judges by 
ascribing characteristics to it (or to them). In this regard, Kant agrees with Evans 
(1975), that predication as ascription of features to some specified, localised particu-
lar(s) is constitutive of empirical knowledge. Their view rejects what are known as 
‘descriptions theories’ of reference, that propositions or sentences refer to whatever 
is described by their fully explicated meanings or intension. Such views cannot be 
correct, because in any case, whether there be no such particulars, many such, or 
only one such particular (for unique, singular reference) depends also, entirely inde-
pendently, upon what in the world there is. Quine’s favourite example, ‘the shortest 
spy’, may fail of unique reference if instead the shortest spies are dwarf triplets of 
exactly the same stature and profession, or if by some stroke of great fortune, their
entire profession disappears. Kant makes this deictic point against Leibniz with two 
raindrops (B328). Furthermore, for unique reference to serve knowledge requires lo-
cating the particular(s) purportedly known; this requires demonstrative reference, 
directly or indirectly; mere truth-values do not suffice for cognition. That’s why 
Kant’s and Evans’ referential, demonstrative point is deictic.
2.13 Kant’s Deduction does imply there are and must be constraints upon objects 
and upon our deictic reference to discriminated particulars, such that we can think 
of them and can know them, but these constraints upon objects are examined in the 
second Book of the ‘Transcendental Analytic’, the ‘Analytic of Principles’. In the 
Deduction Kant focuses on the key intellectual conditions required for us at all to 
think any such specific, determinate thought, which we could think to refer to any 
particulars. (Much commentary and criticism neglects this basic point and so mis-
takes the aim and scope of Kant’s Deduction.)
2.14 Kant explicitly and repeatedly parallels the Deduction of the categories to 
what he here calls the transcendental Deduction of the a priori concepts of ‘space’ 
and of ‘time’ (cf. B118–9, 159, my comments below on ll. 58–75, and §4). These two 
a priori concepts must pertain to any particulars of which we can be aware, because 
we can only respond to spatio-temporal sensory stimulations, and only by such sen-
sory receptivity can any particulars be presented to us, so as to afford any thought 
about any particular(s) at all. (This states Kant’s constraint on sensory receptivity 
very minimally, to suggest how Kant’s transcendental idealist account of space and 
time = nothing but human forms of sensory receptivity (B37–8, 59–60) may be set 
aside. For present purposes, this suggestion suffices; I do not pretend to justify it 
here.)
Kant’s parallel between these two Deductions underscores how Kant’s point in 
the Deduction of the categories concerns the possible connection of any human 
thought to objects, and so of any self-conscious human awareness to objects. Kant’s 
Deduction does not concern objects, except to specify that any objects of which we 
can be self-consciously aware must be spatio-temporal and must afford discrimina-
tion and identification by using our most basic categories, because these a priori 
concepts are constitutive of any humanly possible thought (which can pertain to par-
ticulars). The specification of objects, however, is left wide open in the Deduction, 
by design; it is Kant’s topic in the Analytic of Principles. Kant certainly is aware that 
his Deduction of the categories entails constraints upon the character of spatio-
temporal particulars which we can perceive and identify, but those constraints are 
not Kant’s topic in the Deduction itself (cf. below, §§4, 5).
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2.15 In this regard it is helpful to consider two different senses of the ‘constitu-
tion’ of objects of experience. One sense of ‘constitution of objects’ involves our 
generation of those objects, or at least of their key features. A distinct sense of ‘consti-
tution of objects’ concerns necessary conditions (typically: a priori and formal, espe-
cially conceptual or judgmental conditions) which must be satisfied if we are to be 
able to be aware of any object as an object, or as the object it is. This second sense 
of ‘constitution of objects’ concerns how we can recognise or identify objects; it 
concerns issues of validity and need not appeal to any form of idealism; I shall call 
it the ‘presuppositional’ sense. The first, generative sense of ‘constitution of objects’ 
involves an account of (purported) cognitive process. Whether or how such process 
can also address issues of validity is not obvious; such a demonstration is a task for 
advocates of such views. (The divide marked by these two senses of ‘constitution of 
objects’ divided Husserl and Roman Ingarden; cf. Ingarden (1968, 1975).) I mention 
this contrast here because Kant’s transcendental idealism appears to involve or in-
voke the generative sense, whereas the focus of Kant’s Deduction on issues of va-
lidity – expressly the aim of his ‘objective deduction’ – appears to invoke or require 
(only) the presuppositional sense of ‘constitution of objects’ as objects of our self-
conscious (apperceptive) awareness.
The grand dichotomy driving Kant’s transcendental idealism and his opposition 
to empiricism is stated at the start of §14 in these term:
There are only two possible cases under which synthetic representations and
their objects can come together, connect to each other necessarily and as it were
meet one another: either if the object makes the representation, or this [latter]
alone makes the object possible. (KdrV §14, B124–5, cf. Bxiv)
Kant’s formulation concerns production or generation; it states a para-mechanical
hypothesis concerning process. How such issues of process can address issues of
validity is not indicated here. There is no question that Kant thought in terms of
transcendental idealism as the only tenable metaphysical position. The astonishing
feature of his KdrV is that, and how, under the cover of this macro-level metaphysi-
cal contrast Kant developed in minute, accurate and sufficient detail an account of
the validity of possible human experience and our cognitive judgments which holds
entirely within the domain he designates as ‘empirical realism’, and yet his account
of the necessary conditions for the possible validity of apperceptive human experi-
ence and cognitive judgment ultimately shows that the above dichotomy is spe-
cious; they are not the only options! Instead, Kant’s revolutionary examination, anal-
ysis and justification of the necessary formal and material conditions of possible 
human experience and cognitive judgment identifies and justifies robust external-
ist aspects of semantic content (intension), mental content and cognitive justifica-
tion, all of which stand entirely independently of transcendental idealism. Indeed, 
the reasons why they hold show that, and how, his key arguments for transcenden-
tal idealism are invalid (and leave no obvious replacements in view). These strong 
claims contra transcendental idealism are detailed and defended in KTPR. Here I only 
aim to elucidate how Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Categories of 
the Understanding holds, and can hold entirely independently of transcendental ide-
alism. In exactly this regard, the ‘presuppositional’ sense of object constitution suf-
fices for Kant’s B Deduction, although his transcendental idealism purports to de-
fend a very subtle version of the ‘generative’ sense. Kant’s achievement is indeed 
extraordinary; we do both him and ourselves a grave philosophical disservice if we 
remain captive to the above dichotomy, or otherwise miss the details of his scrutiny 
and justification of conditions of cognitively valid judgment due to preoccupation 
with ‘big picture’ contrasts amongst apparent ontological alternatives.
2.16 My cautions above about appeal to transcendental idealism in connection 
with Kant’s Deduction aims to avoid short-circuiting Kant’s account of the valid use 
of the categories by premature appeal to issues of (putative, cognitive) process. 
Conversely, identifying exactly why and how transcendental idealism is required by 
Kant’s Deduction can be ascertained only by scrutinising the prospect (presented 
here) that it may not be required at all.
In my elucidations (§3) I indicate Kant’s key concern with intellectual = judg-
mental synthesis of concepts by which we identify sensed particulars and their fea-
tures. This judgmental synthesis holds regardless of issues about sensory presenta-
tion of particulars; expressly, such judgmental ‘conjoining’ is an intellectual achieve-
ment. This strongly suggests, indeed it may entail, that the non-idealist, non-process 
gloss on ‘constitution’ of objects as objects of our possible self-conscious awareness 
– the second, presuppositional sense – suffices within and for Kant’s Deduction of 
the categories.
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alone makes the object possible. (KdrV §14, B124–5, cf. Bxiv)
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validity is not indicated here. There is o qu stion that Kant thought in terms of
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Kant’s Deduction can be ascertained only by scrutinising the prospect (presented 
here) that it may not be required at all.
In my elucidations (§3) I indicate K nt’s key concern with i tellectual = judg-
mental synthesis of concepts by which we ide tify sensed particulars and th ir fea-
tures. This judgmental synthesis holds regardle s of i sues about sensory pre enta-
tion of particulars; expressly, such judgmental ‘conjoining’ is an intellectual achieve-
ment. This strongly suggests, indeed it may entail, that th  non-idealist, non-proc ss 
gloss on ‘constitution’ of bjects as objects of our possible self-conscious awarenes  
– the second, presuppositional sense – suffices w thin and for Kant’s Deduction of 
the categories.
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3 TEXT, TRANSLATION & ELUCIDATIONS
This section presents Kant’s text with my elucidations on facing pages. Kant’s sec-
ond edition Deduction is printed with some omissions in the left column (verso), 
and newly translated in the right column (verso). My elucidations and notes are on 
the facing page (recto). Omitted are most passages overtly concerning Kant’s tran-
scendental idealism which do not concern issues of validity, and those concerning 
self-affection, i.e., how we can be sensibly aware of ourselves within inner sense. 
Most of Kant’s footnotes are omitted; some few are placed within the text. All ellip-
ses are marked; longer elisions by ‘[…]’ at the right margin. Line numbers (outside 
the far left margin) are cited in comments on the facing page as ‘l.’ or ‘ll.’ (plural). 
Line numbers indicate Kant’s German text; I have kept the English translation as 
closely sequenced to Kant’s original as possible, whilst allowing proper paragraph 
format. Lines are numbered consecutively throughout to simplify references. Kant’s 
first edition (‘A’) is cited for passages occurring in that edition alone; otherwise only 
the second (‘B’) edition is cited, except when identifying a passage in both editions 
is especially important..
The German text is Kant’s original (1787), unmodernised. Kant’s page breaks 
are indicated to the nearest whole word by B pagination in square brackets, set in 
petit font; e.g.: [B118]. Kant’s own spelling is less a problem for foreigners, who learn-
ing abroad are taught beautiful 18th-century Hochdeutsch. Kant contributed greatly to 
establishing the German philosophical vocabulary. As this involved developing 
German counterparts to Latin terminology, Kant’s German spellings often retain 
more Latin than soon became standard Hochdeutsch, yet these Latinate features of 
Kant’s spelling are closer to English. I have checked Kant’s text, and my edition of 
Kant’s text, against two very reliable modern editions, those of Weischädel and of 
Timmermann. Modern printing better indicates Kant’s Spe r rd ruck  (for empha-
sis), but Modern German omits some of Kant’s subjunctive moods. In the Deduc-
tion, these are only stylistic niceties, yet Kant had absolute command of German 
and wrote with great care and clarity, and often with remarkable expressive power. 
Yes, he struggled with expressing fundamentally revolutionary new ideas, but more 
often readers confront problems comprehending Kant’s often brilliant concision.
(Some examples are noted in §3.) All merely philological or typographical details are 
omitted. Kant’s own editions of KdrV are now readily available on the web, for all 
who wish to scrutinise them.
12 
I welcome sincere attempts to assess my translation, elucidations or editorial
omissions, by which critics may also assess their preferred alternatives. Kant’s De-
duction may deserve or require more ambitious reconstruction than that presented
here. I respectfully submit that any alternative can benefit by scrutinising both it
and the present considerations, which I believe suffice, yet are neither complete nor
final. The elided passages certainly are of interest, but as further comments by Kant
on various related topics, not as central components of, nor guides to, the Deduc-
tion itself. I respectfully submit that, even with its tactical omissions, the attention
devoted here to Kant’s B Deduction is more thorough and careful than what has
become accepted in much contemporary scholarship.
Abbreviations
KdrV Kant, Critik der reinen Vernunft, 1781 (‘A’), 1787 (‘B’); (Riga 1787).
Prol. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Riga 1783).
Anth. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Königsberg, 2nd ed. 1800).
Prin. Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy (Amsterdam 1644).
En.1 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (London 1748, 1756).
KTPR Westphal, Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism (Cambridge 2004).
KCE Westphal, Kant’s Critical Epistemology (Routledge 2020).
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Zweites Hauptstück. Von der Deduction
der reinen Verstandesbegriffe. [B116] 
Erster Abschnitt.
§ 13. Von den Principien einer transscen-
dentalen Deduction überhaupt.5
Die Rechtslehrer, wenn sie von Be-
fugnißen und Anmaßungen reden, unter-
scheiden in einem Rechtshandel die Fra-
ge über das, was Rechtens ist (quid iuris),
von der, die die Thatsache angeht (quid10
facti), und indem sie von beiden Beweis
fordern, so nennen sie den erstern, der
die Befugniß oder auch den Rechtsan-
spruch darthun soll, die Deduc t ion .
Wir bedienen uns einer Menge empiri-15
scher Begriffe ohne jemandes Widerrede
und halten uns auch ohne Deduction be-
rechtigt, ihnen einen Sinn und eingebil-
dete Bedeutung zuzueignen, weil wir je-
derzeit die Erfahrung bey der Hand20
[B117] haben, ihre objective Realität zu
beweisen. Es giebt indessen auch usur-
pirte Begriffe, wie etwa G l ü c k ,
Sch i ck s a l , die zwar mit fast allgemei-
ner Nachsicht herumlaufen, aber doch25
bisweilen durch die Frage: quid iuris, in
Anspruch genommen werden; da man
alsdann wegen der Deduction derselben
in nicht geringe Verlegenheit geräth, in-
dem man keinen deutlichen Rechtsgrund30
weder aus der Erfahrung, noch der Ver-
nunft anführen kann, dadurch die Befug-
niß ihres Gebrauchs deutlich würde.
14 
Chapter Two. Of the Deduction of the
Pure Concepts of the Understanding.
First Section.
§ 13. Of the Principles of a Transcen-
dental Deduction as such.
Speaking of entitlements and claims
in cases at law, jurists distinguish the
question concerning justice (quid iuris)
from that which concerns facts (quid
facti), and since they demand proof of
both, they call the first, which shall
provide the title or the claim of jus-
tice, the deduction. We use a host of
empirical concepts without anyone
taking exception and we take our-
selves even without a deduction to be
entitled to ascribe to these concepts a
sense and a presumed significance,
because we always have experience at
hand to prove their objective reality.
There are also surreptitious concepts,
such as luck or fate, which circulate
with nearly unanimous accord,
though occasionally are protested by
posing the question: quid iuris; and
then by their deduction one falls into
a not insignificant quandary, since
one can provide no clear grounds of
justification, whether from experi-
ence, or by reason, by which the title
to use these concepts would be made
clear and evident.
3.1 §13: Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction as such.
B116–7 (ll. 6–33): Kant’s emphatic contrast between questions of fact and questions of nor-
mative validity marks the same distinction between, e.g., issues of psychological process and 
those of logical validity stressed by Frege (1884); likely Frege adopted this contrast from 
Kant’s KdrV. Kant’s KdrV does investigate issues of cognitive process and origins of various 
factors involved in human experience and cognition, for three reasons: (1) to identify as well 
as possible precisely which issues of cognitive validity, concerning truth, accuracy, justifica-
tion or other such normative modalities must be addressed, (2) to suggest some consider-
ations in view of which they may be addressed and (3) to support his claims that the ac-
count he develops holds true of us. Kant marks their distinction by contrasting his ‘subjec-
tive deduction’, which concerns how experience or cognition is (possibly) generated, to his 
‘objective deduction’, which aims to demonstrate under what conditions cognitive judg-
ments are cognitively justified or justifiable (Axvii , cf. B393). This same contrast recurs in 
Kant’s distinction between a transcendental deduction of a priori concepts and their empiri-
cal deduction, which concerns their acquisition (B117, ll. 47–57).
B117 (l. 21; cf. B148, ll. 839–51): The designation ‘objective reality’ is common throughout the 
Mediaeval and Modern periods, and retains use in optics: In contrast to the eyepiece, the 
lens at the other end which aims at an object is called the ‘objective’ lens (of a binoculars, 
camera, microscope or telescope). The sense of ‘objective reality’ = directed towards an ob-
ject. Despite all naturalistic attempts to reduce, explain or explain away ‘objective reality’ or 
representational content in terms of nothing but the ‘formal reality’ of whatever physical 
objects or events (i.e., their reality as actual, existing particulars), none have (remotely) suc-
ceeded (cf. Westphal 2017). About this duality Descartes was right (cf. Moran 2014).
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Unter den mancherley Begriffen aber,
die das sehr vermischte Gewebe der35
menschlichen Erkenntniß ausmachen,
giebt es einige, die auch zum reinen Ge-
brauch a priori (völlig unabhängig von
aller Erfahrung) bestimmt sind, und die-
ser ihre Befugniß bedarf jederzeit einer40
Deduction: weil zu der Rechtmäßigkeit
eines solchen Gebrauchs Beweise aus
der Erfahrung nicht hinreichend sind,
man aber doch wissen muß, wie diese
Begriffe sich auf Objecte beziehen kön-45
nen, die sie doch aus keiner Erfahrung
hernehmen. Ich nenne daher die Erklä-
rung der Art, wie sich Begriffe a priori
auf Gegenstände beziehen können, die
t r an s s cenden t a l e  Deduc t ion  der-50
selben und unterscheide sie von der
emp i r i s chen  Deduction, welche die
Art anzeigt, wie ein Begriff durch Erfah-
rung und Reflexion über dieselbe erwor-
ben worden, und daher nicht die Recht-55
mäßigkeit, sondern das Factum betrifft,
wodurch der Besitz entsprungen. [B118]
16 
However, amongst the various con-
cepts which constitute the very mixed
fabric of human cognition, there are
some destined to a pure use a priori
(entirely independent from all experi-
ence), and the entitlement to their use
always requires a deduction: because
proofs from experience do not suf-
fice for the legitimacy of their usage,
yet one must of course know how
these concepts can connect to ob-
jects, although these concepts are not
derived from any experience. I call
the explication of how a priori con-
cepts can connect to objects their
transcendental deduction, and distinguish
this from an empirical deduction,
which indicates how a concept can be
acquired from experience and reflec-
tion upon it, and so addresses not the
legitimacy but rather the fact by
which the possession arose.
B117 (l. 36): Within his taxonomy of species of representation (A320/B376–7), hence within
the context of his ‘Deduction’, Kant typically (though not exclusively) uses Erkenntniß (cog-
nition), whether singular or plural, to designate subjective states, ‘perceptions’, which con-
nect to some object distinct to the Subject whose perception it is. (Recall that by ‘percep-
tion’ Kant does not automatically mean ‘apperception’!) As George (1981) indicates, at the
time, the term Erkenntniß was used (inter alia) to denote indexical, demonstrative, ostensive
or deictic reference to (putative) particulars. Which factor(s) or what cognitive achieve-
ment(s) Kant may designate by these terms must be discerned in context, which usually
makes his point quite clear. (Always keep Kant’s taxonomy (A320/B376–7) in mind.)
B117 (ll. 47–8): On ‘Erklärung’ and ‘explication’, see B755–8. ‘Explanation’ connotes quid facti;
explication admits of addressing (normative, justificatory) quid iuris. Kant’s reasons for re-
jecting ‘definition’, demoting the status of ‘analytic truth’ and instead advocating ‘explica-
tion’ in philosophical inquiry are decisive: All we can know by conceptual analysis is the
intension or classificatory content of a concept, none of which can be justified as necessary
truth merely by conceptual analysis. Explication roots Kant’s justificatory fallibilism deeply
within the methodological and substantive core of KdrV.
B117 (ll. 47–51): Kant’s central issue is whether or how pure a priori concepts can ‘connect’
(beziehen) or be referred to objects. Such (possible) reference to objects is the ‘objective valid-
ity’ of these concept; to show that a priori concepts have such objective validity by demon-
strating that they can be referred in determinate, cognitively legitimate (accurate, true, justifi-
able) ways is to ‘realise’ these concepts. Kant adopted this sense of the verb ‘to realise’ from
Tetens (1775, 1777), who held that demonstrating that a concept is cognitively legitimate re-
quires indicating, picking out, deictically demonstrating at least one relevant instance of that
concept. Kant realised that this is precisely what must be shown of our pure a priori con-
cepts, the categories (B117, ll. 34–47).
B117 (ll. 45, 49): Where English has two terms, Kant uses three: ‘Object’, ‘Gegenstand ’ and
‘Ding’ (ll. 765, 785, 790, 793, 808, 884); English provides ‘object’ and ‘thing’. Kant’s terminol-
ogy is flexible and often vexing to readers, because (per his use of conceptual explication,
noted above) he often develops or glosses his terms sufficiently for a particular context of
use. He is not inconsistent, and his flexibility serves to avoid entrapment in rigidified termi-
nology, but it does require great care by his readers. In later parts of the Deduction, he con-
trasts ‘Object’ to ‘Gegenstand ’, plainly using the former to mark a concept of an object as such,
whereas the latter can be an actual particular presented to us by sensory intake. By ‘given’
Kant usually means ‘presented’ or ‘available in’; at no point does he mistake any ‘given’ for
aconceptual knowledge of any particulars.
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truth merely by concept al analysis. Expli ation roots Kant’s justificatory fallibilism deeply
within the methodological and substantive core of KdrV.
B117 (ll. 47–51): Kant’s central issue is whether or how pure a priori concepts can ‘connect’
(beziehen) or be referred to objects. Such (possible) reference to objects is the ‘objec ive valid-
ity’ of these concept; to show that a priori concepts have such objective validity by demon-
strating that they can be referred in d terminate, cognitively l gitim  (accurate, true, justifi-
able) ways is to ‘realise’ these concepts. Kant adopted this sense of the verb ‘to reali ’ from
Tetens (1775, 1777), who held that demonstrating that  concept is cognitively legitimate re-
quires indicating, picking out, deictically demonstrating at least one relev nt ins ance f that
concept. Kant realised that this is precisely w must be shown of our pure a pri ri con-
cepts, the categories (B117, ll. 34–47).
B117 (ll. 45, 49): Where English has two t ms, Kant uses three: ‘Object’, ‘Gegenstand ’ and
‘Ding’ (ll. 765, 785, 790, 793, 808, 884); English provides ‘object’ and ‘thing’. Kant’s terminol-
ogy is flexible and often vexing to rea ers, because (per his use of conc ptual explication,
noted above) he often develops or glosses his terms sufficiently for a partic lar context of
use. He is not inconsistent, and his flexibility serves to avoid entrapment in rigidified termi-
nology, but it does require reat care by his readers. In l t r parts of th  Deduc ion, he c n-
trasts ‘Object’ to ‘Gegenst nd ’, plainly using the former to mark a concept of an bject as su h,
whereas the latter can be an actua  parti ular presented to us by sensory intake. By ‘give ’
Kant usually means ‘presented’ or ‘available in’; a  no point does he mistake any ‘giv n’ for
aconceptual knowledge of any particulars.
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Wir haben jetzt schon zweierley Be-
griffe von ganz verschiedener Art, die
doch darin mit einander übereinkom-60
men, daß sie beiderseits völlig a priori
sich auf Gegenstände beziehen, nämlich
die Begriffe des Raumes und der Zeit als
Formen der Sinnlichkeit und die Catego-
rien als Begriffe des Verstandes. Von ih-65
nen eine empirische Deduction versuc-
hen wollen, würde ganz vergebliche Ar-
beit seyn, weil eben darin das Unter-
scheidende ihrer Natur liegt, daß sie sich
auf ihre Gegenstände beziehen, ohne et-70
was zu deren Vorstellung aus der Erfah-
rung entlehnt zu haben. Wenn also eine
Deduction derselben nöthig ist, so wird
sie jederzeit transscendental seyn müs-
sen. [… B119]75
Ob nun aber gleich die einzige Art ei-
ner möglichen Deduction der reinen Er-
kenntniß a priori, nämlich die auf dem
transscendentalen Wege, eingeräumet
wird, so erhellet dadurch doch eben80
nicht, daß sie so unumgänglich nothwen-
dig sey. Wir haben oben die Begriffe des
Raumes und der Zeit vermittelst einer
transscendentalen Deduction zu ihren
Quellen verfolgt und ihre objective [B120]85
Gültigkeit a priori erklärt und bestimmt.
[… B122]
Die Categorien des Verstandes dage-
gen stellen uns gar nicht die Bedingun-
gen vor, unter denen Gegenstände in der90
Anschauung gegeben werden, mithin
können uns allerdings Gegenstände er-
scheinen, ohne daß sie sich nothwendig
We have already found two quite
distinctive kinds of concepts, which
nevertheless agree insofar as both
connect fully a priori to objects,
namely, the concepts of space and of
time as forms of sensibility and the
categories as concepts of the under-
standing. To want to attempt an em-
pirical deduction of these would be
an utterly futile task, because what is
distinctive of their nature lies pre-
cisely in this, that they connect them-
selves to objects without borrowing
anything from experience. If, then, a
deduction of these concepts is neces-
sary, it must be altogether transcen-
dental. […]
Now if the sole possible kind of
deduction of pure cognitions a priori,
namely a transcendental kind, be
granted, that does not yet illuminate
whether it be so ineluctably required.
Above we have, with little difficulty,
pursued the concepts of space and of
time through a transcendental deduc-
tion to their sources and have expli-
cated and specified a priori their valid-
ity. […]
The categories of understanding,
on the other hand, do not provide us
the conditions under which objects
are given within [sensory] intuition,
hence objects could well appear to us,
though without any necessity that
B118 (ll. 58–86): Kant appeals to results of his Transcendental Aesthetic (hereafter: ‘Tr.
Aesth.’), that we have two a priori concepts, one of ‘space’, one of ‘time’, which must pertain
or ‘connect’ (sich beziehen) to any objects of which we can be aware, because we can only be
aware of objects presented to us in or through sensory intuition, which is spatio-temporal
(in at least the sense that we are only sensitive or responsive to spatio-temporal sensory
stimuli; this minimal sense is further undergirded by his transcendental idealism, but this
latter is set aside in these elucidations). This result from the Tr. Aesth. is here (for the first
time) described as their transcendental deduction. Kant claims the parallel point regarding
the categories, first identified by following out the implications of his Table of twelve formal
aspects of judging for our most basic classifications of whatever we can possibly judge, i.e.,
the categories as our most basic, general classifications. To justify a priori his key claim that
the a priori categories do pertain or connect to any particulars we can possibly experience or
judge is the task of this chapter, the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding. In contrast, their connection to our forms of sensibility, and so to particu-
lars presented to us in sensory perception, makes the Deduction of ‘space’ and of ‘time’
straightforward (cf. ll. 120–5).
B120 (l. 86): Kant often uses the term bestimmen and its cognates in the sense of specify, ra-
ther than in the sense of ‘to make to be as it is’. Both senses are also common in English,
though contemporary Anglophones too often neglect the former sense, illustrated in the
executive request, ‘Phelps, determine what became of the Higgins dossier forthwith!’.
Thinking of Kant’s aims as ‘explanatory’ rather than ‘explicatory’ (per above, B117, ll. 47–52)
re-enforces misleading causal connotations of ‘bestimmen’ as ‘make to be’; whereas Kant’s
concern is ‘specify’.
B122–3 (ll. 88–145): Kant highlights how the Deduction of the categories differs from the De-
duction of the a priori concepts of ‘space’ and of ‘time’, because any objects we can (so to
speak) encounter, or which can affect our sensibility, or which can at all be presented to our
senses, must be spatio-temporal, so that the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ must pertain to them.
(Kant quite deliberately here leaves entirely open how, in what specific ways, those concepts
may pertain to sensed particulars; see B137–8, ll. 527–38.) However, spatio-temporal objects or
appearances or phenomena, though spatio-temporal and though affecting our sensibility,
might be so confused and confusing (B123, ll. 130–45) that they would not at all afford or ex-
hibit the kinds of features or regularities required for any humanly possible thought, which
requires judgmental synthesis of sensory representations so that we can identify (classify) any
instance of any category. Such a condition may be called ‘transcendental chaos’ (KTPR §§15–
29.) I intercalate ‘[sensory]’ to qualify ‘intuition’ (l. 91) to stress that Kant is not (at all) con-
sidering anything intellectual, but intuition as sensory presentation, which he contrasts both
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auf Functionen des Verstandes beziehen
müssen, und dieser also die Bedingungen95
derselben a priori enthielte. Daher zeigt
sich hier eine Schwierigkeit, die wir im
Felde der Sinnlichkeit nicht antrafen, wie
nemlich s ub j ec t i v e  B ed ingungen
des  Denkens  sollten ob j ec t i v e 100
Gü l t i gke i t  haben, d.i. Bedingungen
der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntniß der Ge-
genstände abgeben: denn ohne Functio-
nen des Verstandes können allerdings
Erscheinungen in der Anschauung gege-105
ben werden. Ich nehme z.B. den Begriff
der Ursache, welcher eine besondere Art
der Synthesis bedeutet, da auf etwas A
was ganz Verschiedenes B nach einer
Regel gesetzt wird. Es ist a priori nicht110
klar, warum Erscheinungen etwas der-
gleichen enthalten sollten (denn Erfah-
rungen kann man nicht zum Beweise an-
führen, weil die objective Gültigkeit die-
ses Begriffs a priori muß dargethan wer-115
den können); und es ist daher a priori
zweifelhaft, ob ein solcher Begriff nicht
etwa gar leer sei und überall unter den
Erscheinungen keinen Gegenstand an-
treffe. Denn daß Gegenstände der sinnli-120
chen Anschauung den im Gemüth a pri-
ori liegenden [B123] formalen Bedingun-
gen der Sinnlichkeit gemäß seyn müssen,
ist daraus klar, weil sie sonst nicht Ge-
genstände für uns seyn würden; daß sie125
aber auch überdem den Bedingungen,
deren der Verstand zur synthetischen
Einheit des Denkens bedarf, gemäß seyn
müssen, davon ist die Schlußfolge nicht
they must connect to functions of the
understanding, which would thus
contain their conditions a priori. Thus
in this regard a difficulty arises which
we did not confront in the domain of
sensibility, namely: How subjective con-
ditions of thought are to have objective
validity, i.e. how can they furnish con-
ditions of the very possibility of all
knowledge of objects: since without
functions of the understanding ap-
pearances can of course be given
within intuition. I take, e.g., the con-
cept of cause, which signifies a partic-
ular kind of synthesis, whereby upon
some A some entirely distinct B is
posited according to a rule. It is not
clear a priori why appearances should
contain anything of the kind (for it is
useless to appeal to experience for
proof, because the objective validity
of this concept can only be proven a
priori); hence it is doubtful a priori
whether such a concept might not be
utterly empty and pertain to no ob-
ject whatsoever within appearances.
That objects of sensible intuition
must accord with those formal condi-
tions of sensibility which lie a priori
within our mentality is clear for this
reason, that otherwise they would not
be objects for us; however, that they
also must further accord with those
conditions required by the under-
standing for synthetic unity of think-
ing; insight into this inference is not
to sensation(s), and to apperceptive experience or thought (cf. below, §5); hence neither is he
considerng anything like Humean impressions of sense, nor of sense data.
A further important point very strongly suggested by Kant’s formulation of the key
problem of the Deduction is that, whatever sub-personal cognitive functions must be struc-
tured by our basic formal aspects of judging and our categories, Kant has excellent reason
to distinguish two different uses of the categories, one in guiding such sub-personal sensory
syntheses, quite another one in structuring our humanly possible explicit forms of cognitive
judgment about whatever particulars we happen to sense (see below, B134–5, ll. 456–68;
B151, ll. 943–90). Though it cannot be proven by Kant’s formulation alone, the further rele-
vant evidence (I have argued elsewhere) supports Kant’s formulation and its clear indication
that he agrees, e.g., with Dretske (1969) about the distinction between simple, non-cognitive
(‘non-epistemic’) seeing and any explicitly cognitive seeing that such-and-so is the case, or
likewise with Travis (2004) about the silence of the senses (cf. A293/B350). This view does
not (at all) invoke or entail any aconceptual ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ or mythical ‘given-
ness’, precisely because cognition requires and involves judgment, identifying and classifying
some particular(s) as exhibiting such-and-so features – exactly in accord with Evans (1975).
The textual and exegetical evidence must be carefully examined, because by design Kant
pursues (functional) issues of cognitive processes in order to identify key epistemological
issues of proper functioning and especially of possible genuine and justifiable cognitive refer-
ence to and classificatory identification of particulars. These are the two tasks of his ‘subjec-
tive’ and his ‘objective’ deductions (Axvii, cf. B393).
B122 (ll. 106–10): Kant’s illustrating the issue with the concept ‘cause’ cannot be merely con-
tingent. The concept ‘cause’ is a priori and is modally defined in ways which cannot be speci-
fied in accord with concept empiricism nor verification empiricism; Kant discusses these
points shortly (see below, re: ‘dignity’, l. 171). Kant’s issue in the Deduction expressly con-
cerns how the mere possession of a priori concepts (e.g., the categories) does not suffice to
show that these concepts have any possible valid cognitive use. Demonstrating that they can
have such use requires ‘realising’ them by showing how it is humanly possible to indicate
accurately (if approximately) any, though at least one, relevant instance (per ll. 110–20). This
is the deictic point about the cognitive (and so the epistemological) significance of indexical
or demonstrative reference Kant learnt from Tetens. (This point is neglected by ‘analytic
transcendental arguments’, which only focus upon concept possession; KTPR 28–9, KCE §14.)
B123 (ll. 125–45): Kant here makes the point already mentioned, that spatio-temporal objects
or appearances or phenomena, though spatio-temporal and though affecting our sensibility,
might be so confused and confusing that they would not at all afford or exhibit the kinds of
features or regularities required for any humanly possible thought, which requires judgmen-
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so leicht einzusehen. Denn es könnten130
wohl allenfalls Erscheinungen so be-
schaffen seyn, daß der Verstand sie den
Bedingungen seiner Einheit gar nicht ge-
mäß fände, und alles so in Verwirrung
läge, daß z.B. in der Reihenfolge der Er-135
scheinungen sich nichts darböte, was ei-
ne Regel der Synthesis an die Hand gäbe
und also dem Begriffe der Ursache und
Wirkung entspräche, so daß dieser Be-
griff also ganz leer, nichtig und ohne Be-140
deutung wäre. Erscheinungen würden
nichts destoweniger unserer Anschauung
Gegenstände darbieten, denn die An-
schauung bedarf der Functionen des
Denkens auf keine Weise.145
Gedächte man sich von der Mühsam-
keit dieser Untersuchungen dadurch los-
zuwickeln, daß man sagte: die Erfahrung
böte unablässig Beyspiele einer solchen
Regelmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen dar,150
die genugsam Anlaß geben, den Begriff
der Ursache davon abzusondern und da-
durch zugleich die objective Gültigkeit
eines solchen Begriffs zu bewähren, so
bemerkt man nicht, daß auf diese Weise155
der Begriff der Ursache gar nicht ent-
springen kann, sondern daß er entweder
völlig a priori im Verstande müsse ge-
gründet seyn, oder als ein bloßes Hirnge-
spinst gänzlich [B124] aufgegeben werden160
müsse. Denn dieser Begriff erfordert
durchaus, daß etwas A von der Art sei,
daß ein anderes B daraus nothwendig
und nach e ine r  s ch l ech th in  a l l g e -
me inen  R eg e l  folge. Erscheinungen165
so easy. For appearances could be
altogether so constituted, that the un-
derstanding would not find them at
all in accord with the conditions of
its unity, so that everything lay in
such confusion, so that, e.g., in the
series of appearances nothing pre-
sented itself which would provide a
rule of synthesis and so would corre-
spond to the concept of cause and
effect, so that this concept would
thus be entirely empty, null and insig-
nificant. Appearances would never-
theless present objects to our intu-
ition, since intuition does not at all
require the functions of thinking.
Did we think to extricate ourselves
from the difficulty of such inquiries
by saying, experience affords contin-
ual examples of such regularities
within appearances which furnish
abundant occasion for abstracting
from them the concept of cause and
thus also ratifying the objective valid-
ity of such a concept, one thus ne-
glects that in this way the concept of
cause cannot at all arise, but that it
must either be grounded fully a priori
in the understanding, or otherwise
must be utterly abandoned as a mere
chimera. For this concept absolutely
requires that something A be of such
a kind that something else B follows
from it, necessarily and according to
an altogether universal rule. Of course
appearances provide examples, which
tal synthesis of sensory representations so that we can identify (classify) any instance of any
category. Such a condition of ‘transcendental chaos’ would block the very possibility of hu-
man thought and judgment, even the bare ‘I think …’. Kant’s Deduction does imply con-
straints upon particulars which are humanly identifiable by sensory perception, yet those
constraints are not the topic of the Deduction; they are examined in the Analytic of Princi-
ples. In the Deduction Kant focuses on the barest necessary conditions for any humanly
possible thinking of any thought at all, including the bare self-referential ‘I think …’.
B123–4 (ll. 146–85): Kant characterises why and how the empiricist (Humean) alternative of
settling for customary associations or empirical generalities cannot address key issues about
logically contingent yet strictly universal empirical propositions concerning natural kinds or
(also) causal necessities, and concerning our fallible empirical knowledge of them. The first
order of Kant’s business is to identify the key a priori concepts required even to formulate
these issues and judgments, and then to demonstrate that we can use these concepts in suf-
ficiently accurate and justified cognitive judgments. Readers accustomed to Hume’s empiri-
cism find Kant’s presumption that there are such a priori concepts as the categories ‘unmoti-
vated’. The best demonstration that Kant is right about the a priori status of these concepts
is a strictly internal critique of Hume’s or also C.D. Broad’s concept empiricism; see West-
phal (1998, §4; 2013), Turnbull (1959). On the concept ‘cause’ see B240–1 and Beck (1975,
120–9), whose elucidation shows how very much Kant can state and argue, accurately, inci-
sively and so very concisely in one brief aside. 
B123–4 (ll. 146–85): Kant highlights here (and repeatedly below) what are in effect Hume’s
lessons about how empirical evidence as understood by empiricists provides no more than
customary associations which cannot at all identify or justify the kinds of modality involved
either in any causal production of an effect, or in any cognitive judgment about what is the
case regarding any such causal modality. This latter modal issue is more explicit later
(B141–2, ll. 612–21; B165–6, ll. 1190–1202). Part of Kant’s aim is to demonstrate that our key
concepts and their use are modally structured and significant in ways which cannot be re-
duced to empiricist accounts of meaning or evidence (concept empiricism or meaning em-
piricism). One surprise is that this modal significance (intension) is required even for (appar-
ently) simple affirmative judgments about what anything IS, in contrast to however it may
seem to one or another of us.
B124 (l. 171): ‘Dignity’ indicates a status or standing. Kant pays concerted attention to the
semantic content (intension) of key concepts, especially the categories, and the principles
and particular judgments (claims) we formulate, consider and often affirm, and how these
intensions are modally specified in ways which cannot be defined, identified or justified on a
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geben gar wohl Fälle an die Hand, aus
denen eine Regel möglich ist, nach der
etwas gewöhnlicher maßen geschieht, a-
ber niemals, daß der Erfolg no thwen -
d ig  s ey : daher der Synthesis der Ursac-170
he und Wirkung auch eine Dignität an-
hängt, die man gar nicht empirisch aus-
drücken kann, nämlich daß die Wirkung
nicht bloß zu der Ursache hinzu komme,
sondern du rch  dieselbe gesetzt sei und 175
au s  ihr erfolge. Die strenge Allgemein-
heit der Regel ist auch gar keine Eigen-
schaft empirischer Regeln, die durch In-
duction keine andere als comparative
Allgemeinheit, d.i. ausgebreitete Brauch-180
barkeit, bekommen können. Nun würde
sich aber der Gebrauch der reinen Ver-
standesbegriffe gänzlich ändern, wenn
man sie nur als empirische Producte be-
handeln wollte.185
§ 14. Uebergang zur transscendentalen
Deduction der Categorien. […B125]
Ist aber das zweite, weil Vorstellung an
sich selbst (denn von deren Causalität
vermittelst des Willens ist hier gar nicht190
die Rede) ihren Gegenstand dem Da-
s eyn  nach  nicht hervorbringt, so ist
doch die Vorstellung in Ansehung des
Gegenstandes alsdann a priori bestim-
mend, wenn durch sie allein es möglich195
ist, etwas a l s  e i n en  Gegens t and  zu
e rkennen . Es sind aber zwei Bedin-
gungen, unter denen allein die Erkennt-
niß eines Gegenstandes möglich ist, erst-
can afford a rule, according to which 
something usually occurs, but never 
that the consequence be necessary. 
Hence to the synthesis of cause and 
effect pertains a dignity which one 
cannot at all express empirically, 
namely that the effect not merely co-
mes after the cause, but is posited by it 
and issues from it. The strict univer-
sality of the rule, too, is not at all 
characteristic of empirical rules, 
which by induction can obtain only a 
comparative universality, i.e., an ex-
tensive usefulness. Now the use of 
the pure categories would be entirely 
altered, if one wanted to treat them 
only as empirical products.
§ 14. Transition to the Transcenden-
tal Deduction of the Categories.
[…] In the second case, because rep-
resentation in itself (since causality 
through the will is not here at issue) 
does not produce its object with re-
spect to its existence, nevertheless the 
representation in regard to its object 
is a priori determining, if through it 
alone it is possible to know something as 
object. There are however two condi-
tions under which alone the cogni-
tion of an object is possible, first intu-
ition, by which, though only as ap-
strictly empiricist basis (Hume’s theory of ideas + concept empiricism + verification empiri-
cism; En.1, §§1–7), in order to pose, address and ultimately to resolve questions about how, 
how well and with what validity or justification (quid iuris) we can use such concepts, form 
such judgments and affirm (or reject) such claims, in view of the sharp semantic and modal 
contrasts between our (apparent) empiricist ‘basis’ and the content of these claims. In KdrV 
Kant argues that we must be able to use the categories with sufficient accuracy and justifica-
tion if we are ever able even to think ‘I think …’. One key reason justifying this very strong 
thesis, which is equally anti-empiricist and anti-rationalist (and anti-Cartesian) is developed 
in the Deduction. One direct corollary of Kant’s Deduction is that we could not even col-
lect the empiricists’ preferred empirical evidence and form their preferred customary beliefs, 
unless we succeed, with sufficient if approximate accuracy and justifiedness, to identify at 
least some particulars in our surroundings, so as to distinguish them, and our perceiving 
them, as we perceive them, from ourselves as self-consciously perceiving those particulars. 
These commonsense discriminations and identifications of at least some perceptible particu-
lars all require competent, accurate use of the categories (cf. B125, ll. 205–9; B126, ll. 215–43). 
Such self-conscious self-awareness is a cognitive achievement, not a mere assumption of an 
ego-centric predicament. (The question whether Kant’s account of ‘judgments of percep-
tion’ (Prol. §29), about how something merely appears to oneself, is consistent with KdrV is 
a pseudo-issue, because even to wonder whether the sun warms a stone requires recognising 
and identifying both the sun and the stone, and the warmth of each; these identifications 
require fulfilling the transcendental conditions of the possibility of apperceptive human ex-
perience examined only within KdrV.)
3.2 §14: Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.
B125 (ll. 188–97): Kant acknowledges two unproblematic cases in which object and concept 
may correspond: if either one produces the other (see above, §2.15). Surprisingly, neither is 
relevant to Kant’s Deduction, regardless of his transcendental idealism and how often it 
suggests we do create at least the structure of objects of empirical experience and knowl-
edge. Kant’s Deduction turns instead on identifying necessary a priori conditions of thought 
and judgment, and arguing that we must satisfy these conditions if we are to be at all aware 
of ourselves as being aware of any sensed (intuited) particular(s) (apperception), as his next 
question indicates (ll. 205–9, 215–32, 247–53). Kant’s disuse of the first two models, by 
which either the object produces the representation or vice versa, is a considerable reason for 
stressing Kant’s use of the second, presuppositional sense of ‘constitution of objects’ (a-
bove, §2.15), i.e., examining the a priori conditions required to constitute objects as objects of 
human thought, perception or experience. Here Kant expressly contrasts the existence of 
objects and any knowledge we may have of them as objects (ll. 192–7, 202–4).
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lich Ans chauung , dadurch derselbe,200
aber nur als Erscheinung, gegeben wird;
zweitens B eg r i f f , dadurch ein Gegen-
stand gedacht wird, der dieser Anschau-
ung entspricht. […]
Nun frägt es sich, ob nicht auch Be-205
griffe a priori vorausgehen, als Bedingun-
gen, unter denen allein etwas, wenn
gleich nicht angeschauet, dennoch als
Gegenstand überhaupt gedacht wird;
denn alsdann ist alle empirische [B126]210
Erkenntniß der Gegenstände solchen
Begriffen nothwendiger Weise gemäß,
weil ohne deren Voraussetzung nichts
als Ob j ec t  d e r  Er f ah rung  möglich
ist. Nun enthält aber alle Erfahrung215
außer der Anschauung der Sinne, wo-
durch etwas gegeben wird, noch einen
B eg r i f f  von einem Gegenstande, der in
der Anschauung gegeben wird oder er-
scheint: demnach werden Begriffe von220
Gegenständen überhaupt als Bedingun-
gen a priori aller Erfahrungserkenntniß
zum Grunde liegen: folglich wird die
objective Gültigkeit der Categorien als
Begriffe a priori darauf beruhen, daß225
durch sie allein Erfahrung (der Form des
Denkens nach) möglich sei. Denn als-
dann beziehen sie sich nothwendiger
Weise und a priori auf Gegenstände der
Erfahrung, weil nur vermittelst ihrer230
überhaupt irgend ein Gegenstand der
Erfahrung gedacht werden kann.
Die transscendentale Deduction aller
Begriffe a priori hat also ein Principium,
worauf die ganze Nachforschung gerich-235
pearance, it is given; second concept,
by which an object is thought which
corresponds to this intuition. […]
Here arises the question, whether
any concepts a priori precede, as con-
ditions under which alone, if not now
intuited, something nevertheless is
thought as [an] object as such; since
in that case all empirical cognition of
objects necessarily accords with such
concepts, since without their presup-
position nothing is possible as [an]
object of experience. Now besides intui-
tion of the senses, by which some-
thing is given, all experience also con-
tains a concept of an object which is
given in intuition or [which] appears:
Accordingly concepts of objects as
such as conditions a priori of experi-
ential cognition underlie all such ex-
perience: consequently the objective
validity of the categories as a priori
concepts would be based on this: that
only by them would experience (ac-
cording to the form of thinking) be
possible. For in this case they neces-
sarily and a priori connect themselves
to objects of experience, because only
by their mediation can any object of
experience be at all thought.
The transcendental deduction of all
a priori concepts thus has a principle
by which the whole enquiry must be
B125 (ll. 197–204): Kant clearly and unambiguously, though briefly, recalls his key doctrine
of the two distinct, mutually integrated roles of sensory intuition and intellectual concep-
tualisation within human experience and knowledge (B75–6, 304–5), and at B126 (ll. 215–32).
B125 (ll. 206–10): Kant hints at the key to the transcendental deduction of the categories,
that their use is necessary in order for us at all to think of something we (apparently) intuit
through sensation to be some object or other, so as to be able to experience it. This point
he amplifies at B126 (ll. 215–43).
B125–6 (ll. 210–5, 220–7, 227–32): Kant formulates his key claim three times, that only by
assuming that objects of human experience conform to the categories is anything possibly
an object of our experience (cf. above, §2.15). Kant’s formulation is consistent with the
presuppositional sense of ‘constitution’ of objects, that the proper use of the categories be
necessary to constitute any particular as an object of our apperceptive experience. This read-
ing disregards Kant’s transcendental idealism, yet it may suffice for his Deduction. ‘Proper’
use is an ambitious claim, justifying which requires also the Analytic of Principles.
B126 (ll. 227–32): Kant states the key aim of the Deduction, to demonstrate that the a priori
categories are objectively valid because they alone render experience possible in regard to
the very form of thought; that only by using the categories can any object of experience be
at all thought (l. 232) as an object. This principle is Kant’s key to the entire Deduction (ll.
233–43). Sceptics and critical enquirers may already ask, why think that such thoughts must
be either accurate or justified or justifiable? These questions are crucial, but they are not
Kant’s topic in the Deduction! Although he does illustrate (§26) how and why proper use of
the categories is necessary for any humanly possible experience of any particulars, at the
very end of the Deduction; proof that those illustrations are justified is provided, by design,
in the Analytic of Principles, including the Refutation of [material] Idealism.
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Th  transcend ntal deduction of all
a priori co epts thus has a pri iple
by which the whole enquiry must be
B125 (ll. 197–204): Kant clearly and unambiguously, though briefly, recalls is key doctrine
of e two distinct, mutually integra ed roles of sensory intuiti n and intellectual concep-
tualisation within human experience and knowledge (B75–6, 304–5), an  at 126 (ll. 215–32).
B125 (ll. 206–10): Kant hints at the key to the transcendental deduction of the categories,
that their use is necessary in o der for us at ll to think o  something we (apparently) intuit
through sensation to be some object or other, so as to be able o experience it. This point
he amplifies at B126 (ll. 215–43).
B125–6 (ll. 210–5, 220–7, 227–32): Kant formulates his key claim three time , that only by
assuming that objects of human experience conform to th  categories is anything possibly
an object of our experience (cf. ab ve, §2.15). Kant’s formulation is co sistent with the
presupposition l sense of ‘const ution’ of objects, that the pr per use of the categories be
necessary to constitute any p ticular a  an object of our pperceptiv  experience. This read-
ing disregards Kant’s transcendental ideali m, yet it may suffice for his Deduction. ‘Proper’
use is an ambitious claim, justifying which requires also the Analytic of Principles.
B126 (ll. 227–32): Kant states the key aim of the Deduction, to demonstrate that the a priori
categories are objectively valid because they alone render experience possible in regard to
the very form of thoug t; that only by using the categories can any objec  of experience be
at all thought (l. 232) as an object. This principle is Kant’s key to the entire Deduction (ll.
233–43). Sceptics and critical enquirers may already ask, why think that such thoughts must
be either accurate or justified or justifiable? These questions ar  crucial, but hey are not
Kant’s topic in the Deduction! Although he oes illustrate (§26) how and why proper use of
the categories is necessary for any humanly possible experience of any particulars, at the
very end of the Deduction; pro at those illustrations are justified i  provided, by design,
in the Analytic of Principles, includ ng the Refutatio  of [material] Idealism.
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tet werden muß, nämlich dieses: daß sie
als Bedingungen a priori der Möglichkeit
der Erfahrung erkannt werden müssen
(es sei der Anschauung, die in ihr ange-
troffen wird, oder des Denkens). Begrif-240
fe, die den objectiven Grund der Mög-
lichkeit der Erfahrung abgeben, sind e-
ben darum nothwendig. Die Entwicke-
lung der Erfahrung aber, worin sie ange-
troffen werden, ist nicht ihre Deduction245
(sondern Illustration), weil sie dabei
doch nur zufällig seyn würden. Ohne
diese ursprüngliche Beziehung [B127] auf
mögliche Erfahrung, in welcher alle Ge-
genstände der Erkenntniß vorkommen,250
würde die Beziehung derselben auf ir-
gend ein Object gar nicht begriffen wer-
den können. [… B128]
Vorher will ich nur noch die Erklä-
rung der Categorien voranschicken. Sie255
sind Begriffe von einem Gegenstande ü-
berhaupt, dadurch dessen Anschauung
in Ansehung einer der logischen Func-
tionen zu Urtheilen als bestimmt angese-
hen wird. So war die Function des cate-260
gorischen Urtheils die des Verhältnißes
des Subjects zum Prädicat, z. B. alle
Körper sind theilbar. Allein in Ansehung
des bloß logischen Gebrauchs des Ver-
standes blieb es unbestimmt, welchem265
von beyden Begriffen [B129] die Function
des Subjects, und welchem die des Prädi-
cats man geben wolle. Denn man kann
auch sagen: Einiges Theilbare ist ein
Körper. Durch die Categorie der Sub-270
stanz aber, wenn ich den Begriff eines
guided, namely this: that they must be
recognised to be a priori conditions of
the possibility of experience (whether
of intuition, in which they are met, or
of thinking). Concepts which afford
the objective ground of the possibil-
ity of experience are for that very rea-
son necessary. However, unravelling -
the experience in which they found is
not their deduction (that is rather
their illustration), since in that way
they would yet remain merely contin-
gent. Without this original connec-
tion to possible experience, in which
occur all objects of cognition, their
connection to any object whatsoever
could not at all be comprehended. […]
Consider first the explication of the
categories. They are concepts of an
object as such, by which its intuition
in respect of one or more of the logi-
cal functions of judgment is regarded
as determinate. Thus the function of
the categorical judgment is that of the
relation of subject to predicate, e.g.,
all bodies are divisible. However in
regard to the mere logical use of the
understanding it remains unspecified,
to which of the two concepts one
may assign the function of the sub-
ject, and to which that of the predi-
cate. For one can also say: Some
divisibles are bodies. However, by the
category of substance, if I subsume
under it the concept of a body, it is
Kant’s pronoun, ihr (l. 239) is not plural, but feminie singular dative: ‘her’; it refers back to
conditions found within sensory intuition (Anschauung, fem.).
B126 (ll. 240–7): Kant contrasts the Deduction to any examination of experiences within
which any category may be instantiated; this stresses yet again the distinctive modality of the
claims at issue in the Deduction, in contrast to the ineluctable contingencies involved in any
illustrative instances. To this contrast belongs Kant’s concern about the ‘dignity’ or (modal
and justificatory) status of the concept ‘cause’ (B124, l. 171).
B126–7 (ll. 247–53): Kant’s stress upon the possible ‘connection’ (Beziehung) of a priori cate-
gories to objects, where these must be (if indeed there be any for us human beings) objects
of experience, underscores his concern with using concepts in connection with, i.e., in deic-
tic reference to, objects we can perceive. This is Tetens’s point about ‘realising’ concepts,
and Kant’s point about ‘objective reality’ and ‘objective validity’, both of which concern
possible reference to actual particulars which we can locate, discriminate, identify and ex-
perience.
B128 (ll. 254–60): Kant explicates the categories: They are each concepts of an object as
such, by which any intuited object (any sensed particular) can be determined (specified) in
regard to one or another of the formal aspects of logical functions of judgment. On Kant’s
Table of logical functions of judgment see Wolff (2017).
B128–9 (ll. 260–77): Kant remarks on how, in a categorical judgment, which concept is used
as the subject term and which as the predicate can be indifferent, or they can be converted,
per Aristotle’s Square of Oppositions. Here Kant shrewdly exploits the existential presuppo-
sitions of Aristotelian syllogistic for epistemological insight, noting that the mere logical
inter-convertibility of subject and predicate terms is abandoned by judging any sensed ob-
ject to be a substance exhibiting some feature (now ascribed to, or predicated of it, by the
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Körpers darunter bringe, wird es be-
stimmt: daß seine empirische Anschau-
ung in der Erfahrung immer nur als Sub-
ject, niemals als bloßes Prädicat betrach-275
tet werden müsse; und so in allen übri-
gen Categorien.
Zweiter Abschnitt. Transscendentale
Deduction der reinen Verstandesbe-
griffe.280
§ 15. Von der Möglichkeit einer Ver-
bindung überhaupt.
Das Mannigfaltige der Vorstellungen
kann in einer Anschauung gegeben wer-
den, die bloß sinnlich, d.i. nichts als285
Empfänglichkeit ist, und die Form dieser
Anschauung kann a priori in unserem
Vorstellungsvermögen liegen, ohne doch
etwas andres als die Art zu seyn, wie das
Subject afficirt wird. Allein die Ve rb in -290
dun g  (conjunctio) eines Mannigfaltigen
überhaupt kann niemals durch Sinne in
uns kommen und kann also auch nicht
in der reinen Form der sinnlichen An-
schauung zugleich [B130] mit enthalten295
seyn; denn sie ist ein Actus der Sponta-
neität der Vorstellungskraft, und da man
diese zum Unterschiede von der Sinn-
lichkeit Verstand nennen muß, so ist alle
Verbindung, wir mögen uns ihrer be-300
wußt werden oder nicht, es mag eine
Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen der An-
schauung oder mancherley Begriffe, und
an der ersteren der sinnlichen oder
nichtsinnlichen Anschauung seyn, eine305
Verstandeshandlung, die wir mit der all-
specified: that its empirical intuition
in experience must always be regard-
ed only as subject, never as a mere
predicate; and likewise in all other
categories.
Second Section.  Transcendental  De-
duction of the Pure Concepts of
the Understanding.
§ 15. Of the Possibility of a Combi-
nation as such.
The manifold of representations
can be given in an intuition which is
merely sensuous, i.e., nothing but re-
ceptivity, and the form of this intu-
ition can lie a priori in our capacity of
representing, without however being
anything other than how the subject
is affected. Yet the combination (con-
junctio) of this manifold as such can
never enter us by the senses and so
also as such cannot be contained
within the pure form of sensory intu-
ition; for it is an actus of spontaneity
of the capacity to represent and, in
contradistinction to sensibility, one
must call this understanding; it thus
follows that all combination – whe-
ther we are conscious of it or not, be
it a combination of the manifold in
intuition or in several concepts, and
in the former case be it a sensory or a
non-sensory intuition – is an act of
the understanding to which we would
give the general appellation of synthe-
30 
3.3 §15: Of the Possibility of a Combination as such.
§15 begins Kant’s Second Section (Abschnitt), titled ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Pure
Concepts of the Understanding’. Yet eleven more §§ continue to prepare for §26: ‘Transcen-
dental deduction of the universally possible experiential use of the pure concepts of the un-
derstanding’; in §21 Kant remarks that a start has been made on the Deduction (B144, ll.
703–6), i.e., in the first part of that very Remark (i.e., §21). §§15–21, at least, are expressly
preparatory.
B129 (l. 283): Kant’s term ‘manifold’ simply designates some (unspecified) plurality or vari-
ety; which kind is specified by context. Here it is a plurality of representations within sen-
sory intuition. (Below Kant comments on a manifold of representations which are concepts 
integrated within some candidate judgment; B129, ll. 299–303). Here (ll. 285–6) Kant stresses 
that mere sensibility is merely receptive (i.e., receptive to sensory stimulations resulting in 
sensations).
B129 (ll. 283–90): Kant’s term ‘representation’ (Vorstellung), especially when used in sensory 
or perceptual contexts, must be handled carefully. Within philosophy of perception, the 
sense of Kant’s term often would better be conveyed by ‘presentation’ than by ‘representa-
tion’, which to Anglophone readers readily suggests an indirect theory of perception. Kant 
holds a direct critical (rather than naïve) realism about sensory perception. This is one 
consequence of not mistaking sensations for objects of self-conscious awareness, but in-
stead treating sensations as sub-personal factors in sensory awareness of other particulars 
(whether in one’s surroundings or within one’s own body). This view is common to Reid, 
Tetens, Roy Wood Sellars, Chisholm, Wilfrid Sellars and (e.g.) Dretske. Bird rightly emphasi-
ses Kant’s espousing this view; cf. below, §5. (Kant’s direct perceptual realism holds both 
within his own ‘empirical realism’, and also if his transcendental idealism be rejected.)
B129 (ll. 283–317): Kant sharply contrasts the passivity and manifold character or content of 
sensory intuition to the spontaneity (activity) and discriminating, integrating, synthetic con-
joining or binding (Verbinden) effected by intellect. His remarks carve through a host of intri-
cate issues and options which require and receive more extensive treatment throughout the 
Transcendental Analytic. Kant’s key points stand independently of issues about sensory at-
omism, though Kant rightly raises issues about what are now called the ‘binding problems’ 
in perception, concerning how sensory intake can be integrated at any one time within any 
one sensory modality, and again synchronically across sensory modalities; and likewise how 
it can be integrated over time within any one sensory modality, and again diachronically ac-
ross sensory modalities. However those issues are resolved, Kant’s key point pertains to in-
formation extraction, how sensory information can be, to speak with Dretske, decoded so
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gemeinen Benennung Syn thes i s  bele-
gen würden, um dadurch zugleich be-
merklich zu machen, daß wir uns nichts
als im Object verbunden vorstellen kön-310
nen, ohne es vorher selbst verbunden zu
haben, und unter allen Vorstellungen die
Verbindung die einzige ist, die nicht
durch Objecte gegeben, sondern nur
vom Subjecte selbst verrichtet werden315
kann, weil sie ein Actus seiner Selbst-
thätigkeit ist. Man wird hier leicht ge-
wahr, daß diese Handlung ursprünglich
einig und für alle Verbindung gleichgel-
tend seyn müsse, und daß die Auflösung, 320
A n a l y s i s , die ihr Gegentheil zu seyn
scheint, sie doch jederzeit voraussetze;
denn wo der Verstand vorher nichts ver-
bunden hat, da kann er auch nichts auf-
lösen, weil es nur du r ch  i hn  als ver-325
bunden der Vorstellungskraft hat gege-
ben werden können.
Aber der Begriff der Verbindung
führt außer dem Begriffe des Mannigfal-
tigen und der Synthesis desselben noch330
den der Einheit desselben bey sich. Ver-
bindung ist Vorstellung der s yn the t i -
s chen  Einheit des Mannigfaltigen.*[B131]
* Ob die Vorstellungen selbst identisch
sind, und also eine durch die andere ana-335
lytisch könne gedacht werden, das
kommt hier nicht in Betrachtung. Das
Bewußtseyn der einen ist, so fern vom
Mannigfaltigen die Rede ist, vom Be-
wußtseyn der anderen doch immer zu340
unterscheiden, und auf die Synthesis die-
ses (möglichen) Bewußtseyns kommt es
sis, so as to mark expressly, that we
cannot represent anything as bound
together within an object, which we
have not first ourselves bound to-
gether, and among all representations
combination is uniquely that which
cannot be given by objects, but rather
is effected only by the subject itself,
because it is an actus of its own self-
activity. Here it is readily understood
that this action must originally be
strictly one and is equally valid for all
combination, and that the resolution,
analysis, which seems to be its oppo-
site, nevertheless always presupposes
it; for where understanding has not
already conjoined, there it cannot at
all disjoin, inasmuch as only through it
can anything as combined be offered
to our power of representing.
However, the concept of combina-
tion carries with it, besides the con-
cept of the manifold and of its
synthesis, also the concept of their
unity. Combination is representation
of the synthetic unity of a manifold.*
* Whether the representations are
themselves identical, so that the one
through the other can be thought
analytically, is not pertinent here. In-
sofar as the topic here is the mani-
fold, consciousness of the one is of
course always to be distinguished
from consciousness of the other, and
the sole concern here is the synthesis
that we are able to sense our surroundings (or also our proprioception), and yet again, how
information can be extracted from and exploited in express judgments, beliefs or claims
about what we perceive in our surroundings (or also within our own bodies). Here especially
Kant’s discernment of these issues about processes of sensory integration (quid facti) pose
important issues of how our sensory-perceptual systems function, which pose yet more im-
portant epistemological issues (quid iuris) of how our judgmental capacities can accurately
and justifiedly exploit information extracted from sufficiently reliable and accurate sensory
perception. Most importantly, Kant soon stresses (B131n., ll. 334–49) that for us to think
anything whatsoever about any sensed particular at all requires discerning, differentiating,
identifying and integrated some plurality of its features so as to form any, even candidate
cognitive judgment about that particular. This intellectual, judgmental achievement, whatever
concepts (classifications) it invokes, involves both analysis and synthesis; it holds independ-
ently of questions about whether or how such ‘unity’ amongst diverse aspects or features of
things may (not) ‘enter’ our cognizance via our sensory channels.
B130 (ll. 290–317): Kant stresses his key point, that any and all connecting (Verbindung) as
such is a spontaneous act of our capacity to represent, an act of intellection, regardless of
whether (i) we are conscious of the connecting or not, (ii) the connected manifold be intu-
itive (sensory) or may be a plurality of concepts, (iii) whether a form of intuition is sensory
or non-sensory. Human intuiting is sensory; Kant sets aside the last option, but each of the
others is central to KdrV, and especially: whether we are conscious of various factors re-
quired of, or involved in our cognisance is IRrelevant: ‘transparency of consciousness’ is a
Cartesian myth, followed faithfully by Hume, which by-passes Kant’s key issue: How are we
at all able to achieve self-conscious awareness? Kant’s KdrV is guided by this insight: ‘Now
it is indeed very enlightening, that whatever I must presuppose in order at all to know any
object, cannot itself be known as object […]’ (A402).
B130 (ll. 306–33): Kant approaches more closely his ultimate point by stressing that knowing
any object requires recognising that within it various features or aspects are integrated, but
our representing any such integration of a plurality of features within any one particular re-
quires that we differentiate those features and re-integrate them so as to ascribe them all to
that particular insofar as we recognise these features to be integral to it. Any particular is an
actual synthetic unity of manifold features; both sensory perception, and also knowing or re-
cognising that particular, require actually integrating (synthesising) at least some of its sev-
eral features. That ‘we’ actively integrate sensory intake does not entail that we do so self-
consciously; sensory integration is active, yet entirely sub-personal; express cognitive judg-
ment is self-conscious, but may involve or require many further implicit features or aspects
of judging. Kant here stresses the spontaneous act of judgmental synthesis or integration of
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gemeinen Benennung Syn thes i s  bele-
gen würden, um dadurch zugleich be-
merklich zu machen, daß wir uns nichts
als im Object verbunden vorstellen kön-310
nen, ohne es vorher selbst verbunden zu
haben, und unter allen Vorstellungen die
Verbindung die einzige st, die nicht
durch Objecte gegeben, sondern nur
vom Subjecte selbst verrichtet w rd n315
kann, weil sie ein Actus seiner S lbst-
thätigkeit ist. Man wird hier leicht ge-
wahr, daß diese Handlung ursprünglich
einig und für alle Verbindung gleichg l-
tend seyn müsse, und daß die Auflösung, 320
A n a l y s i s , die ihr Gegenthe l zu seyn
scheint, sie doch jederz t voraussetze;
denn wo der Verstand vorher nichts ver-
bunden hat, da kann er auch nichts auf-
lösen, weil es nur du r ch  i hn  al ve -325
bunden der Vorstellungskraft hat gege-
ben werden können.
Aber der Begriff der Verbindun
führt außer dem Begriffe des Mannigfal-
tigen und der Synthes s desselben noch330
den der Einheit desselben bey sic . Ver-
bindung ist Vorstellung er s yn the t i -
s chen  Einheit des Mannigfaltigen.*[B131]
* Ob die Vorstellungen selbst identisch
sind, und also eine durch die andere a a-335
lytisch könne gedacht werde , das
kommt hier nicht in Betrachtung. Das
Bewußtseyn der einen ist, so fern vom
Mannigfaltigen die Rede ist, vom Be-
wußtseyn der anderen doch immer zu340
unterscheiden, und auf die Synthesis die-
ses (möglichen) Bewußtseyns kommt es
sis, so as to mark expres ly, that we
cannot represent anything as bound
together with n an object, which we
have not first ourselves bound to-
gether, and among all r presentations
combination is uniquely that which
canno  be given by objects, but rather
is effected only by the subject itself,
b cause it is an actus of its own elf-
activity. Here it is readily understood
that this action must originally be
strictly one a d is equally valid for all
combination, and that the resolution,
analys s, which seems to be its oppo-
sit , nevertheless always presuppos
it; for where understanding has not
already conjoin d, there it cannot at
all disjoin, inasmuch as only through it
can anything as combined be offered
to our power of representing.
However, the concept of combina-
tion carries with it, besides th  con-
cept of the manifold and of its
sy thesis, also the concept of their
unity. Combinat on is representation
of the synthetic unity of a manifold.*
* Whether the representations ar
themselves identical, so that the one
t rough the other can be thought
analytically, is not pertinent here. In-
sofar as the topic here is the mani-
fold, consciousn ss of the e is of
course always to be di tinguished
from consciousn ss o  the other, and
the sole c ncern here is the synthesis
that we are able to sense our surrounding  (or also ou  proprioception), and yet again, how
information can be extracted from and exploited in express judgments, beliefs or clai s
about what we perceive in our surroundings (or also within our own bodies). Here especially
Kant’s discernment of these is u s about proc sses of ens ry integration (quid facti) pose
important issues of how our sensory-perceptual syst ms function, which pose yet m re im-
portant epistemological issues (quid iuris) of how our ju gmental capacities can accurately
and justifiedly exploit i formation extracted from sufficien ly reliable and ac ura e sensory
perception. Most importantly, Kant soon stresses (B131n., ll. 334–49) that for us to think
anything whatsoever about any sensed particular t all requires discerning, differentiating,
identifying and integrated some plurality of its features so as t  form ny, even candidate
cognitive judgment about that particular. This intellectual, judgmental achievement, whatever
concepts (classifications) it invokes, involves bo h analysis and synthesis; it holds i epend-
ently of questions about whether or how such ‘unity’ amongst diverse aspects or features of
things may (not) ‘enter’ our cognizance via our sens ry channels.
B130 (ll. 290–317): Kant stresses his key poi t, hat any and all connecting (Verbindung) as
such is a spontaneous a t of our cap city to represent, an t of intellection reg rdless of
whether (i) we are conscious of the connecting or not, (ii) the con ected manifold be i tu-
itive (sensory) or may be a pluralit  of concepts, (iii) whether a form of ntuition is sensory
or non-sensory. Human i tuiting is sensory; Ka t sets asid  the last op ion, but ac  of the
others is central to KdrV, and especially: whether we ar  conscious of various factors re-
quired of, or involved in our cognisance is IRrelevant: ‘transparency of consciousness’ is a
Cartesian myth, followed faithfully by Hume, which by-passes Kant’s key issue: How are we
at all able to achieve self-conscious awareness? Kant’s KdrV is guided by his insight: ‘Now
it is indeed very enligh ening, that whatever I must presuppose in order at all to know any
object, cannot itself be known s object […]’ (A402).
B130 (ll. 306–33): Kant approaches more closely his ultimate point by stressing that knowing
any object requires recognising hat within it various features or aspects are integrated, but
our representing any such int gratio  of a plurality of features within any on  pa ticular re-
quires that we differentiate those features a d re-integrat  them so as to asc ib   all to
that particular insofar as we recognise these features t  be in egral to it. Any part cula  is an
actual synthetic unity of m nifold feat res; both sensory perception, and also knowing or re-
cognising that particular, require ac ually integrating (synthesising) at least some of its sev-
eral features. That ‘we’ ctively integrate sensory intake does not entail th t we do s  s lf-
consciously; sensory integration is active, yet ntirely sub-personal; xp ss cognitive judg-
ment is self-conscious, but may inv lve r req ire many further implicit fe tures or aspects
of judging. Kant here stresses the spontan ous act of judgmental synthesis or integra ion of
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hier allein an.
Die Vorstellung dieser Einheit kann
also nicht aus der Verbindung entstehen,345
sie macht vielmehr dadurch, daß sie zur
Vorstellung des Mannigfaltigen hinzu-
kommt, den Begriff der Verbindung al-
lererst möglich. Diese Einheit, die a prio-
ri vor allen Begriffen der Verbindung350
vorhergeht, ist nicht etwa jene Categorie
der Einheit (§ 10); denn alle Categorien
gründen sich auf logische Functionen in
Urtheilen, in diesen aber ist schon Ver-
bindung, mithin Einheit gegebener Be-355
griffe gedacht. Die Categorie setzt also
schon Verbindung voraus. Also müssen
wir diese Einheit (als qualitative, § 12)
noch höher suchen, nämlich in demjeni-
gen, was selbst den Grund der Einheit360
verschiedener Begriffe in Urtheilen, mit-
hin der Möglichkeit des Verstandes so-
gar in seinem logischen Gebrauche ent-
hält.
365 § 16. Von der ursprünglich-syntheti-
schen Einheit der Apperception.
Das: I ch  denke , muß alle meine
Vorstellungen begleiten [B132] können;
denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorge-
stellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht wer-370
den könnte, welches eben so viel heißt,
als die Vorstellung würde entweder un-
möglich, oder wenigstens für mich
nichts seyn. Diejenige Vorstellung, die
of this (possible) consciousness.
The representation of this unity can
thus not arise from conjunction; ra-
ther, by coming to the representation
of the manifold, [this unity] first
makes possible the concept of com-
bination. This unity, which precedes
a priori all concepts of combination, is
not as it were that category of unity
(§ 10); since all categories are ground-
ed upon logical functions of judging,
yet in these is already thought: con-
junction, hence unity of given con-
cepts. Thus the category already pre-
suppose conjunction. Thus we must
seek this unity (as qualitative, § 12)
still further up, namely, in whatever is
the ground of the unity of diverse
concepts within judgments, or in
whatever contains the possibility of -
the understanding in its logical use.
§ 16. Of the Original-Synthetic Unity
of Apperception.
The I think must be able to accom-
pany all my representations; for oth-
erwise something would be repre-
sented in me which could not be at
all thought; which would mean that
the representation itself would either
be impossible or else be nothing for
me. That representation which can be
conceived (classified) features of any one object judged (ll. 299–17). Such spontaneous judg-
mental integration holds for any and all forms of judging, and whatever concepts are inte-
grated within a judgment (ll. 317–20).
B131n. (ll. 334–43): Kant’s footnote (*) rightly stresses that the relevant syntheses concern 
our own judgments, whether these concern specifications, marks or Merkmale within any 
one concept (intension), or aspects of any one particular, including those which can only be 
distinguished by reason because there is no real distinction between them (e.g., colour and 
extension), or various relations between any plurality of particulars. Each of the relevant 
aspects must be differentiated, identified and integrated within some judgment, so as to as-
cribe those characteristics or relations to relevant concepts or to relevant particulars. This 
key point about judgmental differentiation, integration and attribution (ascription) is one key 
reason why Kant’s transcendental deduction can succeed, independently of his transcenden-
tal idealism, by justifying the presuppositional sense of ‘constitution of objects’ as constitut-
ing objects as objects of our self-conscious awareness (above, §2.15).
B131 (ll. 344–64): As Wolff (2017) notes, cognitive judgments are complex; they integrate 
several judgments and several functions of judgment in discriminating whatever particular(s) 
we do so as to identify it (or them) and its (or their) features. Any category used in a judg-
ment integrates at least those features indicated by (at least) two concepts, but categories are 
used and logical functions of judging are exercised in complex combinations which we do 
integrate. This most fundamental integration, conjunction or ‘synthesis’ makes possible the 
use of any one and of any plurality of categories, and of any plurality of logical functions of 
judging. To be effective at all, these complex syntheses must be possible for us, but they are 
not made by possible by any one category, nor by several categories severally (individually). 
There must be a more comprehensive, fundamental form of synthesis to effect cognitive 
judgment at all; this is Kant’s quarry, first expressly identified in §16.
3.4 §16: Of the Original-Synthetic Unity of Apperception.
B131–2 (ll. 367–74): Kant’s key thesis about the ‘I think’ is expressly modal; the self-reflexive 
thought, ‘I think …’, can accompany any representations of which any one of us can be self-
aware. Kant again acknowledges that many representations may occur within one’s (so to 
speak) mentality without ever being connected with self-conscious apperception, or without 
possibly being so connected. E.g., Kant follows Tetens (1777, 1:306, 338, 375–6) and Reid 
(1765, Ch. 6, §§8, 20–22; cf. below, §5) by holding that typically visual sensations themselves 
are rarely if ever objects of our self-conscious (apperceptive) awareness. Rather, typically, sen-
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3.4 §16: Of the Original-Synthetic Unity of Appercep ion.
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aware. Kant again acknowledges hat many representations ay occur within one’s (so to 
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vor allem Denken gegeben seyn kann,375
heißt Ans chauung . Also hat alles
Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine
nothwendige Beziehung auf das: Ich
denke, in demselben Subject, darin die-
ses Mannigfaltige angetroffen wird. Die-380
se Vorstellung aber ist ein Actus der
Spontaneität, d. i. sie kann nicht als zur
Sinnlichkeit gehörig angesehen werden.
Ich nenne sie die r e in e  Apper czep -
t i on , um sie von der empirischen zu385
unterscheiden, oder auch die u r -
s p r üng l i che  Apper cep t ion , weil
sie dasjenige Selbstbewußtseyn ist, was,
indem es die Vorstellung Ich denke her-
vorbringt, die alle andere muß begleiten390
können, und in allem Bewußtseyn ein
und dasselbe ist, von keiner weiter be-
gleitet werden kann. Ich nenne auch die
Einheit derselben die t r an s s c e nden -
t a l e  Einheit des Selbstbewußtseyns, um395
die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis a priori
aus ihr zu bezeichnen. Denn die man-
nigfaltigen Vorstellungen, die in einer
gewißen Anschauung gegeben werden,
würden nicht insgesamt meine Vorstel-400
lungen seyn, wenn sie nicht insgesamt zu
einem Selbstbewußtseyn gehöreten, d. i.
als meine Vorstellungen (ob ich mich ih-
rer gleich nicht als solcher bewußt bin)
müssen sie doch der Bedingung notwen-405
dig gemäß seyn, unter der sie allein in ei-
nem allgemeinen Selbstbewußtseyn zu-
sammenstehen können, [B133] weil sie
sonst nicht durchgängig mir angehören
würden. Aus dieser ursprünglichen Ver-410
given prior to all thought, is called
intuition. Thus all the manifold of in-
tuition has a necessary connection to
the: I think of that same subject in
which this manifold is found. This
representation is however an act of
spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be regarded
as belonging to sensibility. I call this
the pure apperception, to distinguish it
from the empirical; it may also be
called the original apperception, inas-
much as it is that self-consciousness
which, since it produces the represen-
tation I think, which must be able to
accompany all others, and which in
all consciousness is one and the
same, cannot be accompanied by any
further representation. I also call the
unity within it the transcendental unity
of self-consciousness, to indicate the
possibility it affords of cognition a
priori. For the manifold representa-
tions which are given in any one intu-
ition would not be collectively my
representations, if they did not collec-
tively belong to one single self-con-
sciousness, i.e., as my representations
(even if I am not presently aware of
them as such), hence necessarily they
must accord with the condition under
which alone they can stand together
in one universal self-consciousness,
because otherwise they would not all
belong to me. From this original con-
junction much can be inferred.
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ticular, whether a particular in one’s surroundings or a particular condition of one’s own
body. This contrast between sub-personal sensory and perceptual states (and whatever pro-
cessing such sensory intake requires) and any self-conscious awareness of our surroundings
or our own internal states Kant marks by distinguishing (as did Leibniz) between ‘percep-
tion’ and ‘apperception’. Hence Kant’s readiness to acknowledge that various representa-
tional states may occur within ‘me’ of which ‘I’ am unaware (ll. 367–71).
Kant uses the ordinary German term Gemüt to render into German the Latin term ani-
mus, familiar from the Latin title to Aristotle’s de Anima, pertaining to whatever makes a liv-
ing being alive and active. English provides us only ‘mind’ and ‘body’, obscuring utterly
Kant’s concern with human embodiment and whatever animates us = our human Gemüt.
Kant uses this term to avoid taking a stand on Cartesian dualism of mens and corpora – a dual-
ism of mind and body Descartes advocates in the Meditations and Principles, though otherwise
advocating a much more nuanced view (Ferrini 2015).
B132 (ll. 376–80): Kant states that any and all intuitive manifold(s) are necessarily connected
to the ‘I think’. That they are connected necessarily does not entail they are connected directly
by self-conscious introspection! Kant’s statement neither invokes nor endorses Cartesian
self-transparency, nor any form of intellectual intuition.
B132 (ll. 376–93): Having stressed the spontaneous act of discerning, differentiating and inte-
grating various factors (‘cognitions’, whether concepts, sensed features or identified, local-
ised sensed particulars) in (candidate) cognitive judgments (§§15–17), and that this most
fundamental synthetic conjoining is more fundamental than any specific combination (syn-
thesis) by using any one category to classify, or any one judgment to integrate, categorial
classifications in any one instance (§§15–17), Kant now contends that this most fundamen-
tal active, synthetic integrating is expressed (if incompletely) by the apperceptive, self-refer-
ential ‘I think …’, which of course requires its complement content(s).
B132 (ll. 378–411): The ‘original’ apperception expressed by the ‘I think …’ is unitary, inso-
far as one and the same active self-conscious subject thinks each and every one of its vari-
ous thoughts, including those thoughts about whatever it may apperceptively experience.
The unity of this ‘I think’ Kant calls the ‘transcendental unity of self-consciousness’ because
from it can be deduced further knowledge a priori. This matches his initial gloss on ‘transcen-
dental’ (Tr. Aesth. §3, B40), namely: ‘the explication of a concept as a principle which af-
fords the possibility of other synthetic cognitions a priori. This aim requires (1) that such
cognitions actually flow from the given concept, (2) that these cognitions are only possible
under the presupposition of a specific, given explication of this concept’.
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cessing su h sensory intake req ire ) and any self-conscious aw reness of our s rroundi g
or our own internal states Kant marks by distinguishing (as did Leibniz) between ‘percep-
tion’ and ‘apperception’. He ce Kant’s readiness to acknowledge that various representa-
tional states may occur within ‘me’ of whi h ‘I’ am unaware (ll. 367–71).
Kant uses the ordinary German erm Gemüt to render into rman th  Latin erm ani-
mus, familiar from the Latin title to Aristotl ’s de Anima, pertaining to whatever makes a liv-
ing being alive and active. English provides us only ‘mind’ and ‘body’, obscuring utterly
Kant’s concern with human embodiment and whatever anima es us = our human Gemüt.
Kant uses this term to avoid taking a stand n Cartesia  dualism of mens and corpora – a dual-
ism of mind and body Descartes advocates in the Medit tions nd Principles, though otherwise
advocating a much more nuanced view (Ferrini 2015).
B132 (ll. 376–80): Kant states that any and all intuitive m ifold(s) are necessarily c nnected
to the ‘I think’. That they are con ected necessarily does ot ntail they are connected directly
by self-co scious introspection! Kant’ statemen  neither invokes nor e dorses Cart sia
self-transparency, nor any form of i tellectual intuition.
B132 (ll. 376–93): Having stressed the sponta eous act of discerning, differentiating and inte-
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ised sensed particulars) in (candidate) cognitive judgmen s (§§15–17), and tha  this most
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thesis) by using any on  category to classify, or any one judgment to i tegrate, categorial
classifications in any one instance (§§15–17), Ka t now contends that this most fundamen-
tal active, synthetic integr ting is expr ssed (if incompletely) by the apperceptive, self-refer-
ential ‘I think …’, which of course requires ts c mplem nt conten (s).
B132 (ll. 378–411): The ‘original’ apperception expressed by the ‘I think …’ is unitary, inso-
far as one and the same active self-conscious subject thinks each and every one of its v ri-
ous thoughts, including those t oughts about whatever it may appercepti ly experience.
The unity of this ‘I think’ Kant calls the ‘transcendental unity of self-consciousness’ because
from it can be deduced further knowledge a priori. This matches his init al gloss on ‘transce -
dental’ (Tr. Aesth. §3, B40), namely: ‘ e explicatio  of a concept as a principle which af-
fords the possibility of other synthetic cognitions a priori. This aim requires (1) that such
cognitions actually flow from the given concept, (2) that these cognitions are only possible
under the presuppositio  of a specific, given explic tion o  this conce t’.
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bindung läßt sich vieles folgern.
Nemlich diese durchgängige Identität
der Apperception eines in der Anschau-
ung gegebenen Mannigfaltigen, enthält
eine Synthesis der Vorstellungen, und ist415
nur durch das Bewußtseyn dieser Syn-
thesis möglich. Denn das empirische Be-
wußtseyn, welches verschiedene Vorstel-
lungen begleitet, ist an sich zerstreut und
ohne Beziehung auf die Identität des420
Subjects. Diese Beziehung geschieht also
dadurch noch nicht, daß ich jede Vor-
stellung mit Bewußtseyn begleite, son-
dern daß ich eine zu der andern h in -
zu se t ze  und mir der Synthesis dersel-425
ben bewußt bin. Also nur dadurch, daß
ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegebener Vor-
stellungen i n  e in em B ewußs t s eyn
verbinden kann, ist es möglich, daß ich
mir die I den t i t ä t  d e s  B ewußt s eyn s 430
in  d i e s en  Vor s t e l l ungen  selbst vo-
rstelle, d.i. die ana l y t i s che  Einheit der
Apperception ist nur unter der Voraus-
setzung irgend einer s yn the t i s chen
möglich. [B134]435
Der Gedanke: diese in der Anschau-
ung gegebene Vorstellungen gehören mir
insgesamt zu, heißt demnach so viel, als
ich vereinige sie in einem Selbstbewußt-
seyn, oder kann sie wenigstens darin ve-440
rinigen, und ob er gleich selbst noch
nicht das Bewußtseyn der Syn thes i s
der Vorstellungen ist, so setzt er doch
die Möglichkeit der letzteren voraus, d.i.
nur dadurch, daß ich das Mannigfaltige445
derselben in einem Bewußtseyn begrei-
This is to say, this thorough-going
identity of apperception of that mani-
fold given in [an] intuition contains a
synthesis of representations and is
only possible through the conscious-
ness of this synthesis. For the empiri-
cal consciousness which accompanies
various representations is as such dis-
persed and without connection to the
identity of the subject. This connec-
tion is not effected merely by my ac-
companying each representation with
consciousness, but rather that I com-
bine one to the others and am con-
scious of their synthesis. Thus only
because I can comprehend the mani-
fold of given representations in one
consciousness is it possible that I can
represent to myself this very identity of
consciousness within these representations,
i.e., the analytic unity of apperception
is only possible on the presupposi-
tion of some kind of synthetic unity.
The thought: all these representa-
tions given in intuition altogether
belong to me, amounts to this, that I
unify them in one self-consciousness,
or can at least so unify them, and if
this is not itself at once the con-
sciousness of the synthesis of represen-
tations, it nevertheless presupposes
the possibility of this latter, i.e. only
because I can comprehend their man-
ifold in one consciousness do I call
B133 (ll. 412–35): Kant draws his first major conclusion about human apperception from his
explication of its transcendental unity: Even if we were to grant that individual perceptions,
as perceptive states or events, were also self-conscious states, these are only individually,
distributively perceptive or also apperceptive states. As such and in principle none of them,
whether single or plural, can or does account for any one conscious (or self-conscious) state
of awareness of any plurality of those individual perceptive states. If such perceptions are ‘a-
bout’ anything, they are not about one another; nor do they bundle themselves together into
any one, more complex conscious state. Conscious awareness of any two or more percep-
tions is a distinctive, higher-order form of consciousness which takes two or more percep-
tual states of consciousness as its content or object. Hume was quite right that nothing in
his empiricist principles can or does account for such unitary, compound conscious aware-
ness of any pair or plurality of first-order perceptions. Hume’s official empiricism cannot at
all explicate or justify his own use of the term ‘judgment’, nor even of ‘word’; neither can it
account for all the many cognisant activities and achievements of ‘imagination’ (Westphal
2013). For each of us apperceptive human beings, insofar as ‘I’ can think of any of my vari-
ous perceptual episodes, I can have one comprehensive awareness of those many perceptual
episodes, and be aware of them all as my own perceptual episodes. How extensive or accu-
rate such comprehensive apperception may be is entirely a further question. Also a further
question is whether or how this point can aid our insight into whether or how well we actu-
ally can or do know any empirical particulars. This latter is Kant’s topic in the Analytic of
Principles; it is not his topic in the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding! Misunderstanding this point is central to many objections to Kant’s (pur-
ported) Deduction. Instead, Kant’s Deduction aims to show that we cannot at all think or a-
chieve any apperception unless we successfully use categories in some candidate cognitive
judgment(s) about anything presented us by sensory intuition (B134–5, ll. 436–82). One key
point here (ll. 417–35) is that any analytically unitary ‘I think ...’ only occurs as the unitary
(identical) first-person self-referential thought of some plurality of one’s self-conscious
states, where this plurality of self-conscious states is some synthetic unity of self-consciousness
(apperception). This unitary synthetic apperception consists in self-consciously representing
some plurality of one’s own conscious (perceptive) states. The analytical unity of appercep-
tion (whenever it occurs) requires some synthetic unity of apperception.
B134 (ll. 436–56): Kant here contrasts the mere distributively perceptive or (for the sake of
discussion) apperceptive states afforded by the Cartesian equation of sensations with what-
ever one takes oneself to sense (Med. 2, AT 7:29) and its progeny within the empiricist (sen-
sory atomist) traditions to the unitary collective self-consciousness required to recognise any
plurality of such states as one’s own. Such recognition requires a single comprehensive grasping
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fen kann, nenne ich dieselbe insgesammt
meine Vorstellungen; denn sonst würde
ich ein so vielfärbiges, verschiedenes
Selbst haben, als ich Vorstellungen habe,450
deren ich mir bewußt bin. Synthetische
Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschau-
ungen, als a priori gegeben, ist also der
Grund der Identität der Apperception
selbst, die a priori allem me inem be-455
stimmten Denken vorhergeht. Verbin-
dung liegt aber nicht in den Gegenstän-
den und kann von ihnen nicht etwa
durch Wahrnehmung entlehnt und in
den Verstand dadurch allererst aufge-460
nommen werden, sondern ist allein [B135]
eine Verrichtung des Verstandes, der
selbst nichts weiter ist als das Vermögen,
a priori zu verbinden und das Mannigfal-
tige gegebener Vorstellungen unter Ein-465
heit der Apperception zu bringen, wel-
cher Grundsatz der oberste im ganzen
menschlichen Erkenntniß ist.
Dieser Grundsatz der nothwendigen
Einheit der Apperception ist nun zwar470
selbst identisch, mithin ein analytischer
Satz, erklärt aber doch eine Synthesis des
in einer Anschauung gegebenen Mannig-
faltigen als nothwendig, ohne welche
jene durchgängige Identität des Selbst-475
bewußtseyns nicht gedacht werden kann.
Denn durch das Ich als einfache Vor-
stellung ist nichts Mannigfaltiges gege-
ben; in der Anschauung, die davon un-
terschieden ist, kann es nur gegeben und480
durch Verb indung  in einem Bewußt-
seyn gedacht werden. […] [B136]
40 
them all my representations; since
otherwise I would have as many-col-
oured, diverse a self as I have repre-
sentations of which I am conscious-
ness. Synthetic unity of the manifold
of intuition, as given a priori, is thus
the ground of the identity of
apperception itself, which a priori pre-
cedes any and all of my specific think-
ing. However, conjunction never lies
in the objects and cannot possibly be
borrowed from them through per-
ception and only thus taken up into
the understanding; instead it is en-
tirely an achievement of understand-
ing, which itself is nothing other than
the capacity to conjoin a priori and to
bring the manifold of given represen-
tations under the unity of appercep-
tion; this principle is the ultimate
principle in all human cognition.
Now this principle of the necessary
unity of apperception is itself of
course identical, thus an analytical
proposition, yet it explains the neces-
sary synthesis of the manifold given
in an intuition, without which that
thorough-going identity of self-con-
sciousness cannot be thought. For
through the ‘I’ as simple representa-
tion nothing manifold is given; only
in the intuition, which is different
from that, can it be given and by con-
junction in one consciousness can it be
thought. […]
of some multitude of perceptive states together in one unitary thought of those states as one’s
own. Even granting (generously) that individual perceptive states may also be apperceptive
states only suffices for distributive apperception of each such state; in principle it does not
and cannot suffice for unitary awareness of any plurality of such states as one’s own. In ex-
actly this regard Kant stresses the synthetic unity of any manifold sensory intuition(s) as the
ground for the possibility of any identical apperception by which one can identify that plural-
ity of sensory intuition(s) (perceptions) as one’s own perceptions (ll. 436–56).
B134 (ll. 451–6), B135 (ll. 469–76): Kant’s thesis is that the synthetic unity of the manifold of
sensory intuition is the ground of the identity of apperception holds distributively for any
humanly possible instance of ‘I think …’. This thesis does not address how extensive or per-
sisting anyone’s personal identity may be. It explicates a priori conditions required to think (ll.
472–6) any such apperceptive identity.
B134–5 (ll. 456–68): Kant again claims that combining or Verbindung is not due to objects
and cannot be absorbed from them. Certainly conjoining or binding as activities are not ef-
fected within or by any objects; objects have whatever plurality of features they do. The key
point is indeed intellective: that recognising any object to have any features requires recognis-
ing it and ascribing to it some plurality of features. This requires (i) discriminating, recognis-
ing and integrating those features into the sensory perception of that particular and (ii) ex-
plicitly discriminating, identifying (classifying) and integrating those (classified) features in
any judgment by which one ascribes those features to that particular. Those are two different
sets of achievements; later (§§24, 26n.) Kant ascribes the former, sensory-perceptual
achievements to the transcendental power of (productive) imagination (functioning sub-per-
sonally), and the latter to the understanding as our capacity to make express, explicit judg-
ments about anything we can or do perceive.
B135 (ll. 461–8): The most fundamental characteristic of our capacity to judge at all, i.e., our
understanding, is its capacity to combine according to its own a priori functions pluralities of
representations so that they can be brought under the unity of apperception. This is, Kant
states, the highest principle of human cognition.
B135 (ll. 470–82): Kant expressly contrasts the conceptual simplicity of the thought, ‘I think’,
which is ‘identical’ by default: it neither expresses, integrates nor differentiates any plurality
whatsoever; hence it is ‘analytic’ by default: it has no internal semantic (intensional) com-
plexity which could be explicated, explicitated or otherwise articulated. This very simplicity
highlights that any use of this thought, or any occasion for thinking this thought, must have
its judgmental, intensional or sentential complement: some thought thunk by any ‘I’. No
such complement can be provided by the ‘I think’ itself; it must be otherwise provided. The
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§ 17. Der Grundsatz der synthetischen
Einheit der Apperception ist das
oberste Princip alles Verstandes-485
gebrauchs.
Der oberste Grundsatz der Möglich-
keit aller Anschauung in Beziehung auf
die Sinnlichkeit war laut der transscen-
dentalen Ästhetik: daß alles Mannigfalti-490
ge derselben unter den formalen Bedin-
gungen des Raums und der Zeit stehe.
Der oberste Grundsatz eben derselben
in Beziehung auf den Verstand ist: daß
alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung un-495
ter Bedingungen der ursprünglich-syn-
thetischen Einheit der Apperception
stehe. Unter dem ersteren stehen alle
mannigfaltige Vorstellungen der An-
schauung, so fern sie uns gegeben  wer-500
den, unter dem zweiten, so fern sie in
einem Bewußtseyn müssen verbunden
[B137] werden können; denn ohne das
kann nichts dadurch gedacht oder er-
kannt werden, weil die gegebene Vorstel-505
§ 17. The Principle of the Synthetic
Unity of Apperception is the
Highest Principle of all Use of
the Understanding.
The ultimate principle of the possi-
bility of all intuition in connection to
sensibility was, according to the
Transcendental Aesthetic, this: that
all its manifold must stand under the
formal conditions of space and time.
The ultimate principle of that same
possibility in connection to under-
standing is: that all manifold of intu-
ition (would) stand under conditions
of the original synthetic unity of
apperception. All manifold represen-
tations of intuition stand under the
former, so far as they are given to us;
and under the latter, so far as they
must be able to be conjoined within
one single consciousness; for without
such conjunction nothing can be
thought or cognised, because the
most general answer can only be that some sensory intuition(s) presents some comprehensi-
ble content which can be thought (conceived, judged), and conceived as one’s own thought of
___ (whatever is sensorily presented). Thought without content is empty; mere sensory con-
tent(s) are ‘blind’ (B75), since they do not and cannot provide or afford any apperceptive
thought of or through them about anything whatever. In these regards Kant examines the
most basic logical functions of thought and judgment to highlight that the Cartesian cogito
can only be a result, indeed an abstraction from a result; it is not the automatic, fixed starting
point it is so widely presumed to be. Any occasion to think ‘I think …’ is parasitic upon
some actual occasion(s) in which one at least presumptively perceives something of one’s
surroundings. The Deduction underscores that no thought and no thinking is at all humanly
possible without exercising (if wittingly, sub-personally or implicitly) some of our most basic
judgmental capacities to discriminate, differentiate, and integrate various features of any one
perceived particular in order to perceive that individual.
3.5 §17: The Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception is the Highest Principle
of the Use of the Understanding.
B136–7 (ll. 487–508, cf. ll. 477–82): Kant begins by noting a parallel between the transcen-
dental deduction of the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic (§13,
B121, cf. Tr. Aesth. §§3, 5, B40, 48, 63–4), that anything which appears to us by sensibility
must be temporal, and much of it must also be spatial; hence the concepts ‘time’ and ‘space’
must pertain to these domains (respectively). (Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, his hallmark
thesis that space itself = nothing but a human form of sensory receptivity + time itself =
nothing but a human form of sensory receptivity (Tr. Aesth. §§6, 8, esp. B59–60), may be
elided here and throughout much of Kant’s Deduction by substituting a weaker thesis, that
our human form of sensory receptivity is only receptive (sensitive, responsive) to spatio-
temporal particulars; cf. above, §2.15.)
B136–7 (ll. 487–508): Kant’s parallel claim about apperception is expressly modal: Whatever
can at all be thought must in principle be integratable with and by the original unity of
apperception so as to be at all a candidate for my express, self-conscious thought that such-
and-so.
B137 (ll. 510–26): Speaking generally, Kant glosses understanding as the capacity for cogni-
tions, and any cognition as the determinate connection of given representations to an ob-
ject. This determinate connection is ascriptive: ascribing features to some sensed, localised
particular as its features. This is a key point at which Kant’s concern with process highlights
a key epistemological issue about cognitive semantics, which requires at least putative deictic
reference and putative ascription of features to some particular(s). These epistemological
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§ 17. Der Grundsatz der synthetischen
Einheit der Apperception ist das
oberste Princip alles V andes-485
gebrauchs.
Der oberste Grundsatz der Möglich-
keit aller Anschauung in Beziehung f
die Sinnlichkeit war laut der transscen-
dentalen Ästhetik: daß alles Mannigfalti-490
ge derselben unter den forma en Bedin-
gungen des Raums und d r Z it stehe.
Der oberste Grundsatz eben derselbe
in Beziehung auf den Verstand ist: daß
alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung un-495
ter Bedingungen der ursprünglich-syn-
thetischen Einheit der Apperception
stehe. Unter dem erster n stehen alle
mannigfaltige Vorstellu gen der An-
schauung, so fern sie uns gegeben  wer-500
den, unter dem zweiten, so fern sie in
einem Bewußtseyn müssen verbunden
[B137] werden können; denn ohne das
kann nichts dadurch gedacht oder er-
kannt werden, weil die gegebene Vorst l-505
§ 17. The Principle of the Syntheti
Unity of Apperceptio  is the
Highest Principle of all Use of
the Understanding.
The ultimate principle of the possi-
bility of all intuition in connection o
sensibility was, according to the
Transcendental Aesthetic, this: that
all its ma ifold must stand under the
formal conditions of space and time.
Th  ultimate pri ciple of that same
possibility in connecti n to under-
standing is: that all manifold of intu-
ition (would) tand under conditions
of the o iginal synthetic unity of
app rception. A  manifold represen-
tations of intuition s nd under the
former, so far as they a e given to us;
a d und  the latter, so far as y
mu t be able to be conjoined within
one si gle consciousness; for without
such conjunction nothing can be
thought or cognised, because the
most general answer can only b  th t ome sensor  intuition(s) presents some comprehensi-
ble content which can e th ught (con eived, judged), and conceived as one’s own thought of
___ (whatever is sensorily presented). Thought without content is empty; mere sensory con-
tent(s) are ‘blind’ (B75), since they do not and cannot provide or afford any apperceptive
thought of or through them about anything whatever. In these regards Kant examines the
most basic logical functions of th ught and judgment t  highlight that the Cartesian cogi o
can only be a result, indeed an abstraction from a result; it is not the automatic, fixed starting
point it is so widely presumed to be. Any occasion to think ‘I think …’ is parasitic upon
some actual occasion( ) in which ne at least presumptively perceives so ething of one’s
surroundings. The Ded ction u derscores that n  thought and no thi king is at all humanly
possible without exercising (if it ingly, sub-personally or implicitly) some of ur ost basic
judgmental capacities to discriminate, diff rentiate, and integrate various features of any one
perceived particular in order to perceive that individual.
3.5 §17: The Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Appercep on is he Highest Principle
of the Use of the Unders anding.
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dental deduction of th  concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic (§13,
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must pertain to these domains (respec ively). (Kant’  Trans endental Idealism, his hallmark
thesis that space itself = no ing but a human f rm of sensory receptivity + time itself =
nothing but a human f rm of sensory receptivity (Tr. Aesth. §§6, 8, esp. B59–60), may be
elided here and throughout much of Kant’s Deduction by subs ituting a weaker thesis, that
our human for  of sensory receptivity is only eceptive (sensitive, respons ) to patio-
temporal particulars; cf. above, §2.15.)
B136–7 (ll. 487–508): Kant’s parallel claim about apperception is expressly modal: Whateve
can at all be thought must in principle be integratable w th and by the original unity of
apperception so as to be at all a candidate for my express, self-conscious thought that such-
and-so.
B137 (ll. 510–26): Speaking generally, Kant glosses understandi g as th  capacity for cogni-
tions, and any cognition as the determinate connection of given repres ntations to a ob-
ject. This determinate connection is ascriptive: ascrib ng features to some sensed, localised
particular as its features. This is  key point at w ch Kant’s c ncern ith proces highlights
a key epistemological issu  about cognitive semantics, which requires t least putativ  deictic
reference and putative ascription of featur s to some particular(s). These pistemological
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lungen den Actus der Apperception:
I ch  denke , nicht gemein haben und
dadurch nicht in einem Selbstbewußt-
seyn zusammengefaßt seyn würden.
Verstand ist, allgemein zu reden, das510
Vermögen der Erkenn tn i s s e . Diese
bestehen in der bestimmten Beziehung
gegebener Vorstellungen auf ein Object.
O b j ec t  aber ist das, in dessen Begriff
das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen An-515
schauung ve r e in ig t  ist. Nun erfordert
aber alle Vereinigung der Vorstellungen
Einheit des Bewußtseyns in der Synthe-
sis derselben. Folglich ist die Einheit des
Bewußtseyns dasjenige, was allein die520
Beziehung der Vorstellungen auf einen
Gegenstand, mithin ihre objective Gül-
tigkeit, folglich daß sie Erkenntnisse
werden, ausmacht, und worauf folglich
selbst die Möglichkeit des Verstandes525
beruht.
Das erste reine Verstandeserkenntnis
also, worauf sein ganzer übriger Ge-
brauch sich gründet, welches auch zu-
gleich von allen Bedingungen der sinnli-530
chen Anschauung ganz unabhängig ist,
ist nun der Grundsatz der ursprüngli-
chen s yn the t i s chen  Einheit der Ap-
perception. So ist die bloße Form der
äußeren sinnlichen Anschauung, der535
Raum, noch gar keine Erkenntnis; er gibt
nur das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung a
priori zu einem möglichen Erkenntnis.
Um aber irgend etwas im Raume zu er-
kennen, z.B. eine Linie, muß ich sie zie-540
given representations would have no-
thing in common with the actus of
apperception, I think, and so would
not be brought together into one sin-
gle self-consciousness.
Generally speaking, understanding
is the capacity for cognitions. These
consist in determinate connection of
given representations to an object.
However, object is that in the concept
of which the manifold of a given in-
tuition is united. Now all unification
of representations requires unitary
consciousness in their synthesis.
Consequently the unity of conscious-
ness is that which alone constitutes
the connection of representations to
an object (Gegenstand ), and thus their
objective validity, so that they be-
come cognitions, and thus is that
upon which rests the possibility of
the understanding itself.
Thus the first pure cognition of the
understanding, upon which is
grounded its entire further use, which
also is altogether independent of all
conditions of sensible intuition, is the
principle of the original synthetic unity
of apperception. Thus the mere form
of our outer sensory intuition, space,
is not yet a cognition; it only affords
a priori the manifold of intuition to a
possible cognition. Yet actually to
know anything whatever in space, e.g.,
a line, I must draw it and so effect
synthetically a determinate connec-
issues must await the Analytic of Principles; here Kant anticipates that whatever we may
putatively know, and however (and however well) we may putatively know it, requires of us
actively discerning, differentiating, identifying and integrating some plurality of information
by which alone we can (even putatively) localise any candidate particular object of knowl-
edge and ascribe (even putatively) any features to it. All of this requires that we can ex-
pressly and explicitly make such cognitive judgments, which requires that we can indeed
think ‘I think’ in connection with whatever judgments we consider making about this or these
particular(s). Only by such intellectual, judgmental integration of some plurality of sensory
and classificatory information can our proto-cognitive states have any ‘objective validity’ as
(re)presenting this apperceived state of affairs. Only insofar as we can engage actively in scru-
tinising whatever we experience and identifying at least some of it, do we have and exercise
any understanding whatsoever.
B137–8 (ll. 527–76): Kant further explicates his thesis concerning the principle of the origi-
nal synthetic unity of apperception, by highlighting that, merely because our sensibility pre-
sents to us whatever it may within space and time and in some regard or other as spatial and
temporal, does not at all specify, individuate or discriminate any particular(s) within space or
time. That the concept ‘time’ as such cannot serve to delimit any periods of time, and so
cannot serve to delimit any appearance(s) within any period of time, is underscored by
Kant’s reason why the Tr. Aesth. cannot include even the mere concept ‘alteration’ (Ver-
änderung) among its a priori data, because any alteration must instead be some altering within
time at some time or during some period of time, and would require some perception of
something existing which exhibits successive features (A41/B58); mutatis mutandis, the same
would hold of the concept ‘space’ (cf. B195). Hence these concepts do not suffice for cog-
nition (of particulars; l. 513, cf. ll. 539–40), though they are required for the possibility of their
cognition (ll. 534–38). Kant appeals to his earlier point about the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’,
that they indicate unbounded continuous manifolds, one successive, the other concurrent
though extended (spatially), yet these concepts can be arbitrarily delimited so as to circum-
scribe periods of time or regions of space, or both together (B39–40, 47–8). Here Kant adds
that any cognitive use of such specifications of spatio-temporal scope requires that one can
be aware of the unity of each or any such bounded region, so as to be able to know that re-
gion as one specific particular region (ll. 534–48), and (prospectively) to be able to know any
particular occupying that region (§26).
B138 (ll. 539–57): The synthetic unity of consciousness required to delimit and to designate
any such spatio-temporal region is thus ‘an objective condition of all cognitions’, insofar as
it is required to have any, even putative particular object of awareness or prospective ascrip-
tion within some indicated region, as an object one presumes to be aware of, because what-
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gion as one specific particular region (ll. 534–48), nd (prospectively) to be able to know any
particular occupying that region (§26).
B138 (ll. 539–57): The synthetic unity of con ciousness required to delimit and to d signate
any such spatio-temporal region is thus ‘an objective condition of all cogniti s’, nsofar as
it is required to have any, even puta ive particular object of awareness or prospective ascrip-
tion within some indicated region, as an object on  presumes t  b  aware of, because what-
44 45 
 4746  
hen und also [B138] eine bestimmte Ver-
bindung des gegebenen Mannigfaltigen
synthetisch zu Stande bringen, so daß
die Einheit dieser Handlung zugleich die
Einheit des Bewußtseyns (im Begriffe545
einer Linie) ist, und dadurch allererst ein
Object (ein bestimmter Raum) erkannt
wird. Die synthetische Einheit des Be-
wußtseyns ist also eine objective Bedin-
gung aller Erkenntniß, nicht deren ich550
bloß selbst bedarf, um ein Object zu
erkennen, sondern unter der jede An-
schauung stehen muß, um fü r  m i ch
O b jec t  zu  werden , weil auf andere
Art und ohne diese Synthesis das Man-555
nigfaltige sich nicht in einem Bewußt-
seyn vereinigen würde.
Dieser letzte Satz ist, wie gesagt,
selbst analytisch, ob er zwar die syntheti-
sche Einheit zur Bedingung alles Den-560
kens macht; denn er sagt nichts weiter,
als, daß alle meine Vorstellungen in ir-
gend einer gegebenen Anschauung unter
der Bedingung stehen müssen, unter der
ich sie allein als m e i ne  Vorstellungen565
zu diesem identitschen Selbst rechnen,
und also, als in einer Apperception syn-
thetisch verbunden, durch den allgemei-
nen Ausdruck I ch  denke  zusammenfa-
ßen kann.570
Aber dieser Grundsatz ist doch nicht
ein Prinzip für jeden überhaupt mögli-
chen Verstand, sondern nur für den,
durch dessen reine Apperzeption in der
Vorstellung: I ch  b in , noch gar nichts575
Mannigfaltiges gegeben ist. […] [B139]
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tion of the given manifold, so that
the unity of this act is equally also the
unity of consciousness (in the con-
cept of a line), so that thereby an ob-
ject (a determinate space) is at all
known. The synthetic unity of con-
sciousness is thus an objective condi-
tion of all cognition, not only to en-
able me to know an object, but one
under which must stand any intu-
ition, if it is to become an object for me,
because in any other way and without
this synthesis, the manifold would
not be united within one single con-
sciousness.
This last proposition itself is, as
mentioned, analytic, though it makes
the synthetic unity into a condition of
all thinking; for it says no more than
that all of my representations in
whatever given intuition must stand
under the condition under which
alone I can ascribe them as my repre-
sentations to this identical self, and
thus, as conjoined synthetically within
one apperception, [I can] summarily
grasp them all together with the gen-
eral expression: I think.
Yet this principle is of course not a
principle for any possible understan-
ding as such, but rather only for that
kind, through whose pure appercep-
tion in the representation: I am, noth-
ing at all manifold is yet given. […]
ever particular(s) we can know occupy such regions, and because any possible thought one
can have of any one such particular requires that one can (and often does) self-consciously
integrate such cognitively crucial information so that any of us can think: ‘I think …’ in re-
gard to this designated, circumscribed, localised, sensorily presented particular. The sense of
‘objective’ condition is that such thoughts can have objective validity by actually being about
particulars one judges – or mis-judges as the case may be, though Kant’s transcendental
proof of (Critical commonsense, direct perceptual) realism rules out the sceptical generalisa-
tion from the occasional, yet ubiquitous possibility of perceptual errors or illusions to the
sceptical hypothesis of global perceptual scepticism. (This is the key point of his Refutation
of Idealism, B275–87.)
B138 (ll. 539–57): Most directly, for any object to be an object for me requires that I can think
in regard to it ‘I think …’. This analytically simple apperceptive thought is a necessary aspect
of any such thought about any particular of which any human being can be self-aware. And
this analytically simple, self-referential apperceptive thought only occurs, and only pertains
to knowledge, insofar as one thinks ‘I think …’ in connection to some synthetic unity, some
judgmentally integrated classifications of the spatial region occupied by some particular ex-
hibiting such-and-so (identified, classified, ascribed) features (however approximately).
B138 (ll. 558–70): Kant again contrasts the conceptual simplicity of the thought, ‘I think’,
which is ‘identical’ (cf. B135, ll. 469–82) or ‘analytic’, which is decisive precisely because its
possibility requires some (one or another, however episodic or extensive) synthetic unity, and
it makes possible any self-conscious thought about any particulars we can think of or about.
B138 (571–6): Kant underscores that his explication of any humanly possible ‘I think …’, under
what necessary conditions a priori it is possible, and what cognitive achievements its occurrence
represents, are not conceptual truths as such; they cannot and do not belong to any ‘analytic
transcendental argument’; they are conceptual explications (per B755–8) and pertain to a specific
kind of understanding qua capacity to judge, namely any kind whose apperceptive thought, ‘I
think …’, does not automatically contain or provide anything manifold. Its very simplicity is
Kant’s key to demonstrating that thinking this thought is parasitic (dependent) upon other cog-
nitive achievements, as conditions necessary for the possibility of human apperception. Only
very few of these conditions are identified within the Deduction; most are identified in the An-
alytic of Principles; cf. B122–3 (ll. 88–145), B164–5 (ll. 1128–70) re: transcendental affinity, and
B162 (ll. 1084–99) re: seeing a house (and KCE, Pt 2).
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§ 18. Was objective Einheit des Selbst-
bewußtseyns sei.
Die t r an s s cenden t a l e  E inh e i t
der Apperception ist diejenige, durch580
welche alles in einer Anschauung gege-
bene Mannigfaltige in einen Begriff vom
Object vereinigt wird. Sie heißt darum
ob j ec t i v  und muß von der s u b j ec t i -
v en  E in he i t  des Bewußtseyns unter-585
schieden werden, […]. [B140] Dagegen
steht die reine Form der Anschauung in
der Zeit, bloß als Anschauung über-
haupt, die ein gegebenes Mannigfaltiges
enthält, unter der ursprünglichen Einheit590
des Bewußtseyns lediglich durch die
nothwendige Beziehung des Mannigfalti-
gen der Anschauung zum Einen: Ich
denke, also durch die reine Synthesis des
Verstandes, welche a priori der empiri-595
schen zum Grunde liegt. Jene Einheit ist
allein objectiv gültig; […]
§ 19. Die logische Form aller Urtheile
besteht in der objectiven Einheit
der Apperception der darin ent-600
haltenen Begriffe.
[…] Wenn ich aber die Beziehung gege-
bener Erkenntnisse in jedem Urtheile ge-
nauer untersuche, und sie, als dem Ver-
stand angehörige, von dem Verhältnisse605
nach Gesetzen der reproductiven Einbil-
§ 18. What is Objective Unity of Self-
Consciousness.
The transcendental unity of appercep-
tion is that unity through which all 
the manifold within an intuition is 
united within a concept of an object. 
This unity is thus called objective, and 
must be distinguished from the subjec-
tive unity of consciousness. […] In 
contrast, the pure form of intuition in 
time, merely as intuition as such, 
which contains a given manifold, 
stands under the original unity of 
consciousness solely in consequence 
of the necessary connection of the 
manifold of intuition to one: I think; 
that is, it so stands solely in conse-
quence of the pure synthesis of un-
derstanding, which synthesis is pre-
supposed a priori by any empirical 
synthesis. The former unity alone is 
objectively valid; […].
§ 19. The Logical Form of all Judg-
ments consists in the Objective
Unity of the Concepts they
Contain.
[…] However, if I examine the con-
nection of given cognitions in any
judgment more exactly, and distin-
guish these as belonging to the
understanding from those relations
 48
3.6 §18: What is Objective Unity of Self-Consciousness.
B139 (ll. 579–84): The transcendental unity of apperception is that unitary consciousness 
which integrates whatever manifold of sensed features may be presented in sensory intuition 
into a concept of the object so presented. Kant’s phrase, ‘vom Object ’, may be more concise 
than we would wish, but it clearly contrasts to his previous locutions which expressly con-
cern concepts of an ‘object as such’, to which no presented manifold of sensory intuition per-
tains. The conclusion of §17 expressly concerns constraints upon intuition and sensory 
manifolds required for anything ‘to become an object for me’. The ‘objectivity’ of this unity 
of apperception is that it is required for objective reference or for objective reality (possible 
representation of particulars) or for objective validity (possibly justified representation of 
particulars); it is necessary, though not sufficient, for truth, accuracy or justifiedness. It is 
necessary so that any humanly possible thought can be object-directed or pertain to objects.
B140 (ll. 586–97): Kant here remarks, not upon time, but upon the form of any sensory intu-
ition within time which contains some specific, de facto, ‘given’ sensory manifold, though 
considering these ‘merely as intuition as such’, and regardless of any particular manifold of 
sensation. This temporal form of an intuition only pertains to the original unity of appercep-
tion insofar as the manifold it contains can be integrally comprehended by someone (syn-
thesised) who can think, ‘I think …’ in connecting that sensory manifold to some putative 
object so presented (intuited), thought and (hence) conceived.
Note that the genitive preposition ‘of ’ – as always in epistemology! – must be under-
stood carefully to avoid a host of errors. A ‘manifold of sensation’ is not some batch of sen-
sations; it is some plurality of sensed qualities, characteristics, features or aspects; it con-
cerns contents conveyed in, through or by sensory processes and channels. Sensations as 
occurrences may be modifications of a subject’s sensory receptivity, but the character or ‘con-
tent’ of such sensory modifications may be and often is indicative of something real as a 
(typical) occasioning cause or source of such type sensations; cf. B207 and below, §5.
3.7 §19: The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of the Con-
cepts they Contain.
B141–2 (ll. 602–21): In contrast to the logician’s account of judgment, and apart from any 
consideration of reproductive imagination (required to continue considering any sensed par-
ticular through any period of time), simply regarding the connection of any given cognitions 
within any judgment, as belonging to understanding, Kant finds that judgment is how those 
cognitions are brought to the objective unity of apperception. This connection is expressed 
by the affirmative copula ‘IS’, constitutive of any judgment one can make that any particular 
is as one now judges it to be. That is the ‘objective’ unity of apperception, in contrast to the
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dungskraft (welches nur subjective Gül-
tigkeit hat) unterscheide, so finde ich,
daß ein Urtheil nichts andres sey, als die
Art, gegebene Erkenntnisse zur objecti-610
ven Einheit der Apperception zu brin-
gen. Darauf zielt das Verhältnißwört-
chen i s t  in [B142] denselben, um die ob-
jective Einheit gegebener Vorstellungen
von der subjectiven zu unterscheiden.615
Denn dieses bezeichnet die Beziehung
derselben auf die ursprüngliche Apper-
ception und die nothwendige Einheit
derselben, wenn gleich das Urtheil selbst
empirisch, mithin zufällig ist, z.B. die620
Körper sind schwer. Damit ich zwar
nicht sagen will, diese Vorstellungen ge-
hören in der empirischen Anschauung
nothwendig zu einander, sondern sie
gehören vermöge der nothwendigen625
Einheit der Apperception in der Syn-
thesis der Anschauungen zu einander,
d.i. nach Principien der objectiven Be-
stimmung aller Vorstellungen, so fern
daraus Erkenntniß werden kann, welche630
Principien alle aus dem Grundsatze der
transscendentalen Einheit der Appercep-
tion abgeleitet sind. Dadurch allein wird
aus diesem Verhältniße ein U r the i l ,
d.i. ein Verhältniß, das objectiv gültig ist635
und sich von dem Verhältniße eben der-
selben Vorstellungen, worin bloß subjec-
tive Gültigkeit [B143] wäre, z. B. nach Ge-
setzen der Association, hinreichend un-
terscheidet. Nach den letzteren würde640
ich nur sagen können: Wenn ich einen
Körper trage, so fühle ich einen Druck
according to laws of reproductive
imagination (which only have subjec-
tive validity), I then find that a judg-
ment is nothing other than the way to
bring given cognition to the objective
unity of apperception. That’s the
point of the copula ‘IS’ within judg-
ments, to distinguish the objective
unity of given representations from
the subjective unity. For that [copula]
indicates their connection to the orig-
inal apperception and its necessary
unity, even if the judgment itself is
empirical, and so is contingent, e.g.,
bodies are heavy. By this I do not
mean to say that these representa-
tions belong in that empirical intu-
ition to each other necessarily; rather,
due to the necessary unity of apper-
ception in the synthesis of intuitions
they belong to one another, i.e., ac-
cording to principles of the objective
determination of all representations, -
so far as they can afford cognition,
which principles all derive from the
principle of the transcendental unity
of apperception. Only in this way can
this relation afford a judgment, i.e., a
relation which is objectively valid,
and which is sufficiently distinct to
relations of even these same repre-
sentations which would contain
merely subjective validity, e.g., accord-
ing to laws of association. According
to these latter I could only say: If I
carry a body, then I feel a pressure of
subjective unity, which concerns merely how something seems to one to be: objective unity
is directed to and concerns that object, not merely how it may seem or appear to one to be.
The objectivity here at issue is two-fold: That the cognitions (sensory or conceptual) inte-
grated within an affirmative judgment have objective reality, in that they represent or can
pertain to objects, and that in this judgment these cognitions have this objective reality, that
they pertain to this presented, discriminated, identified particular one now judges. This (cog-
nitively) necessary unity of apperception is entirely consistent with the logical contingency
of any empirical judgment one makes (e.g., that bodies are heavy, or that this body is heavy).
B142 (ll. 621–35): Kant carefully distinguishes his intended modal claim from any modal claim
about the representation of constituent aspects within any empirical (sensory) intuition (its
‘manifold’) belonging together necessarily. Kant’s modal claim concerns the possibility of mak-
ing any judgment about any sensed particular (ll. 634–5). Kant’s claim is that these representa-
tions belong together necessarily as aspects (cognitions) integrated within a (prospective) judg-
ment formed by someone thinking ‘I think …’ about this sensed, intuited particular. Whatever
contingencies (or de res necessities) may pertain to the existence or characteristics of some per-
ceived particular, those modal issues are distinct to the cognitive modalities which pertain to
apperceptively ascribing to that perceived particular some feature(s) or other(s).
B142 (ll. 636–40): Kant expressly indicates that the same plurality (‘manifold’) of representa-
tions within one and the same cognisant event or activity can have distinctive roles, depending
upon the connections in which they are regarded, here: whether subjectively, as indicative of
any subject’s state of mind and whatever may appear to it via sensory perception, or instead
objectively, as indicative of what that same subject thinks and judges about that particular, as
having objective reference and as purporting to ascribe identified features to that particular.
This is Kant’s ‘objective validity’ (ll. 633–5), that a thought or judgment can (i) be directed to
any particular object at all, and that it can (ii) be accurate, justified or justifiable. Kant’s Deduc-
tion aims to demonstrate that our proper use of the categories is necessary to any such objec-
tive validity. This necessary unity of apperception by which in judgment one refers to what
some sensed, perceived particular IS, is distinctive even in regard to the very same component
representations used in that same judgment, so far as these merely represent also how that per-
ceived item seems or appears to one. This is how closely issues of objective validity can (and
do) intersect issues of cognitive process, whilst nevertheless being distinctive in character. This
also indicates Kant’s reiterated concern to highlight how, in principle, empiricist accounts of
psychological association cannot address issues of cognitive validity, because their modalities
differ in kind, not in degree; issues of cognitive validity have an irreducible status, a ‘dignity’
(B124, l. 171, cf. B126, ll. 240–7). In the Analytic of Principles Kant argues that we can and do
(insofar as any of us achieves apperception) competently identify at least some particulars we
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der Schwere; aber nicht: er, der Körper,
i s t  schwer; welches so viel sagen will,
als, diese beide Vorstellungen sind im645
Object, d. i. ohne Unterschied des Zu-
standes des Subjects, verbunden, und
nicht bloß in der Wahrnehmung (so oft
sie auch wiederholt seyn mag) beysam-
men.650
§ 20. Alle sinnliche Anschauungen stehen
unter den Categorien als Bedingun-
gen, unter denen allein das Mannig-
faltige derselben in ein Bewußtseyn
zusammenkommen kann.655
Das mannigfaltige in einer sinnlichen
Anschauung Gegebene gehört nothwen-
dig unter die ursprüngliche synthetische
Einheit der Apperception, weil durch
diese die E inhe i t  der Anschauung al-660
lein möglich ist (§ 17). Diejenige Hand-
lung des Verstandes aber, durch die das
Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen
(sie mögen Anschauungen oder Begriffe
seyn) unter eine Apperception überhaupt665
gebracht wird, ist die logische Function
der Urtheile (§ 19). Also ist alles Mannig-
faltige, so fern es in Einer empirischen
Anschauung gegeben ist, in Ansehung
einer der logischen Functionen zu ur-670
theilen bestimmt, durch die es nämlich
zu einem Bewußtseyn überhaupt ge-
bracht wird. Nun sind aber die Ca t e -
g o r i en  nichts andres als eben diese
Functionen zu urtheilen, so fern das675
Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschau-
ung in Ansehung ihrer bestimmt ist
weight; but not: it, the body, is heavy; 
which purports to express that both 
of these representations are bound 
together in the object, i.e. regardless 
of the state of the subject, and are 
not merely present together in per-
ception (however often it may be re-
peated).
§ 20. All Sensory Intuitions stand un-
der the Categories as Conditions
under which alone their Mani-
fold can coalesce in one Con-
sciousness.
The manifold in anything given in a
sensory intuition necessarily belongs
under the original synthetic unity of
apperception, because only through
that [unity] is the unity of the intuition
possible (§ 17). However, that act of
the understanding by which the man-
ifold of given representations (whe-
ther intuitions or concepts) is
brought under an apperception as
such, is the logical function of judg-
ments (§ 19). Therefore, everything
manifold, so far as it is given in one
empirical intuition, is determined by
one of the logical functions of judg-
ment, by which function it can at all
be brought to one consciousness as
such. However, the categories are noth-
ing other than precisely these func-
tions of judgments, so far as the
manifold of a given intuition is be
determined in their regard (§ 13).
sense, and distinguish them from our perceiving them, as we perceive them.
B142 (ll. 633–50): Kant expressly distinguishes the cognitive relations required for objective
validity from merely psychological laws of association, which in principle can only afford
subjective validity, i.e., reports of how anything appears to one to be, which can never suf-
fice for any affirmation that any sensed particular IS as one perceives and judges it to be.
3.8 §20: All sensory Intuitions stand under the Categories as Conditions under which
alone their Manifold can coalesce in one Consciousness.
B143 (ll. 656–80): Kant expressly links together the implications of §§13, 17, 19. §17 con-
cerns unity of, i.e., within, sensory intuitions. Kant’s concise discussion includes points about
process – unity within sensory intuitions – and disregards his key point that apperception
and its constraints govern any representations which can be something for oneself, by con-
tributing to any of one’s apperceptive episodes. (Kant’s concern with what one can consider,
judge or be aware of is reiterated at the start of §21.) The key points Kant highlights con-
cern validity, specifically: conditions under which integrated cognitions can have objective
reality (in the sense of being directed towards objects one can experience) and can be objec-
tively valid insofar as these integrated cognitions are now realised (in Tetens’ sense) in and by
this particular one now judges to be such-and-so. Kant recalls from §17 that any sensory in-
tuition which can be ‘given’ or presented to any humanly possible apperceptive ‘I think’ re-
quires necessarily the synthetic unity which makes possible such apperception of any sen-
sorily presented manifold. Such unification and identification requires exercise of our basic
logical functions of judging (§19). Exercising these logical functions of judging requires that
whatever is judged can be properly (if approximately) classified under at least some of our
most basic categories (§13). Thus Kant’s conclusion follows: Any (sensory or conceptual)
manifold of which anyone (of us human beings) can be apperceptively aware necessarily
conforms to (or accords with) the categories. This is a conditional necessity, and states a
transcendental constraint upon the integratability of any sensory intuitions and of any con-
ceptual classifications which can be judged to indicate features of any particular regarding
which one can judge that it is such-and-so – however approximate or inaccurate one’s judg-
ment may be, and however logically or causally contingent may be the relation of the fea-
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der Urtheile (§ 19). Also ist alles Mannig-
faltige, so fern es in Einer empirischen
Anschauung gegeben ist, in Ansehung
einer der logischen Functionen zu ur-670
theilen bestimmt, durch die es nämlich
zu einem Bewußtseyn überhaupt ge-
bracht wird. Nun sind aber die Ca t e -
g o r i en  nichts andres als eben diese
Functionen zu urtheile , so fern das675
Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschau-
ung in Ansehung ihrer bestimmt ist
weight; but not: it  the body, is heavy;
which purports to express that bo h
of these representati ns are bound 
toget er in the objec , i.e. regardless 
of the state of the subject, and are
not erely present together in per-
ception (however often i  may be re-
peated).
§ 20. All Sensory Intuitions stand un-
der the Categories as Conditions
under which alone their Mani-
fold can coalesce in ne Con-
sciousness.
The ma ifold i  anything given in a
sensory i tuition necessarily belongs
under the original synthetic unity of
appercept on, because only through
that [unity] is the unity of the intuition
possible (§ 17). However, that act of
the understanding by which the man-
ifold of given representati ns (whe-
th r intuitions or concepts) is
brought under an apperceptio  as
such, is the logical function of judg-
ments (§ 19). Therefor , everything
manifold, so far as it is g ven in one
empirical intuition, is determined by
o e of the logical functions of jud -
ment, by which function it can at all
be brought to one consciousness as
such. However, the categories are noth-
ing other than precisely these func-
tions f judgments, so far as the
manifold of a given intuition is be
d termined in their regard (§ 13).
sense, and distinguish them from our perceiving them, as we ercei e them.
B142 (ll. 633–50): Kant expressly distinguishes the cognit ve relations required for objective
validity from merely psychological laws of a sociation, which in prin ple can only affo d
subjective validity, i.e., repor s of how anything appears t  one to be, which can never suf-
fice for any affirmation that any sensed particular IS as one perceives and judges it to be.
3.8 §20: All sensory Intuitions stand under the Categories as Conditions under which
alone their Manifold c n coalesce in one Consciousness.
B143 (ll. 656–80): Kant expressly links together th  implications of §§13, 17, 19. §17 c n-
cerns unity of, i.e., within, sensor intuitions. Kant’s concise d scussion includes points about
process – unity within sensory intuitions – and disregards his key point that apperception
and its constraints govern any representati ns which can b  something for oneself, by con-
tributing to any of one’s apperceptive episode . (Kant’s conc rn with wh t one can consider,
judge or be aware of is reiterated t th start of §21.) The key points Kant highlights con-
cern validity, specifically: conditions under whi h integrated cognitions can h v  objective
reality (in the sense of being direct d towards objects on  can experience) and can b  objec-
tively valid insofar as these integrated cognitions are now r alised (in Tetens’ sense) in and by
this particular one now judges to be such-and-so. Kant recalls from §17 that any sensory in-
tuition which can be ‘given’ or presented to any humanly possible pperceptive ‘I think’ re-
quires neces arily the synthetic unity which makes possible such apperce tion of any sen-
sorily pr sented manifold. Such u ificatio  an  identification requires exercise of our basic
logi al functions of judging (§19). Exercising these logical funct ons of judging requires that
whatever is judged can be properly (if approximately) c assified under t east som  of our
mo t basic categories (§13). Thus Kant’s conclusion follows: Any (sens ry r conceptual)
manifold of which anyo e (of us human beings) can be apperceptively aware nec ssarily
conforms to (or accords with) the categories. This is a conditional necessity, and states a
transcendental constraint upon the integrat bility of any senso y intuitions and of an  con-
ceptual classifications which can be judged to ndi te f at res of any par icular regarding
which one can judge that it is such-and-so – however approximate or inaccurate ne’s judg-
ment may be, and however logically or causally contingent may be the relation of the f a-
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(§ 13). Also steht auch das Mannigfaltige
in einer gegebenen Anschauung noth-
wendig unter Categorien. [B144]680
§ 21. Anmerkung.
Ein Mannigfaltiges, das in einer An-
schauung, die ich die meinige nenne, ent-
halten ist, wird durch die Synthesis des
Verstandes als zur nothwendigen Einheit685
des Selbstbewußtseyns gehörig vorge-
stellt, und dieses geschieht durch die
Categorie.*
* Der Beweisgrund beruht auf der vor-
gestellten E inhe i t  der Anschauung, da-690
durch ein Gegenstand gegeben wird,
welche jederzeit eine Synthesis des Man-
nigfaltigen zu einer Anschauung Gege-
benen in sich schließt, und schon die
Beziehung dieses lezteren auf Einheit695
der Apperception enthält.
Diese zeigt also an: daß das empiri-
sche Bewußtseyn eines gegebenen Man-
nigfaltigen einer Anschauung eben so-
wohl unter einem reinen Selbstbewußt-700
seyn a priori, wie empirische Anschauung
unter einer reinen sinnlichen, die gleich-
falls a priori Statt hat, stehe. – Im obigen
Satze ist also der Anfang einer D educ -
t i on  der reinen Verstandesbegriffe ge-705
macht, in welcher ich, da die Categorien
unabhängig von S inn l i chke i t  bloß im
Verstande entspringen, noch von der
Art, wie das Mannigfaltige zu einer em-
pirischen Anschauung gegeben werde,710
abstrahiren muß, um nur auf die Einheit,
die in die Anschauung vermittelst der
Hence also the manifold in a given
intuition necessarily stands under
categories.
§ 21. Remark.
A manifold which is contained in
an intuition which I call my own, is
represented through the synthesis of
the understanding as belonging to the
necessary unity of self-consciousness,
and this transpires through the cate-
gory.*
* The ground of proof rests upon the
represented unity of the intuition
through which an object is given,
which always contains a synthesis of
the manifold of something given by
an intuition, and thus already con-
tains the connection of this latter to
the unity of apperception.
Thus this indicates that the empiri-
cal consciousness of a given manifold
of an intuition stands equally well
under one pure self-consciousness a
priori, as empirical intuition stands
under one pure sensible [conscious-
ness], which likewise holds a priori. –
In this proposition thus begins a de-
duction of the pure concepts of the
understanding, in which, because the
categories originate independently of
sensibility, merely in the understand-
ing, I must still abstract from the
manner in which the manifold to an
empirical intuition be given, in order
to attend solely to the unity provided
54 
3.9 §21: Remark.
B144 (682–8): Kant states concisely his conclusion to §20, though indicating here that it per-
tains to those cognitions which one can call one’s own, and more clearly indicating that the 
relevant synthesis of the understanding – the conjoining effected or identified in any judging 
of any manifold cognitions (whether concepts or sensory intuitions, including sensory pre-
sentations) – is required for including this complex cognition within the necessary unity of 
self-consciousness. Kant’s claims here include both the synthetic and the analytic unity of 
apperception by adroitly not mentioning expressly this pair of unities. 
B144 (ll. 689–96): Kant’s (footnoted *) ground of proof for this conclusion stresses both the 
unitary representation of some unified, hence integrated, sensory-intuitive manifold by 
which any object can be presented (in sensation or sensory intuition), where this unitary 
representation of that integral, complex object-presentation, as presented, is connected to 
unitary apperception – where this unitary apperception must be synthetic, and can (also) be 
analytic, expressed by the ‘I think …’.
B144 (ll. 697–703): Kant’s conclusion thus shows that any (humanly possible) empirical con-
sciousness of any manifold presented within a sensory intuition is subject both to sensible 
and to intellectual conditions a priori, thus achieving the intended parallelism of the two 
Deductions, one of the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’, the other of the categories.
B144 (ll. 703–6): This result marks the ‘beginning’ of Kant’s Deduction of the categories, 
which is expressly assigned to §26 (l. 714–25), as is also reflected in the title to §26, by appeal 
to the result restated here from §20 (l. 719).
B144 (ll. 703–12): Kant’s start on his Deduction indicates his key interest in this Deduction, 
that use of categories is to be shown necessary for any unity contributed by understanding 
within intuition. This may sound merely like comment about alleged process, but his express 
contrast between the mere subjective validity of psychological laws of association, and the 
conceptual, judgmental conditions which alone can provide for the possibility of objective 
validity (at the end of §19; B142, ll. 634–50), suggest instead his concern with the conditions 
required for any (putative) experiential judging which can be objectively valid.
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3.9 §21: Remark.
B144 (682–8): Kant states concisely his conclusion to §20, though ind cating here that it per-
tains to those cognitions which n an call one’s own, and more clearly indic ting that th  
relevant synthesis of th  under tanding – the conjoining effected or identified in any judging 
of any manifold cognitions (whether concepts or sensory intuitions, including se sory pre-
sentations) – is required for i cluding this complex cognition within th  necessary un y of 
self-consciousness. Kant’s claims her  include both the synthetic and the analytic un ty of 
apperception by adroitly not mentioning expressly this pair of unities. 
B144 (ll. 689–96): Kant’s (footnoted *) ground of pro f for this conclusion stresses both the 
unitary representation of som  unified, hence integrated, sensory-intuitive manifold by 
which any object can be presented (in se sation or sensory intuition), where this unitary 
representation of that integral, complex objec -p esentation, as pr sented, is connected to 
unitary apperception – where this unitary apperc ption mus  be synthetic, a d can (also) be 
analytic, expressed by the ‘I think …’.
B144 (ll. 697–703): Kant’s conclusion thus shows that any (humanly possible) empiric l con-
sciousness of any manifold pre ented withi  a sensory intuition is subject both to sensible 
and to intellectual conditions a priori, thus achieving the ntended parallelism of the two 
Deductions, one of the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’, the other of the cat gori s.
B144 (ll. 703–6): This result marks the ‘beginning’ of Kant’s D duction the categories, 
which s expressly assigned to §26 (l. 714–25), as is also reflected in the title t  §26, by appeal 
to the result restated here from §20 (l. 719).
B144 (ll. 703–12): Kant’s start on his Deduction indicates his key interest in this Deduct on, 
that use of categories is to b shown nec sary for any unity contributed by understanding 
within intuition. This may sou d merely like comme t about al eg d proc ss, but his express 
contrast between the mere subjective validity of psychological laws f a sociation, and the 
conceptual, judgmental condi ions which alone can provide for the possibility of objective 
validity (at the end of §19; B142, ll. 634–50), suggest instead his concern with he conditions 
required for any (putative) experiential judging which can be objectively valid.
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Categorie durch den Verstand hinzu-
kommt, zu sehen. In der Folge (§ 26)
wird aus der Art, wie in der Sinnlichkeit715
die empirische Anschauung gegeben
wird, gezeigt [B145] werden, daß die Ein-
heit derselben keine andere sei, als wel-
che die Categorie nach dem vorigen § 20
dem Mannigfaltigen einer gegebenen720
Anschauung überhaupt vorschreibt, und
dadurch also, daß ihre Gültigkeit a priori
in Ansehung aller Gegenstände unserer
Sinne erklärt wird, die Absicht der De-
duction allererst völlig erreicht werden.725
[…]
[…] die Categorien […] sind nur Regeln
für einen Verstand, dessen ganzes Ver-
mögen im Denken besteht, d.i. in der
Handlung, die Synthesis des Mannigfalti-730
gen, welches ihm anderweitig in der An-
schauung gegeben worden, zur Einheit
der Apperception zu bringen, der also
für sich gar nichts erkennt, sondern nur
den Stoff zum Erkenntniß, die Anschau-735
ung, die ihm durchs Object gegeben
werden muß, verbindet und ordnet. Von
der Eigenthümlichkeit unsers Verstandes
aber, nur vermittelst der Categorien und
[B146] nur gerade durch diese Art und740
Zahl derselben Einheit der Apperception
a priori zu Stande zu bringen, läßt sich
eben so wenig ferner ein Grund ange-
ben, als warum wir gerade diese und kei-
ne andere Functionen zu Urtheilen ha-745
ben, oder warum Zeit und Raum die ein-
zigen Formen unserer möglichen An-
schauung sind.
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to the intuition by the category via the
understanding. In the sequel (§ 26)
shall be shown, by the manner in
which the empirical intuition is given
within sensibility, that its unity is
none other than that which the cate-
gory (according to the preceding, §
20) prescribes to the manifold of a
given intuition as such, and thus, in-
sofar as their a priori validity in regard
to all objects of our senses is thus
explicated, that the aim of the deduc-
tion is first fully achieved. (…)
(…) the categories are only rules for
an understanding, the entire capacity
of which consists in thinking, i.e., in
the action of bringing the synthesis
of the manifold, which is otherwise
provided in intuition, to the unity of
apperception, which as such thus
knows nothing, but rather only com-
bines and orders the matter of cogni-
tion, intuition, which must be given
to it by the object. However, no fur-
ther reason can be provided for the
peculiarity of our understanding, that
only by the categories and only by
this kind and number of them it ef-
fects unity of apperception a priori,
than for why we have just these and
no other functions of judging, or why
time and space are the sole forms of
our possible intuition.
B145 (ll. 714–25): If the unity required for objectively valid (humanly possible) judgments can
be shown to be exactly that form of unity afforded by use of the categories (per §20) in re-
gard to sensory intuitions of particulars presented to us within sensation, so that such use of
the categories holds valid of any and all objects we can sense (and identify ourselves as sens-
ing), then the Deduction succeeds. Kant’s remark here about the categories prescribing
forms of unity to any given intuitions as such suggests the generative sense of ‘constitution
of objects’ (above, §2.15), but this may merely be a suggestive connotation of Kant’s concise
expression. Kant’s Deduction may succeed by demonstrating conditions which must be sat-
isfied by any particulars we can be aware of via sensation; i.e., Kant’s locution concerning
‘prescription’ may only indicate that his Deduction does entail constraints upon those par-
ticulars of which we can be aware in sensory perception, though which constraints these are,
and whether anything we do sense satisfies them, can remain issues for the Analytic of Prin-
ciples.
B145–6 (ll. 727–48): Kant reiterates and elaborates his dual capacity account of human
cognisance: understanding and sensibility, which each make their distinctive provisions, but
which can only work together for any humanly possible apperceptive thought or experience.
Kant’s remarks all concern process (subjective deduction), and highlight that his Deduction
appeals to some logically contingent premises. This entails that he must provide credible
reasons to think these premises hold true of us homo sapiens sapientes. Kant does provide rea-
sons for his premises, though not in this paragraph. By focussing on necessary a priori for-
mal conditions for the possibility of human apperception, Kant avoids one hopeless conun-
drum of infallibilist global perceptual scepticism, which purports to require demonstrating
our cognitive fitness for any logically possible environment, to prove we are cognitively fit
for our actual spatio-temporal, perceptible natural environs. Kant’s justification for his
claims about our forms of judging and categories is in the first chapter of the Analytic of
Concepts; see Wolff (2017) regarding formal aspects of judging. As for Kant’s claim that we
can only think and judge in connection with some manifold presented by sensibility (not
understanding), Schelling tried to work out a purportedly human account of a productively
intuitive understanding, i.e., an understanding which creates its own (manifoldly character-
ised) object of knowledge. His attempt utterly fails to respond to Pyrrhonian scepticism, as
Schulze (1803) made evident by strictly internal critique of Schelling’s proclaimed ‘intellec-
tual intuition’.
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B145 (ll. 714–25): If the unity required for objectively val d (humanly possible) judgments can
be shown to be exactly that form of unity afforded by use of he categories (per §20) in re-
gard to se sory i tuitions of particulars prese ted to us within sensation, so that such use of
the categories holds valid of any and all objects we can sense (and identify ourselv s s sens-
ing), then the Deduction succeeds. Kant’s remark h re abou  the c tegories prescribing
forms of unity to any given intuitions as such suggests the generative sense of ‘constitution
of objects’ (above, §2.15), ut his may merely be a suggestive connotation of Kant’s concise
expression. Kant’s Deduction may succeed by demonstrating conditions which must be sat-
isfied by any particulars we can be aware of via sensation; i.e., Kant’s locution concerni g
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ticulars of which we can be aware in sensory perception, though which constraints these are,
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can only think and judge in connectio  with some manifold presented by sensibility (not
understanding), Schelling tried to work out a pu portedly human ccount of a productively
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§ 22. Die Categorie hat keinen andern 750 
Gebrauch zum Erkenntnisse der
Dinge, als ihre Anwendung auf
Gegenstände der Erfahrung.
Sich einen Gegenstand denken und
einen Gegenstand erkennen, ist also
nicht einerlei. Zum Erkenntnisse gehö-755
ren nämlich zwei Stücke: erstlich der
Begriff, dadurch überhaupt ein Gegen-
stand gedacht wird (die Categorie), und
zweitens die Anschauung, dadurch er
gegeben wird; denn könnte dem Begriffe760
eine correspondirende Anschauung gar
nicht gegeben werden, so wäre er ein
Gedanke der Form nach, aber ohne allen
Gegenstand und durch ihn gar keine Er-
kenntniß von irgend einem Dinge mög-765
lich, weil es, so viel ich wüßte, nichts
gäbe, noch geben könnte, worauf mein
Gedanke angewandt werden könne. Nun
ist alle uns mögliche Anschauung sinn-
lich (Ästhetik), also kann das Denken770
eines Gegenstandes überhaupt durch
einen reinen Verstandesbegriff bey uns
nur Erkenntniß werden, so fern dieser
auf Gegenstände der Sinne bezogen
wird. Sinnliche [B147] Anschauung ist775
entweder reine Anschauung (Raum und
Zeit) oder empirische Anschauung desje-
nigen, was im Raum und der Zeit un-
mittelbar als wirklich, durch Empfin-
dung, vorgestellt wird. Durch Bestim-780
mung der ersteren können wir Erkennt-
nisse a priori von Gegenständen (in der
Mathematik) bekommen, aber nur ihrer
Form nach als Erscheinungen; ob es
§ 22. The Category has no other Use
for Cognition of Things than its
Application to Objects of Ex-
perience.
To think an object, and to know an
object, are thus not one and the
same. Namely, to cognition belong
two factors: first, the concept by
which an object is at all thought (the
category), and second, the intuition
through which that object is given;
for if to the concept no correspond-
ing intuition could be given, that con-
cept would be a thought only for-
mally, though without any object, so
that through it altogether no cogni-
tion of any thing whatever would be
possible, because so far as I would
know, nothing would be given, nor
could be given, to which my thought
could be applied. Now, all intuition
possible for us is sensible (Aesthetic);
therefore the thinking of an object as
such by a pure concept of the under-
standing can for us only become a
cognition in so far as this category is
connected to objects of the senses.
Sensible intuition is either pure intu-
ition (space and time) or empirical
intuition of whatever is represented
immediately by sensation within
space and time as actual. By deter-
mining the former, we can obtain a
priori cognitions of objects (in mathe-
matics), but only according to their
form as appearances; whether things
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3.10 §22: The Category has no other Use for Cognition of Things than their Application
to Objects of Experience.
B146 (ll. 753–68): Kant contrasts thought or thinking as such to cognition, here as successful
knowing of some particular object (Gegenstand), by stressing that any such knowing requires
both using some (perhaps more than one) category and also some sensory intuition(s) by
which that object be ‘given’ or presented to us. Note how Kant stresses that thought as such
cannot specify whether any such object exists. This shows that Kant distinguishes between
conceptual intension and any indicative (deictic) reference which can contribute to knowing;
both are required for any, even putative knowing (i.e., both are necessary also to misattribu-
tion). Once both factors are acknowledged requirements for any successful knowing, the
prospect of ‘ambiguous descriptions’ which may hold of indefinitely many particulars is
shown to be irrelevant to epistemology, because only indicated particulars are candidates for
human (perceptual) knowing. Issues of (logically, i.e., numerically) ‘ambiguous descriptions’
arise by presuming meaning or intension can fill a role it does not and cannot. That is the
defect, in principle, of ‘descriptions theories of reference’ and of Russell’s ‘knowledge [sole-
ly] by description’, which persists through Quine’s attempts to banish singular referring
phrases.
B146 (ll. 768–75): Kant appeals to his finding in the Tr. Aesth., that human beings can only
have sensory intuition; i.e., particulars can only be presented or ‘given’ to us by sensory
channels. Consequently any thought of any object as such can only contribute to knowledge
insofar as this thought is connected to (i.e., used in connection with) some object we sense.
B146–7 (ll. 775–97): Kant remarks on his account of mathematics, which concerns con-
structing forms (arithmetical or geometrical forms) within our pure a priori formal intuitions
of space and of time. Such mathematical constructions do not suffice to prove that they
have any actual instances amongst spatio-temporal particulars.
B147 (ll. 777–80): Important to Kant’s account of empirical knowledge is the second kind of
sensory intuition(s), namely: empirical intuition(s) of whatever is presented within space and
time by sensation as actual. This point Kant picks up directly following his remarks on space,
time and mathematics.
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§ 22. Die Categorie hat keinen andern 750 
Gebrauch zum Erkenntnisse der
Dinge, als ihre Anwendung auf
Gegenstände der Erfahrung.
Sich einen Gegenstand denk und
einen Gegenstand erkennen, ist lso
nicht einerlei. Zum Erkennt isse gehö-755
ren nämlich zwei Stücke: erstlich d r
Begriff, dadurch überhaupt ein Gegen-
stand gedacht wird (die Categorie), un
zweitens die Anschauung, da urch er
gegeben wird; denn könnte dem Begriffe760
eine correspondirend  Anschauung gar
nicht gegeben werde , so wäre er ein
Gedanke der Form nach, aber ohne allen
Gegenstand und durch ihn gar keine Er-
kenntniß von irgend einem Dinge mög-765
lich, weil es, so viel ic üßte, nichts
gäbe, noch geben könnt w rauf m in
Gedanke angewandt wer e  kön e. Nun
ist alle uns mögliche Anscha ung sinn-
lich (Ästhetik), also kann das Denken770
eines Gegenstandes überhaupt durch
einen reinen Verstandesbeg iff bey uns
nur Erkenntniß werden, so fer  dieser
auf Gegenstände der Sinne bezog n
wird. Sinnliche [B147] Anschauung ist775
entweder reine Anschauung (Raum und
Zeit) oder empirische Anschauung desje-
nigen, was im Raum und der Zeit un-
mittelbar als wirklich, durch Empf n-
dung, vorgestellt wir . Durch Bestim-780
mung der ersteren können wir E kennt-
nisse a priori von Gegenständen (in der
Mathematik) bekommen, aber nur ihrer
Form nach als Erscheinungen; ob es
§ 22. The Category has no other Use
for Cognition of Things than its
Application to Objects of Ex-
perience.
To thi  an object, and to k ow an
object, are thu  not one and e
same. Namely, to cognition belong
two factors: first, the con ept by
which an obj ct is at all thought (the
category), and second, the intuition
through whi  that object is given;
for if to the concept no correspond-
ing intuition could be give , that con-
cept would be a thought only for-
mally, though without an  object, so
that through it altogether no cogni-
tion of a y thin  whatever would be
possible, because so far as I would
know, nothing would be given, or
could be given, to which my thought
could be appl ed. Now, all intuition
possible for us is sensible (A sthetic);
therefore he thinking of an object as
such by a pure concept of the under-
standing can for us only become a
cognition in s  far as this category is
con e ted to objects f the senses.
Sensible intuitio  is either pure intu-
ition (space and time) or empirical
intuition of whatever is represented
immediately by sensation within
space and time as actual. By deter-
mining the former, we can obtain a
priori cog itions of objects (in mathe-
matics), but only accord ng to heir
form as appearances; whether things
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3.10 §22: The Category has no ot r Us  f  Cognition of Things than their Application
to Objects of Experience.
B146 (ll. 753–68): Kant contrasts thought or hinking as such to cogn tio , here as successful
knowing of some particular object (Gegenstand), by str ssing that y such knowing requires
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conceptual intension and any indica ive (deictic) referen e which can contribute to knowi g;
both are required for any, even putative knowing (i.e., both are ecessary also to misattribu-
tion). Once both factors are acknowledged equireme ts for any successful knowing, the
pr spect of ‘ambiguous des riptions’ which may hold of indefinitely many particulars is
shown to be irrelevant t  epistemology, because only indicated particulars are candi ates for
human (perceptual) knowing. Issues of (logically, i e., n merically) ‘ mbiguous d scriptions’
arise by presuming meaning or intens on can f ll a role it does not and cannot. That is he
defect, in principle, of ‘des riptions theories of reference’ and of Russell’s ‘knowle ge [sole-
ly] by description’, which persists hrough Quine’s attempts to ban sh singular referring
phrases.
B146 (ll. 768–75): Kant appeals to his findi g in the Tr. Aesth., that human beings can only
have sensory intuition; i. ., particulars can only be presented or ‘given’ to us by sensory
channels. Consequently any thought of any object as s c  can only con ribute to k owledge
insofar as this thought is connec ed to (i.e., used in connecti n with) some bject we sense.
B146–7 (ll. 775–97): Kant remarks on his account of mathematics, which concerns con-
structing forms (arithme ical or geometrical forms) within ou  pure a priori formal intuitions
of space and of time. Such mathematical constructions do not suffice to prove tha they
have any actual instances amongst spatio-temporal particulars.
B147 (ll. 777–80): Important to Kant’s account of empirical knowledge is the second kind of
sensory intuition(s), namely: empir cal intuition(s) of whatever is presented ithin space and
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Dinge geben könne, die in dieser Form785
angeschaut werden müssen, bleibt doch
dabey noch unausgemacht. Folglich sind
alle mathematische Begriffe für sich
nicht Erkenntnisse, außer so fern man
voraussetzt, daß es Dinge giebt, die sich790
nur der Form jener reinen sinnlichen
Anschauung gemäß uns darstellen laßen.
D inge  im  R aum und de r  Ze i t  wer-
den aber nur gegeben, so fern sie Wahr-
nehmungen (mit Empfindung begleitete795
Vorstellungen) sind, mithin durch
empirische Vorstellung. Folglich ver-
schaffen die reinen Verstandesbegriffe,
selbst wenn sie auf Anschauungen a prio-
ri (wie in der Mathematik) angewandt800
werden, nur so fern Erkenntniß, als die-
se, mithin auch die Verstandesbegriffe
vermittelst ihrer auf empirische An-
schauungen angewandt werden können.
Folglich liefern uns die Categorien ver-805
mittelst der Anschauung auch keine Er-
kenntniß von Dingen, als nur durch ihre
mögliche Anwendung auf empirische
Ans chauung , d.i. sie dienen nur zur
Möglichkeit emp i r i s che r  Erkenn t -810
n iß . Diese aber heißt Erfahrung. Folg-
lich haben die Categorien keinen ande-
ren Gebrauch zum Erkenntnisse der
Dinge, als nur [B148] so fern diese als
G egens t ände  mög l i che r  Er f ah -815
rung  angenommen werden.
60 
could be given which must be intu-
ited in such a form, thus remains of
course still undetermined. Conse-
quently all mathematical concepts as
such are not cognitions, except inso-
far as one presupposes that there be
such things which can only be pre-
sented to us in accord with those
forms. However, things in space and
time are only given insofar as they are
perceptions (representations accom-
panied by sensation), hence through
empirical representation. Conse-
quently, the pure concepts of the
understanding, even if they are ap-
plied to a priori intuitions (as in math-
ematics), only afford cognition inso-
far as these [mathematical applica-
tions], hence by that mediation also
the concepts of the understanding,
can be applied to empirical intuitions.
Consequently also the categories pro-
vide us no cognition of things, except
solely through their possible applica-
tion to empirical intuition, i.e., they
only serve the possibility of empirical
cognition. However, this is called expe-
rience. Hence the categories have no
other use for cognition of things,
except insofar as these are assumed
to be objects of possible experience.
B147 (ll. 793–7): Kant remarks that things (here: Dinge) within space and time are only given (pre-
sented) to us insofar as they are perceived, hence insofar as they are (re)presented in con-
junction with sensation(s) by specifically empirical representations (in contrast to pure a priori
representations, whether thoughts or formal intuitions = space, time as such).
B147 (797–805): Kant completes his remark on the use of mathematical constructions in
actual empirical knowledge as expected, that any categories used in connection with those
constructions, and also these constructions themselves, only afford empirical knowledge inso-
far as they can be applied to empirical intuitions of actual, localised, deictically demonstrated
(indicated) spatio-temporal particulars (ll. 801–4).
B147 (ll. 805–11): Kant now expressly draws the conclusion that the categories can provide
knowledge only by their possible application(s) to empirical intuition; so that they only serve
the possibility of empirical knowing – whether mathematicised or (merely) classificatory, which
may include classifying relations, such as causal relations or natural kinds. If Modern readers
find Kant’s argument needlessly explicit, it is because we have long ago given up on a priori
metaphysics. Or have we? Contemporary ‘modal metaphysics’ such as David Lewis’ possible
worlds are at most explications of various intensions, that is, explications of the contents and
logical implications of concepts. These do not automatically provide any ontology, no
metaphysics, no models; only partial descriptions without reference to any identifiable partic-
ulars instantiating them; all these possible instances are mere suppositions.
B147 (ll. 805–14): Kant (here) equates empirical knowledge with experience. One may demur
at this equation, as much of human experience may involve partial ignorance, conjecture,
expectation, action, inquiry and even discovery. However, Kant’s point here concern catego-
ries and their possible legitimate (valid) roles in human knowledge. For this purpose, Kant’s
equation of human experience with knowledge is harmless; his key point stands: We can
only use the categories in genuine, legitimate, valid (accurate, justified) knowledge insofar as
this (prospective, possible) knowledge is experiential, or empirical knowledge.
B147–8 (ll. 811–6): Kant provisionally draws his key conclusion: Our sole humanly possible
use of the categories for knowing things (Dinge) is in ascriptive reference to things as objects
(Gegenstände) of possible experience. Kant’s conclusion is provisional insofar as this §22 is
preliminary, preparing for §26, and insofar as his next untitled § explicates the philosophical
importance of this preliminary conclusion.
61 
Dinge geben könne, die in di s r Form785
angeschaut werden müss n, bleibt doch
dabey noch unausgemacht. F lglich sind
alle mathematische B griffe für si
nicht Erkenntnisse, außer so fer  man
voraussetzt, daß es Dinge giebt, die sich790
nur der Form jener reinen sinnlichen
Anschauung gemäß uns darstellen laßen.
D inge  im  R aum und de r Ze i t  wer-
den aber nur gegeben, so fern sie Wahr-
nehmungen (mit Empfindung begleitete795
Vorstellungen) sind, mithi  durch
empirische Vorstellung. Folglich ver-
schaffen die reinen Verstandesbeg iffe,
selbst wenn sie auf Anschauungen a prio-
ri (wie in der Mathematik) angewandt800
werden, nur so fern Erkenntniß, als di -
se, mithin auch die Verstandesbegriffe
vermittelst ihrer auf e piri che An-
schauungen angewandt werden kö n n.
Folglich liefern uns die Categorien ver-805
mittelst der Anschauung auch keine Er-
kenntniß von Dingen, als nur durch ihre
mögliche Anwendung auf mpirische
Ans chauung , d.i. sie dienen nur zur
Möglichkeit emp i r i s che r  Erkenn t -810
n iß . Diese aber heißt Erfahrung. Folg-
lich haben die Categorien keinen ande-
ren Gebrauch zum Erkenntnisse der
Dinge, als nur [B148] so fern diese als
G egens t ände  mög l i che r  Er f ah -815
rung  angenommen werden.
60 
could b  given which must be ntu-
ited in such a form, thus remains o
course still undetermined. Conse-
quently all mathematical concepts s
such are not cog itions, except inso-
far as one pre upposes that th re be
such things w ich can only be pre-
sented to us in accord with those
forms. However, things in space and
time are only given insofar as the  are
perceptions (representations accom-
panied by sensation), hence through
empirica  representation. Conse-
quently, th  pure concepts of the
understanding, even if they are ap-
plied to a priori in uitions (as in math-
ematics), on y afford cognition i so-
far as these [mathematical applica-
tions], henc  by that mediatio  also
he concepts of the understanding,
can be applied to empirical intuitions.
Consequently also the categori s pro-
vide s no cognition of things, except
solely through t ir possible applica-
tion to empirical intuition, i.e., they
only serve the possibility of empirical
cognition. However, this is called exp -
rie ce. H ce th  categori s have no
other use for cognition of things,
except insofar s these are as umed
to be objects of possible experi nce.
B147 (ll. 793–7): Kant remarks that things (here: Dinge) within space and time are only given (pre-
sented) to us insofar as they are perceived, hence insofar as they are (re)presented in con-
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B147 (ll. 805–11): Kant now expressly draws the conclusion th t the categorie  can provide
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may include classifying relations, such as causal relation  or natural kinds. If Modern re ders
find Kant’s argument needlessly explicit, it is becau e we have long ago given up on a priori
metaphysics. Or have we? Contemporary ‘modal metaphysics’ such as David Lewis’ possible
worlds are at most explications of various intensions, that is, explica ions of the contents and
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§ 23. [Ohne Überschrift]
Der obige Satz ist von der größten 
Wichtigkeit; denn er bestimmt ebenso
wohl die Grenzen des Gebrauchs der820
reinen Verstandesbegriffe in Ansehung
der Gegenstände, als die transscendenta-
le Ästhetik die Grenzen des Gebrauchs
der reinen Form unserer sinnlichen An-
schauung bestimmte. Raum und Zeit825
gelten als Bedingungen der Möglichkeit,
wie uns Gegenstände gegeben werden
können, nicht weiter als für Gegenstände
der Sinne, mithin nur der Erfahrung.
Über diese Grenzen hinaus stellen sie830
gar nichts vor; denn sie sind nur in den
Sinnen und haben außer ihnen keine
Wirklichkeit. Die reinen Verstandesbe-
griffe sind von dieser Einschränkung frei
und erstrecken sich auf Gegenstände der835
Anschauung überhaupt, sie mag der uns-
rigen ähnlich seyn oder nicht, wenn sie
nur sinnlich und nicht intellectuell ist.
Diese weitere Ausdehnung der Begriffe,
über un s e r e  sinnliche Anschauung hin-840
aus, hilft uns aber zu nichts. Denn es
sind alsdann leere Begriffe von Objec-
ten, von denen, ob sie nur einmal mög-
lich sind oder nicht, wir durch jene gar
nicht urtheilen können, bloße Gedan-845
kenformen ohne objective Realität, weil
wir keine Anschauung zur Hand haben,
auf welche die synthetische Einheit der
Apperception, die jene allein enthalten,
angewandt werden, und sie so einen Ge-850
genstand bestimmen [B149] könnten.
Uns e r e  sinnliche und empirische An-
§ 23. [untitled]
The above proposition is of utmost
importance; for it equally well deter-
mines the limits of the use of the
pure concepts of the understanding
in regard to objects, as [in their re-
gard] the Aesthetic determined the
limits of the use of the pure form of
our sensible intuition. Space and time
count as conditions of the possibility
of how objects can be given us, no
further than as objects of the senses,
hence of experience. Beyond these
limits they represent nothing at all;
for they are only in the senses and
otherwise have no actuality. The pure
concepts of the understanding are
free of this restriction, and extend to
objects of intuition as such, regard-
less of whether it be like ours, if only
it be sensible and not intellectual.
This further extension of concepts
beyond our sensible intuition, how-
ever, helps us not at all. For they are
then empty concepts of objects, re-
garding which [objects], whether they
even be possible or not, we cannot at
all judge by those concepts, which are
[in this case] mere forms of thought
lacking objective reality, because we
have at hand no intuition to which
the synthetic unity of apperception,
which contains only those concepts,
can be applied, so that they could
determine (specify) any object. Only
our sensible and empirical intuition
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3.11 §23: [untitled]
B148 (ll. 818–25): Kant’s provisional conclusion is ‘of the highest importance’, because it 
specifies (bestimmt) the limits of our possible valid use of categories in regard to objects, ex-
actly as the Tr. Aesth. specifies the limits of the use of the pure form of our sensory intu-
ition (receptivity). Here is an instance of Kant’s chronic fluidity regarding human sensibility. 
He has the resources to make important, specific distinctions, and often does so, yet he also 
often conflates the following. Taking ‘FORM’ as any condition which allows items to be or-
dered, and ‘MATTER’ as whatever is conditioned by a form, so that it can be ordered, Kant 
distinguishes two senses of ‘form of intuition’, also ‘formal intuition’ and two senses of 
‘form of sensibility’:
Form of Intuition: (a) a ‘form of intuiting’: a formal feature of some mode of intuiting;
(b) a ‘form of an intuited’: a formal feature of something so intuited.
Formal Intuition: a sensible intuition, the character of which depends solely upon the
form of the mode of intuiting, and not upon particular objects given within that form
of intuiting.
Form of Sensibility: (i) a ‘form of receptivity’, or a form of sensibly intuiting; (ii ) a form
of particulars qua sensibly intuited. (Allison 1983, 6–7, 96–7; Paton 1936, 1:101ff.)
The parallel Kant requires between the Deduction of the Categories and that regarding space
and time concerns the a priori concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’, which likewise can only be used by us
legitimately in connection with localising sensed particulars by delimiting (if approximately) the
regions they occupy during those periods of time in which we perceive (or measure) them.
Kant here states that space and time (as such) only pertain to objects we can sense, be-
cause they are (nothing but) conditions of our possibly being presented with particulars we
can sense. That is Kant’s transcendental idealism. Even setting that aside, Kant’s subordi-
nate claims hold: We can only sense spatio-temporal particulars, and we can only use the a
priori concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ in (referential) connection to sensed particulars. Only in
connection with particulars sensed within space and time can we specify any actuality (ll.
832–3), whether of particulars themselves, or of spatial or temporal features or structures.
B148 (ll. 833–8): Kant contrasts the categories to (the concepts of) space and time, indicating
that, at least in principle, our categories can hold for any kind of form of sensory intuiting,
i.e., for any way in which particulars may be made available by sensing to a judging intellect
(understanding). This expansive scope (erstecken, l. 835) is a function of their conceptual con-
tent or intension (only).
B148–9 (ll. 839–54): Kant underscores his anti-rationalist point that, although the (semantic)
scope or intension of the categories is much greater than the domain of possible objects of
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schauung kann ihnen allein Sinn und
Bedeutung verschaffen.
Nimmt man also ein Object einer855
nicht-sinnlichen Anschauung als gegeben
an, so kann man es freilich durch alle die
Prädicate vorstellen, die schon in der
Voraussetzung liegen, daß ihm n i ch t s
zu r  s i nn l i chen  Anschauung  Ge - 860
hö r i g e s  zukomme: also, daß es nicht
ausgedehnt, oder im Raume sei, daß die
Dauer desselben keine Zeit sei, daß in
ihm keine Veränderung (Folge der Be-
stimmungen in der Zeit) angetroffen865
werde, usw. Allein das ist doch kein ei-
gentliches Erkenntnis, wenn ich bloß an-
zeige, wie die Anschauung des Objects
n i ch t  s e i , ohne sagen zu können, was
in ihr denn enthalten sei; denn alsdenn870
habe ich gar nicht die Möglichkeit e in e s
O b j ec t s  zu meinem reinen Verstandes-
begriff vorgestellt, weil ich keine An-
schauung habe geben können, die ihm
korrespondierte, sondern nur sagen875
konnte, daß die unsrige nicht für ihn
gelte. Aber das Vornehmste ist hier, daß
auf ein solches Etwas auch nicht einmal
eine einzige Categorie angewandt werden
könnte: z.B. der Begriff einer Substanz,880
d. i. von Etwas, das als Subject, niemals
aber als bloßes Prädicat existieren könne,
wovon ich gar nicht weiß, ob es irgend
ein Ding geben könne, das dieser Ge-
dankenbestimmung korrespondierete,885
wenn nicht empirische Anschauung mir
den Fall der Anwendung gäbe. Doch
mehr hievon in der Folge. [B150]
64 
can provide [those concepts] sense
and significance.
Thus if one assumes an object of a
non-sensible intuition to be given,
one can admittedly represent by all
those predicates already involved in
the assumption, i.e. that nothing belong-
ing to sensible intuition pertains to it:
hence it is not extended or located in
space, that its duration would not be
any time, that within it no alteration
(succession of determinations in
time) is to be found, etc. However,
that is no proper cognition, if I mere-
ly indicate how the intuition of the
object is not, without being able to say
anything about what then that intu-
ition may contain; for in this case I
have not at all represented the pos-
sibility of an object for my pure con-
cept of the understanding, because I
have not been able to assign any intu-
ition which would correspond to it; I
could only say that in its regard our
intuition is invalid. Above all how-
ever the key point here is that, to
such a something not a single cate-
gory could be applied: e.g., the con-
cept of a substance, i.e., of something
which could exist only as subject, but
never as a mere predicate; of which I
cannot at all know, whether any such
thing could be given corresponding
to this merely conceptual specifica-
tion, if empirical intuition gives me
no case to which to apply [these con-
sensory intuition (sensory presentation) of particulars, this extra scope is to us cognitively
useless, precisely because we cannot identify any non-spatio-temporal particulars to which
this extra scope or intension can possibly pertain, in any specifiable, cognitively valid way.
We can only use categories in knowledge by subsuming particulars under concepts within
(prospective, candidate) cognitive judgments. Subsumable particulars can only be presented
to us in and through sensory intuition; we can only localise and identify particulars as candi-
date subjects of our cognitive judgment(s) within sensory experience, which is spatio-tem-
poral. This is fundamental to the cognitive structure of the human condition. (This point
holds independently of transcendental idealism, and of (non-)Euclidean spaces; see §4.)
B149 (ll. 852–4): Our categories can only be provided sense and significance by our sensory
and empirical intuition(s). These key terms were made famous (to Anglophones) by Frege:
sense and meaning or reference. Kant’s explication of our concepts and their possibly valid
cognitive use does make Frege’s points (so far as these pertain to empirical knowledge), yet
more emphatically in the Schematism: Only as connected or referred to sensed objects do
concepts have Bedeutung (B185–7). The specific ‘sense and significance’ which must be sup-
plied to the categories is their more specific intension by which alone they can pertain to fea-
tures of particulars localised and discriminated within space and time. (This is the topic of
the Schematism.) The specific, fully-fledged cognitive ‘sense and significance’ of the categories
required for empirical knowledge is supplied to the (schematised) categories by referring
them to spatio-temporally localised particulars we discriminate and identify within (spatio-
temporal) experience; this is the topic of Kant’s ‘System of Principles’, both topics belong to
Kant’s ‘Analytic of Principles’. My disambiguation of Kant’s distinctions regarding space,
time and forms of intuiting may suggest that the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ might then also
have a broader scope (or a less specific intension) than required for using these a priori con-
cepts (only) in connection with our human forms of sensory receptivity. This is correct, yet
cognitively useless to us (with regard to particulars) for the same reasons as the broader
scope, i.e. less specific intension, of any of the categories (see §4). Kant suggests (just below)
he agrees, at least regarding the concept ‘time’: If we assume (for the sake of discussion) an
object of non-sensory intuition, it may perhaps have ‘a duration which would not be time’
(B149, ll. 862–3).
B149–50 (ll. 855–88): Kant expressly indicates his proscription of the cognitive use of indirect
proof (disjunctive syllogism plus negation elimination) in any cases in which we cannot indi-
cate – localise, ostend, demonstrate indexically – the relevant particular(s), because in such
cases we cannot realise the concepts involved in our putative cognition (in Teten’s sense) by
indicating demonstratively, deictically, that there is any such object. Though this proscription is
central to Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic, it is not restricted to such transcendent or meta-
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§ 24. Von der Anwendung der Catego-890 
rien auf Gegenstände der Sinne
überhaupt.
Die reinen Verstandesbegriffe bezie-
hen sich durch den bloßen Verstand auf
Gegenstände der Anschauung über-
haupt, unbestimmt ob sie die unsrige895
oder irgend eine andere, doch sinnliche
sei, sind aber eben darum bloße Ge-
dankenfo rmen , wodurch noch kein
bestimmter Gegenstand erkannt wird.
Die Synthesis oder Verbindung des900
Mannigfaltigen in denselben bezog sich
bloß auf die Einheit der Apperception
und war dadurch der Grund der Mög-
lichkeit der Erkenntniß a priori, so fern
sie auf dem Verstande beruht, und mit-905
hin nicht allein transscendental, sondern
auch bloß rein intellectual. Weil in uns
aber eine gewiße Form der sinnlichen
Anschauung a priori zum Grunde liegt,
welche auf der Receptivität der Vorstel-910
lungsfähigkeit (Sinnlichkeit) beruht, so
kann der Verstand als Spontaneität den
inneren Sinn durch das Mannigfaltige
gegebener Vorstellungen der syntheti-
schen Einheit der Apperception gemäß915
bestimmen und so synthetische Einheit
der Apperception des Mannigfaltigen der
sinnlichen Anschauung a priori denken,
als die Bedingung, unter welcher alle Ge-
genstände unserer (der menschlichen)920
cepts]. More on this of course in the 
sequel.
§ 24. Of the Application of the Cate-
gories to Objects of the Senses
as such.
The pure concepts of the under-
standing connect by mere under-
standing to objects of intuition as
such, regardless of whether it be ours
or another kind, provided only that it
be sensible; yet they are, for that very
reason, mere thought-forms, through
which no determinate object yet be
cognised. Synthesis or connection of
the manifold within [those thought-
forms] was connected only to the
unity of apperception and was thus
the a priori ground of the possibility
of cognition, so far as this [possibil-
ity] is based upon the understanding,
and so is not only transcendental, but
also utterly, purely intellectual. How-
ever, because within us a specific
form of sensible intuition a priori is
fundamental, which rests upon the
receptivity of the capability of repre-
sentations (sensibility), the under-
standing as spontaneity can thus de-
termine the inner sense through the
manifold of given representations in
accord with the synthetic unity of
apperception, and so can think a priori
synthetic unity of apperception of the
manifold of sensible intuition as the
physical contexts, as his principal discussion of this point in the Doctrine of Method (B817–22) 
makes plain. This, too, apparently belongs to Kant’s shrewd explication of the epistemological 
significance of the existential presuppositions of Aristotelian syllogistic.
3.12 §24: Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses as such.
B150 (ll. 892–9): Kant’s title to §24 and opening statement recount his painstaking conclusion 
from §23, yet §24 is not redundant! Kant again states that through use by the understanding in 
judging, categories connect to objects presented by intuition as such, regardless of the kind of 
intuition involved, provided only that it be sensible intuition (ll. 892–9). (This point supports 
my suggestion that Kant’s Deduction is neutral with regard to his transcendental idealist ac-
count of space and time = forms of human sensory intuition; regardless, only by sensory intu-
ition of particulars which can stimulate sensations in us can any particulars be presented or ‘giv-
en’ to us.) Kant’s statement about the use and reference (connection) of concepts to objects of 
intuition as such highlights that the categories as such are mere forms of thought, which do 
not suffice to know any specific (determinate) object (ll. 897–9).
B150 (ll. 900–7): Kant now focuses on that kind of conjoining or ‘synthesis’ of a manifold (a 
plurality) within these forms of thought, i.e., of categories (or indeed other concepts) used in 
judging, connects (or relates, refers) solely to the unity of apperception. To anticipate, Kant 
here turns the focus of the Deduction ‘upward’ to the intellectual conditions necessary for 
any humanly possible unified apperception. Due to this connection (to unitary appercep-
tion), the conjoining effected by using categories (in judging) grounds a priori the possibility 
of knowledge, insofar as this possibility is based upon understanding. Because this ground of 
apperception is entirely conceptual and judgmental, it is altogether purely intellectual (as 
well as transcendental).
B150–1 (ll. 907–26): Kant contrasts the understanding to our human form of sensory intui-
ting. He states that a specific form of sensory intuition is a priori fundamental to our human 
cognisance, a form of sensory intuition based upon our sensory receptivity to representa-
tions (our sensibility). (All of this characterisation of our sensibility can be accommodated 
by my alternative, minimal claim about our sensory receptivity.) Kant’s point is that, in con-
trast to sensory receptivity, our understanding is active or ‘spontaneous’, and can determine 
our inner sense through a manifold (or plurality) of given representations in accord with the 
synthetic unity of apperception. In this regard, understanding can a priori think (judge, con-
ceive, comprehend) a synthetic unity of apperception of any manifold within sensory intuition, 
and can do so as the (intellectual) condition under which all objects of human intuition must 
necessarily stand, so that the categories as mere forms of thought obtain or achieve objective 
reality, by being applied to objects given us within (sensory) intuition. (Note that the intellec-
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Anschauung nothwendiger Weise stehen
müssen, dadurch denn die Categorien als
bloße Gedankenformen objective Reali-
tät, d.i. Anwendung auf Gegenstände,
[B151] die uns in der Anschauung gege-925
ben werden können, aber nur als Er-
scheinungen bekommen; denn nur von
diesen sind wir der Anschauung a priori
fähig.
Diese Syn thes i s  des Mannigfalti-930
gen der sinnlichen Anschauung, die a
priori möglich und nothwendig ist, kann
f i gü r l i ch  (synthesis speciosa) genannt
werden zum Unterschiede von derjeni-
gen, welche in Ansehung des Mannigfal-935
tigen einer Anschauung überhaupt in der
bloßen Categorie gedacht würde und
Verstandesverbindung (synthesis intellec-
tualis) heißt; beyde sind t r an s s cen -
den t a l , nicht bloß weil sie selbst a priori940
vorgehen, sondern auch die Möglichkeit
anderer Erkenntniß a priori gründen.
Allein die figürliche Synthesis, wenn
sie bloß auf die ursprünglich-syntheti-
sche Einheit der Apperception, d.i. diese945
transscendentale Einheit, geht, welche in
den Categorien gedacht wird, muß zum
Unterschiede von der bloß intellectuellen
Verbindung die transscendentale Synthe-
sis der Einbildungskraft heißen. E in -950
b i l dungs k r a f t  ist das Vermögen, ei-
nen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Ge-
genwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen.
Da nun alle unsere Anschauung sinnlich
ist, so gehört die Einbildungskraft der955
subjectiven Bedingung wegen, unter der
condition under which all objects of
our (human) intuition must necessar-
ily stand, so that the categories as
mere forms of thought can thus ob-
tain objective reality, i.e. application
to objects which can be given us in
intuition, although only as appear-
ances, for only of these are we capa-
ble a priori to intuit.
This synthesis of the manifold of
sensible intuition which is a priori
possible and necessary, can be called
figurative (synthesis speciosa) to distin-
guish it from that synthesis which in
regard to the manifold of an intuition
as such would be thought within the
mere category and is called intellec-
tual connection (synthesis intellectualis);
both are transcendental, not merely be-
cause they each proceed a priori, but
also because they ground the possi-
bility of other cognitions a priori.
However, figurative synthesis,
merely in regard to the original syn-
thetic unity of apperception, i.e., this
transcendental unity which is thought
in the categories, must, in contradis-
tinction to the merely intellectual
conjunction, be called the transcen-
dental synthesis of the power of ima-
gination. The power of imagination is the
capacity to represent an object  in
intuition even without its presence.
Now as all of our intuition is sensi-
ble, the power of imagination, due to
the subjective conditions under
tual integration of distinct concepts within judging may suffice for Kant’s key claim, that the
analytic unity of apperception can only occur in necessary conjunction with some synthetic
unity of apperception, i.e., with such an integration of distinct concepts in judging, where
these concepts are more than mere thought-forms only when used to identify, differentiate
and integrate sensed features of particulars presented to us via sensory intuition. If this is
correct, Kant’s Deduction holds independently of his transcendental idealism.)
B151 (ll. 926–9): Understandably, Kant recalls his transcendental idealist qualifier, that ob-
jects are given to us within (sensory) intuition only as appearances. That doctrine Kant be-
lieves is demonstrated in the Tr. Aesth.. That doctrine and its qualifier, however, are not
required or justified by anything Kant demonstrates (so far) in the Deduction.
B151 (ll. 930–42): Kant now expressly distinguishes two different kinds or domains of synthetic
integration (unification, conjoining) of manifolds: one within sensibility, the other within intel-
lect. Both are guided by the same formal aspects of judging and by the same categories, yet one
concerns sensory integration (binding) required merely to perceive sensed objects; the other
concerns judgmental differentiation, classification and integration within judgments, by which
we can apperceive anything we perceive, and so can know it empirically. My comments above
(B150, ll. 900–7) capitalised upon Kant’s own indication of the ‘purely intellectual’ conjunction
effected by judging. Kant’s transition here to considering sub-personal sensory integration or
synthesis is an expository, not an inferential, transition. This sub-personal sensory integration
Kant calls figurative synthesis (l. 930–4) or synthesis speciosa (l. 934) primarily concerns process
(the subjective deduction), yet Kant stresses that, like intellectual judgment, sensory integration
too is grounded and guided by a priori conditions, from which the possibility of further a priori
knowledge follows. Hence both kinds or domains of synthesis can afford transcendental
knowledge properly speaking (Tr. Aesth. §3, B40). (For discussion of Kant’s account of figura-
tive synthesis, see Longuenesse (1998), 202–29, 240–7; Kant’s functionalist cognitive architec-
ture, most of which is sub-personal, is charted in KCE, §43.)
B151 (ll. 943–61): Kant further characterises figurative synthesis, but now expressly calls it tran-
scendental synthesis of the power of imagination (ll. 949–50, cf. ll. 966–71). Because Kant’s
remarks primarily concern cognitive process, and so belong to his subjective deduction, I fore-
go detailed comment. The transcendental point of Kant’s discussion of figurative synthesis ef-
fected by transcendental power of imagination (sub-personally) is that some such integration
of sensory intake over time and through space is required for us at all to perceive our surround-
ings, without which we could never (self-consciously) apperceive our surroundings, much less
ever think to ourselves ‘I think …’ that particular over there is now such-and-so. Kant’s con-
cern with synthesis appears much earlier in KdrV (A77–8/B103); recall Kant’s comment: ‘Syn-
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Anschauung nothwendiger Weise stehen
müssen, dadurch denn die Categorien als
bloße Gedankenformen objective Reali-
tät, d.i. Anwendung auf Gegenstände,
[B151] die uns in der Anschauung gege-925
ben werden können, aber nur als Er-
scheinungen bekommen; de n ur v n
diesen sind wir der Anschauung a priori
fähig.
Diese Syn thes i s  des Mannigfalti-930
gen der sinnlichen Anschauung, die a
priori möglich und nothwendi  st, kann
f i gü r l i ch  (synthesis speciosa) genannt
werden zum Unterschie  von derjeni-
gen, welche in Ansehung des Man igfal-935
tigen einer Anschauun  üb rhaupt in der
bloßen Categorie gedacht würde und
Verstandesverbindung (synthesis intellec-
tualis) heißt; beyde sind t r an s s cen -
den t a l , nicht bloß weil sie selbst a pri ri940
vorgehen, sondern auch die Möglichkeit
anderer Erkenntniß a priori gründ .
Allein die figürliche Synthesis, wenn
sie bloß auf die ur prünglich-synth ti-
sche Einheit der Apperc ption, d.i. diese945
transscendentale Einheit, geht, welche in
den Categorien gedacht wird, muß zum
Unterschiede von der bloß intellectuellen
Verbindung die transsc ndentale Synthe-
sis der Einbildungskraft heiße . E i -950
b i l dungs k r a f t  ist das Vermögen, e -
nen Gegenstand auch ohne des en Ge-
genwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen.
Da nun alle unsere Anschauung sinnlich
ist, so gehört die E nbildungskraft d r955
subjectiven Bedingung w gen, unt r der
condition under which all objects of
our (human) intuition must necessar-
ily stand, so that the categories as
mere form  of thought can thu b-
tain objective r ality, .e. application
to objects which can be given us in
i tuitio , although o ly as appear-
ances, for only of these are we capa-
ble a priori to intuit.
This synthesis of the manifold of
sensible intuition which is a pr ori
possible and necessary, can be called
figurative (synthesis speciosa) to dis in-
guish it from that synthesis which in
regard to the m nifold of an in uition
as suc  would be thought within the
mere category and is called intellec-
tual connection (synthesis intellectualis);
both are transce dental, not m rely b -
cause they each proceed a priori, but
also because th y ground the possi-
bility of other cognitions a priori.
However, figurative synthesis,
mere y in regard to the orig al syn-
thetic unity of appercep on, i.e., this
transcendental u ity which is thought
in the categories, must, in contradis-
tinct on to th  merely i tellectual
conjunction, be called the transcen-
dental sy thes s of the power of ima-
gination. The power of imagination is the
capacity to represent an object  in
intuition even without its presence.
Now as all of our intuition is sensi-
le, the power of imagination, du  t
the subjective conditions under
tual integration  distinct concepts within judging may suff ce for Ka t’s key claim, that the
analytic unity of apperception can only occur in necessary conjunction with some synthetic
unity of apperception, i.e., with such an i tegration of distinct concepts in judgi g, wher
these concepts are mor  than m re thought-forms only w en used to identify, differentia e
and integrate sensed features of particulars pres nted to us vi  sensory intuition. If this is
correct, Kant’s Deduction holds i dependently of his transce de tal ideal m.)
B151 (ll. 926–9): Understandably, Kant recall  his transcendental idealist qualifier, th t ob-
jects are given to us within (sensory) intuition only as appearances. That doctrine Kant be-
lieves is demonstrated in the Tr. Aesth.. That doctrine and its qualifier, however, are not
required or justified by anything Kant demonstra es (so far) in the Deduction.
B151 (ll. 930–42): Kant now expressly distinguishes two different kinds or doma ns of synthetic
integration (unification, conjo ning) o  manifolds: one within sens bi ity, the other within intel-
lect. Both are guided by the same formal aspec s of judging and by the same cate ories, e  one
concerns sensory integration (binding) requi ed merely to pe ceive sens d objects; the oth r
concerns judgmental differ ntiation, classification and integr tion within ju gm nts, by hich
we can apperceive anything we perceive, d so can know it mpirically. My comm nts above
(B150, ll. 900–7) capitalised upon Kant’s own in ication of the ‘purely intellectual’ conjunctio
effected by judging. Kant’s transition here to considering sub-personal ensory integration or
synthesis is an expository, not an inferential, transition. This sub-personal sensory integration
Kant calls figurative synthesis (l. 930–4) or synt sis speciosa (l. 934) primarily ncerns process
(the subjective deduction), yet Kant str sses that, like intellectual judgment, sensory integration
t o is grounded and guided by a priori conditions, from which the p s ibility of further a priori
knowledge follows. Hence both kinds or domains of synthesis can afford transcendental
knowledge properly speaking (Tr. Aesth. §3, B40). (For discussion of Kant’s account f figura-
tive synthesis, see Longu nesse (1998), 202–29, 240–7; Kant’s functionalist cognitive architec-
ture, mo t of which is s b-personal, is charted in KCE, §43.)
B151 (ll. 943–61): Kant further characterises fig ative synthesis, but now expressly calls it tran-
scendental synthesis of the power of imagina ion (ll. 949–50, cf. ll. 966–71). Because Kant’s
remarks primarily conc rn cognit ve process, and s  belong t  hi  subjective deduction, I for -
go detailed comment. The tr nscendental point of Kant’s discussi n of figura ive synthesis e -
fected by transcendental power of imagination (sub-personally) is that some such integration
of sensory intake over tim  and through space is required for u  at all to perceive ou surround-
ings, without which we could never (self-cons iously) apperc ive our surroundings, much le s
ever think to ourselves ‘I think …’ that particular over there is now such-and-so. Kant’s con-
cern with synthesis app ars much earlier in KdrV (A77–8/B103); recall Kant’s comment: ‘Syn-
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sie allein den Verstandesbegriffen eine
correspondirende Anschauung geben
kann, zur Sinnlichkeit; so fern aber doch
ihre Synthesis eine Ausübung der Spon-960
taneität ist, welche bestimmend und
nicht wie der Sinn [B152] bloß bestimm-
bar ist, mithin a priori den Sinn seiner
Form nach der Einheit der Appercep-
tion gemäß bestimmen kann, so ist die965
Einbildungskraft so fern ein Vermögen,
die Sinnlichkeit a priori zu bestimmen,
und ihre Synthesis der Anschauungen,
den Categorien gemäß, muß die trans-
scendentale Synthesis der Einbildungs-970
kraft seyn, welches eine Wirkung des
Verstandes auf die Sinnlichkeit und die
erste Anwendung desselben (zugleich
der Grund aller übrigen) auf Gegenstän-
de der uns möglichen Anschauung ist.975
Sie ist als figürlich von der intellectuellen
Synthesis ohne alle Einbildungskraft,
bloß durch den Verstand, unterschieden.
So fern die Einbildungskraft nun Spon-
taneität ist, nenne ich sie auch bisweilen980
die productive Einbildungskraft und un-
terscheide sie dadurch von der repro-
ductiven, deren Synthesis lediglich empi-
rischen Gesetzen, nämlich denen der A-
ssociation, unterworfen ist, und welche985
daher zur Erklärung der Möglichkeit der
Erkenntniß a priori nichts beyträgt und
um deswillen nicht in die Transscen-




which alone it can provide an intu-
ition corresponding to the concepts
of the understanding, thus belongs to
sensibility; however, insofar as its
synthesis is of course an exercise of
spontaneity which is determining and
not like the senses merely determina-
ble, hence can determine a priori the
senses according to its form in ac-
cord with the unity of apperception,
the power of imagination is thus in
that regard a capacity to determine
sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of
intuition in accord with the categories
must be the transcendental synthesis
of the power of imagination, which is
an effect of the understanding upon
sensibility and its first application
(and equally the ground of all further
applications) to objects of our possi-
ble intuition. As figurative it is dis-
tinct to that intellectual synthesis
without the power of imagination
merely through the understanding.
Now insofar as the power of imagi-
nation is spontaneity, occasionally I
call it productive imagination and
thus distinguish it from the reproduc-
tive, the synthesis of which is subject
to merely empirical laws, namely
those of association, and which thus
contributes nothing to the explication
of the possibility of cognition a priori
and so belongs not to transcendental
philosophy but rather to psychology.[…]
thesis as such, as we shall see presently, is the mere effect of imagination, a blind yet indispens-
able function of the soul, without which we would have altogether no knowledge; [yet] to bring
this synthesis to concepts is a function exercised by understanding, by which understanding first
provides us knowledge in the proper sense of the term’ (A77/B103). Kant’s doubled roles for
category-guided forms of synthesis is first stated at A79/B104–5.
B151 (ll. 954–9): Kant here assigns power of imagination to sensibility, and stresses that tran-
scendental power of imagination and its figurative (sensory-perceptual) synthesis is required
for the concepts of the understanding (i.e., the categories) ever to have ‘a corresponding
intuition’, i.e., a sensory presentation of any particular properly classified or characterised by
any category (or any specification of a category) used as a predicate in (even a candidate)
cognitive judgment. Hence this sub-personal sensory-perceptual integration is crucial to any
human thought ever being about any sensed particulars = anything other than ourselves,
within our surroundings, of which we ever can be aware, whether merely perceptually or also
apperceptively. This entire discussion of transcendental imagination concerns process and
belongs to Kant’s subjective deduction, yet Kant uses it here also to highlight issues about
the very possibility of object-directed human sensory perception, apperception and thought;
i.e., the very possibilities for us of ‘objective reality’ (= intentionality qua object-directedness,
or the constitution of objects as objects of attention or thought) and of ‘objective validity’
(= accuracy, truth, justifiedness or justification).
B151–2 (ll. 959–72): Kant indicates, without here explaining, a cognitively much more signif-
icant, much more active and productive role of imagination (or figurative synthesis), de-
scribed as an ‘exercise of spontaneity’ and as ‘determining’ or ‘specifying’, hence not merely
receptive, being determined or specified, nor merely reproducing or retaining in present at-
tention immediately passed sensory-perceptual states. This active role can specify the form
of sense (or sensibility in sensing) a priori in accord with the unity of apperception. This por-
tentous claim can be understood to indicate this a priori role does not merely respond to
sensory intake (cf. ll. 979–87); it is an active responding to continuing sensory intake (sensory
binding). I surmise: This role is explicated in the Analytic of Principles as the anticipatory
character of sensory perception, by which we identify and discriminate particulars within
our sensory experience in part by anticipating what are their structures and features, such
that our continuing perception of them is likely to exhibit some (causally possible) set(s) of
characteristics rather than others (in contrast to those characteristics of our continuing per-
ception of them which are instead due to our own bodily, perceptual-motor activity). This
conjecture accords with KCE Ch. 8; Kant’s discussion here is explicatory, not argumentative
(not justificatory).
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synthesis is of course an exerc e of
spontaneity which is determining and
not like the s ns s merely d termina-
ble, hence can determine a priori the
senses according to its form in ac-
cord with the u ity of apperception,
the power of imagination is thus in
that regard a capacity to determine
sensibility a p iori, and its synthesis of
intuition in accord with the categories
must be the tran cendental synthesis
of the power of imagination, which is
an effect of the understanding upon
sensibility a d its first application
(and equally the ground of all further
applica ions) to objects of our possi-
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without the wer of imagination
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Now insofar as the power of imagi-
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to merely empi ical laws, namely
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thesis as such, as we shall ee presently, is the mer  effect of imagination, a blind yet indispens-
able functi  of the soul, without which we would have altogether no knowledge; [y t] to bring
this synthesis to concepts is a function exercised by understanding, by which understanding first
provides us knowledge in the proper sense of the t rm’ (A77/B103). Kan ’s doubled roles for
category-guided forms of synthesis is first stated at A79/B104–5.
B151 (ll. 954–9): Kant here assigns power of imagination to sensibil ty, and stresses that tran-
scendental power of imagination and its figur tive (se sory-perceptual) synthesis is required
for the concepts of the understanding (i.e., the categories) ever to have ‘a corresponding
intuition’, i.e., a sensory prese tation of any particular pr perly classified or characterised by
any category (or any specificati n of a category) used as a predicate in (even a candidate)
cognitive judgme t. Hence his s b-personal sensory-perceptual integration is crucial to any
human thought ver being about any sensed particulars = anything other than ourselves,
within our surroundings, of which we ever can be a are, heth merely perc ptually or also
apperc ptively. This entir  discussion of tra sc n ental imagination concerns process and
belo gs to Kant’  subjective deduction, yet Kant uses it here also to highligh issues about
the very possibility of object-directed human sensory perception, apperception and thought;
i.e., the very possibilities for us of ‘objective reality’ (= intentionality qua object-directedness,
or the constitution of objects as objects of attention or thought) nd of ‘objective validity’
(= accuracy, truth, justifiedness or justification).
B151–2 (ll. 959–72): Kant indicates, without here expl ining, a cognitively much more signif-
icant, much more act ve and productive role of imagination (or figurative synthesis), de-
scribed as an ‘exercise of spontaneity’ and as ‘determining’ or ‘specifying’, hence not m rel
receptive, being determin d or sp cifie , nor merely reproducing or r taining in present at-
tention imme iately passed sensory-perceptual stat s. This active role can spec fy the form
of sense (or sens bility in sensing) a priori in accord with the unity of apperception. This por-
ent us claim can be understood to indicate this a priori role do s not merely espond to
sensory intake (cf. ll. 979–87); it is an a tive responding to con inuing se sory intake (sensory
binding). I surmise: Th s role is explicat d in the Analytic of Principles as the anticipatory
character of sensory perception, by which we identify and d scriminat  particulars within
our sensory experience in part by anticipating wh t are their structures nd featu e , such
that our continuing perception of hem is likely to exhibit some (causally possible) set(s) of
characteristics rather than other  (in contrast to those characteristics of our continuing per-
ception of them which are i stead due to our ow  bodily, perceptual-motor activity). This
conjecture accords with KCE Ch. 8; Kant’s discussion here is explicatory, not a gumentative
(not justificatory).
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§ 25. [Ohne Überschrift]
[…] So wie zum Erkenntnisse eines von
mir verschiedenen Objects außer dem
Denken eines Objects überhaupt (in der995
Categorie) ich doch noch einer An-
schauung bedarf, dadurch ich jenen all-
gemeinen Begriff bestimme, so bedarf
ich auch zum Erkenntnisse meiner selbst
außer dem Bewußtsein, oder außer dem,1000
daß ich mich denke, noch einer An-
schauung des Mannigfaltigen in mir, wo-
durch ich diesen Gedanken bestimme,
und ich existiere als Intelligenz, die sich
lediglich ihres Verbindungsvermögens1005
bewußt ist, in [B159] Ansehung des Man-
nigfaltigen aber, das sie verbinden soll,
einer einschränkenden Bedingung, die
sie den inneren Sinn nennt, unterworfen,
§25. [untitled]
[…] Just as for cognition of an object
distinct to me, besides the thought of
an object as such (in the category) I
of course still also require an intui-
tion through which I determine that
universal concept; for cognition of
myself, in addition to that conscious-
ness, or additionally, that I think my-
self, I require likewise an intuition of
the manifold within me, through
which I determine this thought, and I
exist as intelligence which is only
conscious of its capacity to conjoin,
yet in regard to this manifold it shall
conjoin, it is subject to a limiting con-
dition, which may be called inner
sense, to make that conjunction
B152 (ll. 963–75): Kant’s statement recaps the points just discussed, to stress that this role of 
‘imagination’ within human sensory perception, actively specifying sensibility and its synthe-
sis of (sensory) intuition in accord with the categories, ‘must be the transcendental synthesis 
of imagination’. This Kant describes as ‘an effect of the understanding upon sensibility’. 
This action of understanding upon sensibility, which IS transcendental synthesis of imagina-
tion, is ‘the first application’ of understanding (which is the power of judging by using the 
categories) to objects (Gegenstände) of any humanly possible sensory intuition. This is ‘figura-
tive synthesis’ (l. 976); it grounds any and all further possible use of categories in connection 
with objects which we can at all sense or perceive; i.e., it grounds any and all explicit judg-
ments we can make about them. (These syntheses all pertain to sensory binding.)
B152 (ll. 976–90): This active, figurative synthesis counts as ‘productive imagination’. It con-
tributes to explicating a priori the very possibility of knowledge; I surmise, it concerns percep-
tual discrimination. The merely reproductive imagination does not so contribute (Kant says); 
although its retention of passing and immediately past sensory states is necessary to any and all 
sensory-perceptual discrimination, it has no implications for a priori explication of those formal 
structures by which objective validity is at all possible for our sensory experience or perceptual 
judgments. (The long ellipsis here omits Kant’s discussion of self-affection, B152–8, including 
the start of §25. My key reason for omitting it is stated above, §2.5.)
3.13 §25: [untitled]
B158 (ll. 993–8): Kant recalls his key deictic, referential point, that any knowledge of any ob-
ject distinct to oneself requires, in addition to the thought of an object as such (using one or 
another category, or some categories), some sensory intuition (of some sensorily given, per-
ceptually presented particular). Yet he recalls this referential point to highlight an important, 
parallel point about the very possibility of any human thinking: ‘I think …’.
B158 (ll. 998–1006): Kant’s self-referential point is that the self-attribution expressed by and 
achieved through any actual thought that ‘I think …’ requires, in addition to that thought, 
also some intuition of some manifold within oneself (within one’s cognisance) by which one 
specifies that first-person thought that ‘I think …’ (such-and-so).
B158–9 (ll. 999–1013): Kant’s point is extremely important, however speculative, conten-
tious, anti-Cartesian, anti-Humean or anti-egoist it may appear to be (re: egoism, cf. Anth. 
§2). Kant claims that any actual occurrence, any actual ‘tokening’ (as is said today), of ‘I 
think …’ is not self-sufficient; it can be thought, Kant claims, only in connection with some 
complex or manifold of which one is aware and regarding which one thinks that ‘I think …
(such-and-so)’. If indeed thinking requires judging, and judging requires forming and consid-
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jene Verbindung nur nach Zeitverhält-1010
nissen, welche ganz außerhalb den ei-
gentlichen Verstandesbegriffen liegen,
anschaulich machen, und sich daher
selbst doch nur erkennen kann, wie sie,
in Absicht auf eine Anschauung (die1015
nicht intellektuell und durch den Ver-
stand selbst gegeben sein kann), ihr
selbst bloß erscheint, nicht wie sie sich
erkennen würde, wenn ihre Anschauung
intellektuell wäre.1020
intuitable (or viewable) only accord-
ing to temporal relations, which lie
entirely outside the concepts of the
understanding proper. Hence one can
only know oneself as one merely ap-
pears in regard to an intuition (which
is not intellectual and cannot be given
through the understanding itself), and
not as one would know oneself if
one’s intuition were intellectual.
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ering complete judgments, thinking that ‘I think …’ is only possible by also thinking its pro-
per complement on some occasion, within some temporal context. Any one of us finite
homo sapiens sapientes who thinks ‘I think …’ exists as intelligence solely conscious of one’s
own capacity to conjoin in regard of some manifold which is to be conjoined, i.e., some plural-
ity or complex of sensed or perceived features of particulars and some plurality of concepts
by which they are classified and so are identified, at least tentatively, so that they can be
(provisionally) ascribed to some particular.
B159 (ll. 1001–9): The necessity of this complex complement required ever to consider
thinking ‘I think …’ is a condition restricting the human possibility of thinking ‘I think …’.
B159 (ll. 1003–14): More specifically, this complex complement to ‘I think …’ involves, di-
rectly or indirectly, some sensory-perceptual content which, insofar as it can be judged or
can by judgment be comprehended, alone provides any occasion to judge and so provides any
occasion to think ‘I think …’ now (and here about that). As an occasional thought, the ‘I think
…’ is subject to temporal relations, which pertain both to the relevant sensory-perceptual
integration and also to the conceptual-classificatory conjoining which is the judging now that
this (or these) particular(s) are such-and-so. Temporal relations (and likewise, may be added:
spatial relations) are not defined or specified by the 12 categories; they are defined or speci-
fied by properly delimiting the distinct a priori concept ‘time’ (and ‘space’) so as to be able to
specify what is now sensorily presented (here and now) to me. Hence, to elucidate Kant’s
point further, our thinking ‘I think …’ requires using the categories, which themselves can
be used only by also using the concepts ‘time’ (and ‘space’) so as to identify within one’s
present (i.e., current) perceptual context whatever is now to be seen here. (Including space and
its concept accords with Kant’s marginalium that the Schematism must also be developed in
connection with space, not only time; GS 23:48.16–7; cf. Erdmann (1881), No. CXXVII.)
B159 (ll. 1015–20): These restrictions upon the humanly possible use of ‘I think …’ all fol-
low from our sensory, receptive form of intuiting; we can only think ‘I think …’ now, on some
occasion, hence at some time, hence subject to conditions not specified solely by the cate-
gories (plus the conccepts ‘space’ and ‘time’), nor by the bare ‘I think …’ as such.
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jene Verbindung nur nach Zeitverhält-1010
nissen, welche ganz außerhalb d n ei-
gentlichen Verstandesbegriffen liegen,
anschaulich machen, und sich d her
selbst doch nur erkennen kann, wie sie,
in Absicht auf eine Anschauung (die1015
nicht intellektuell und durch den Ver-
stand selbst gegeben sein kann), ihr
selbst bloß erscheint, nicht wie sie sich
erkennen würde, wenn ihre Anschauung
intellektuell wäre.1020
intuitable (o  viewable) only accord-
ing to temporal relations, which lie
enti ely outsid  the conc pts of the
understanding proper. H nce one can
o ly k ow ones lf as one merely ap-
pears in regard to an intuition (which
is not intellectual and cannot be given
through the understanding itself), a
ot as one would know oneself if
one’s intuition were intellectual.
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ering complete judgm nts, thinking that ‘I think …’ is only possible by also thinking its pro-
per complement on some occasion, within some temporal context. Any one of us finite
homo sapiens sapientes who thinks ‘I thi k …’ exists as in elligence solely conscious of one’s
own capacity to conjoin in regard of s me ma ifold which is to be conjoined, i.e., ome plural-
ity or complex of sensed or perceived features f a ticulars and some lurality of concepts
by which they are classified and so  identified, at least tentatively, so that hey can be
(provisionally) ascribed t  some particular.
B159 (ll. 1001–9): The necessity of this complex complement required ever to consider
thinking ‘I think …’ is a co dition restricting the huma  possib lity of t inki g ‘I think …’.
B159 (ll. 1003–14): More specifically, this c mplex complement to ‘I think …’ involves, di-
rectly or indirectly, some sensory-perceptual content which, insofar as it can be judged or
can by judgment be comprehended, alone provides any occ sion to judg  and s  pr vides any
occasion to think ‘I think …’ n w (a d here about that). As an occasional ought, the ‘I thi k
…’ is subject to temporal relations, which pertain b th to the relev nt sensory-perceptual
integration and also to the c ceptual-classificatory onjoining which is the judgin now t at
this (or these) particular(s) a e such-and-so. Temporal relation  (and likewise, may be d ed:
spatial relations) are not defin d or specified by the 12 categori s; they are defined or speci-
fied by properly delimiting the distinct a prior  conc pt ‘ me’ (and ‘space’) so as to be able to
specify what is now sensorily presented (h re and now) to me. Hence, to elucidat  Kant’s
point further, our thinki g ‘I think …’ requires using the categor es, which thems lves can
be used only by also using the concept  ‘time’ (and ‘spa ’) so as to identify within one’s
present (i.e., current) perc p ual context whatever is now to be seen here. (Including space and
its concept accords w h Kant’s marginalium that the Schematis  must also be developed in
connection with space, not only time; GS 23:48.16–7; cf. Erdmann (1881), No. CXXVII.)
B159 (ll. 1015–20): These restrictions upon th humanly possible use of ‘I think …’ all fol-
low from our sensory, receptive f rm of intuiting; w can only think ‘I think …’ ow, on some
occasion, hence at some time,  subject to conditions not specified solely by the cate-
gories (plus the conccepts ‘space’ and ‘time’), nor by the bare ‘I think …’ as such.
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§ 26. Transscendentale Deduction des
allgemein möglichen Erfahrungs-
gebrauchs der reinen Verstandes-
begriffe.
In der metaphysischen Deduction1025
wurde der Ursprung der Categorien a pri-
ori überhaupt durch ihre völlige Zusam-
mentreffung mit den allgemeinen logi-
schen Functionen des Denkens darge-
than, in der transscendentalen aber die1030
Möglichkeit derselben als Erkenntnisse a
priori von Gegenständen einer Anschau-
ung überhaupt (§ 20, 21) dargestellt. Jetzt
soll die Möglichkeit, durch Categorien
die Gegenstände, die nur immer unseren1035
Sinnen vorkommen mögen, und zwar
nicht der Form ihrer Anschauung, son-
dern den Gesetzen ihrer Verbindung
nach a priori zu erkennen, also der Natur
gleichsam das Gesetz vorzuschreiben1040
und sie sogar möglich zu machen, erklärt
[B160] werden. Denn ohne diese ihre
Tauglichkeit würde nicht erhellen, wie
alles, was unseren Sinnen nur vor-
kommen mag, unter den Gesetzen ste-1045
hen müsse, die a priori aus dem Verstan-
de allein entspringen.
Zuvörderst merke ich an, daß ich
unter der S yn thes i s  d e r  Apprehen -
s ion  die Zusammensetzung des Man-1050
nigfaltigen in einer empirischen An-
schauung verstehe, dadurch Wahrneh-
mung, d.i. empirisches Bewußtseyn der-
selben (als Erscheinung), möglich wird
[…]. [B161]1055
§26. Transcendental Deduction of
the Universally Possible Experi-
ential Use of the Pure Concepts
of the Understanding.
In the metaphysical deduction the
origin of the categories a priori as
such was exhibited by their complete
correspondence to the universal logi-
cal functions of thinking, however in
the transcendental [deduction] their
possibility as cognitions a priori of
objects of an intuition as such (§§ 20,
21) was exhibited. Now shall be ex-
plicated the possibility by these cate-
gories to cognize the objects which
can only ever present themselves to
our senses, and indeed not according
to the form of their intuition, but
rather according to the laws of their
connection a priori, hence as it were
to prescribe the law to nature and to
make it [nature] possible. For without
this, their sufficiency, it would not be
clear how everything whatsoever
which can confront our senses must
stand under laws which stem a priori
only from the understanding.
First I remark that by synthesis of
apprehension I understand the placing
together of the manifold in an empir-
ical intuition, so that perception, i.e.
empirical consciousness of it (as ap-
pearance) becomes possible […].
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3.14 §26: Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Experiential Use of the
Pure Concepts of the Understanding.
B159 (ll. 1025–33): Kant recalls his previous presentation of the categories as corresponding pre-
cisely to the universal logical functions of judging. That is Kant’s ‘metaphysical deduction’ of the
categories. In contrast, their ‘transcendental’ deduction must present their possibility as a priori
cognitions of intuited objects as such. Kant’s refers to §§20, 21 as indicating this task of their tran-
scendental deduction; he does not claim to have already executed that task.
B159 (ll. 1033–9): Kant’s task now is to explicate a priori the possibility of cognition of any
objects which can be presented to (or by) our senses, not according to their intuitive form
(as spatio-temporal), but according to (a priori) laws of their connection or conjoining.
B159 (ll. 1036–9): Such an explication is, ‘as it were’ (gleichsam) to prescribe the law to nature
and so to ‘make’ nature ‘possible’. Kant’s expressly figurative language cautions against hasty
appeal to the generative sense of ‘constitution of objects’, and expressly allows for the
presuppositional sense of ‘constitution’ of nature (or of particulars within nature) as objects
of our possible sensation, perception, experience, judgment and apperceptive awareness (a-
bove, §2.15). Kant’s Deduction of the categories does set constraints on particulars we can
perceive, experience or judge, but these are epistemic, transcendental constraints; they are
not developed in the Analytic of Concepts, but in the Analytic of Principles.
B160 (ll. 1042–7): The point of Kant’s Deduction is to show that proper use of the catego-
ries is necessary to be aware of sensed particulars, as the particulars they are; so that what-
ever can be presented to our senses must stand under laws deriving a priori from the under-
standing alone. (Serious philosophical issues concern whether Kant’s Deduction must, or
does, prove such an unrestricted universal thesis about any particulars the senses may pres-
ent; or whether it may suffice for Kant to show that apperceptive human experience is only
possible if some sensed particular(s) can be properly identified by correct use of the catego-
ries, leaving it then to empirical inquiry to specify how extensive may be such identifiability
of sensed objects. Kant’s observations at the end of §25 about the occasional character of
any actual ‘I think …’ may support the latter, weaker thesis.)
B160 (ll. 1048–54): Kant remarks on the cognitive process(es) involved in integrating mani-
fold, complex, variegated sensory intake, sufficient to afford perceptual, i.e., empirical con-
sciousness (as distinct to apperceptive perceptual consciousness). His point about process
helps identify issues of cognitive validity addressed subsequently. (Omitted is a brief passage
about space and time as unitary formal intuitions, not merely forms of sensory receptivity;
his key premiss for the ensuing proof is retained on B161, here l. 1056–7.)
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§ 26. Transscendentale Deduction des
allgemein möglichen Erfahrungs-
gebrauchs der reinen Verstandes-
begriffe.
In der metaphysischen Deduc ion1025
wurde der Ursprung der Categorien a pri-
ori überhaupt durch ihre völlige Zusam-
mentreffung mit den allgemei en logi-
schen Functionen des D kens darge-
than, in der transscendentalen abe  die1030
Möglichkeit derselben als Erkenntnis  a
priori von Gegenständen einer Anschau-
ung überhaupt (§ 20, 21) dargestellt. Jetzt
soll die Möglichkeit, durch Categorien
die Gegenstände, die nur immer u s ren1035
Sinnen vorkommen mögen, und zwar
nicht der Form ihrer Anschauung, son-
dern den Gesetzen ihrer Verbindung
nach a priori zu erken en, lso der Natur
gleichsam das Gesetz vorzuschreiben1040
und sie sogar möglich zu machen, erklärt
[B160] werden. Denn ohne diese ihr
Tauglichkeit würde nicht erh llen, wi
alles, was unseren Sinnen nur vor-
kommen mag, unter den Gesetzen ste-1045
hen müsse, die a priori aus dem Verstan-
de allein entspringen.
Zuvörderst merke ich an, daß ich
unter der S yn thes i s  d e Appr ehen -
s ion  die Zusammensetzung des Man-1050
nigfaltigen in einer empirischen A -
schauung verstehe, dadurch Wahrneh-
mung, d.i. empirisches Bewußts yn der-
selben (als Erscheinung), möglich wird
[…]. [B161]1055
§26. Transcen ntal Deduction of
the Univer ally Possible Experi-
ential Use of the Pur  Concepts
of the Understanding.
In the metaphysical deduction the
origin f the categories a priori as
such was exhibited by their complete
corr spo dence to the universal logi-
cal functions of thinking, however in
the tra scendental [deduction] their
possibility as cognitions a priori of
obj cts of an intuition as such (§§ 20,
21) was xhibited. Now shall be ex-
plicated th  possibility by these cate-
gories to cognize the objects which
can only ever present themselves to
our senses, and indeed not according
to the form of their intuiti n, but
rather according to the laws of their
connection a priori, hence as it were
to prescribe the law  nature and to
make it [nature] possible. For wi hout
this, their sufficiency, it would not be
clear how everything w atsoever
which can confront our senses must
stan  under laws which stem a priori
only from the understa ding.
First I remark that by synthesis of
apprehension I u derst nd the placing
together of the manifold in an empir-
ical ntuition, so that perception, i.e.
empirical consciousn ss of it (as ap-
pearance) becomes possible […].
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3.14 §26: Transcendental Deductio  of th  Universally Possible Experiential Use of the
Pure Concepts of the Understanding.
B159 (ll. 1025–33): Kant reca s his previous pres ntation of the categories s correspondin  pr -
cisely to the universal logical functions of judging. That is Kant’s ‘metaphysical deduc ion’ of the
categories. In contrast, th ir ‘transcendent l’ deduction must present their possibility a  a priori
cognitions of intuited objects as such. Kant’s ref rs to §§20, 21 s indicating this task of their tran-
scendental deduction; he does not claim t  hav  alr ady executed t t task.
B159 (ll. 1033–9): Kant’s task now is to explicate a priori the possibility of c gnition of any
objects which can be presented to (or by) our s ses, not according to their intuitive form
(as spatio-temporal), but according to (a priori) laws of their connection or conjoining.
B159 (ll. 1036–9): Such an explication is, ‘as it w re’ (gleichsam) to prescribe the law to nature
and so to ‘mak ’ nature ‘possible’. Kant’s expressly figurative language cautions against h sty
appeal to the generative sense of ‘co stitution of objects’, and expressly allows for the
presuppo itional sense of ‘const ution’ of nature (or of particulars within nature) as objects
of our possible sensation, perception, xperie ce, judgme t and apperceptive awareness (a-
bove, §2.15). Kant’s Deduction of the categories does se  constraints on particulars we can
perceive, experience or judg , but th se are epist mic, tran cendental constraints; they are
not developed in the Analytic of Concepts, but in the Analytic of Principles.
B160 (ll. 1042–7): The point of Kant’s Deduction is to show that pr per use of the c tego-
ries is necessary to be aware of sensed particul s, as the particulars they are; so that what-
ever can be presented to our senses must stand nd r laws deriving a priori from the u der-
standing alone. (Serious philosophical issues concern whether Kant’s Deduction must, or
does, prove such an unr tricted universal thesis about any particular the senses may pres-
ent; or whether it may suffice for Kan to show that apperceptive human ex erience is only
possibl  if some sensed particular(s) can b  properly identified by c rr ct us  of the catego-
ries, leaving it then to empirical inquiry to specify how extensive may be such id t fiability
of sensed objects. Kant’  observation  at the end of §25 about the occasional charac er of
any actual ‘I think …’ may support the latter, weaker thesis.)
B160 (ll. 1048–54): Kant remarks on the cognitive process(es) involved in int grating mani-
fold, complex, variegate  sensory intake, sufficient to afford perceptual, i.e., empirical con-
sciousness (as distinct t  apperceptive perceptual consciousness). His poi t about process
helps identify issues of cognitive val dity addressed subsequently. (Omitted is a brief passage
about space and time as nitary formal intuitions, not mere y forms of sensory receptivity;
his key premiss for the ensuing proof is etained o  B161, here l. 1056–7.)
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[…] E inhe i t  d e r  S yn thes i s  des Man-
nigfaltigen außer oder in uns, mithin
auch eine Verbindung, der alles, was im
Raume oder der Zeit bestimmt vorge-
stellt werden soll, gemäß seyn muß, [ist]1060
a priori als Bedingung der Synthesis aller
Apprehension schon mit (nicht in) die-
sen [raum-zeitlich, sinnlichen] Anschau-
ungen zugleich gegeben.
Diese synthetische Einheit aber kann1065
keine andere seyn, als die der Verbin-
dung des Mannigfaltigen einer gegebe-
nen Anschauung überhaupt in einem ur-
sprünglichen Bewußtseyn, den Categori-
en gemäß, nur auf unsere sinnliche1070
Anschauung angewandt. Folglich steht
alle Synthesis, wodurch selbst Wahrneh-
mung möglich wird, unter den Categori-
en; und da Erfahrung Erkenntniß durch
verknüpfte Wahrnehmungen ist, so sind1075
die Categorien Bedingungen der
Möglichkeit der Erfahrung und gelten
also a priori auch von allen Gegenstän-
den der Erfahrung.
*   *   *1080
[…] Unity of synthesis of the manifold
outside or within us, hence also a
connection with which must accord
everything which shall be represented
determinately within space or time,
[is] given at once a priori as condition
of the synthesis of all apprehension
already with (not in) these [sensible,
spatio-temporal] intuitions.
However, this synthetic unity can
be none other than the binding of the
manifold of a given intuition as such
in an original consciousness accord-
ing to the categories, applied solely to
our sensible intuition. Consequently
all synthesis, by which even percep-
tion is possible, stands under the cat-
egories; and since experience is cog-
nition through connected percep-
tions, the categories are thus condi-
tions of the possibility of experience
and are thus valid a priori also of all
objects of experience. […]
*   *   *
 78 
B161 (ll. 1056–79): Insofar as particulars (of whatever sort or scale) are sensed by or pre-
sented to us via our senses and so are sensed by or presented to us spatio-temporally, the
two a priori concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ pertain to them; whatever is so presented to us falls
within the intension (scope) of those two concepts. However, these conditions as such do
not at all suffice to individuate, discriminate or identify any sensed particular whatever. Nei-
ther do these conditions suffice to specify any instance of any a priori categorical feature(s)
of our concept of an object as such. Hence these sensory, intuitive, spatio-temporal, concep-
tual and judgmental conditions do not suffice to specify any complement to any (attempted)
apperceptive ‘I think …’. Actually to think any instance of ‘I think …’ involves thinking
about some particular(s) or others now sensorily presented (here or there). Any such humanly
possible thought must be structured and facilitated by judgmental use of categories, which
we must be able to use to discriminate some sensorily presented particular(s). This does en-
tail constraints on humanly identifiable particulars, but those constraints are the topic of the
Analytic of Principles. Kant’s point in the Deduction is that anyone who can think ‘I think
…’ must think by using the categories in making judgments, however approximate, tentative
or inaccurate, by which s/he can identify and discriminate, at least presumptively, some
spatio-temporal sensed particular(s), so as to be able to think that s/he perceives that or them,
now (and there), so as to realise the incomplete thought ‘I think …’ by ascribing that thought
to oneself in the context of being able to identify, individuate and correctly (if perhaps
crudely) identify some feature(s) of some perceived particular(s), and only thus being able to
think and to correctly conceive oneself as perceiving that or those particular(s). Without us-
ing the categories in presumptive cognitive judgments about some particular(s) or other(s),
one could neither think nor say ‘it is (such-and-so)’; indeed, not even to think or to say ‘it
seems to me to be (such-and-so)’, because even this thought and judgment require discrimi-
nating by localising the relevant ‘it’, in part by delimiting the region (spatial scope) within
which one now (period) perceives it, by ascribing at least some feature(s) to it. Kant’s Deduc-
tion focuses on the highest conceptual and judgmental conditions which must be satisfied
for any actual instance of any humanly possible ‘I think …’. The Analytic of Principles ex-
amines the correlative constraints upon sensed, perceived particulars, such that we can at all
identify them.
Kant’s point in the deduction is that any humanly possible discrimination of specific regions
of space and of specific periods of time require discriminating particulars which one identifies
within some perceptual-experiential context, on some occasion, as having their specific spatial
configuration and temporal duration, both of which can be specified only by conjointly speci-
fying some features of those particulars by which one can at all discriminate them from one an-
other, and contrast it or them to onself and one’s perceiving of it or them. All these specific, par-
ticular discriminations require competent judgmental use of the categories and the concepts
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[…] E inhe i t  d e r  S yn thes i s  des Man-
nigfaltigen außer oder in uns, mithin
auch eine Verbindung, der alles, was im
Raume oder der Zeit bestimmt vorge-
stellt werden soll, gemäß seyn muß, [ist]1060
a priori als Bedingung der Synthesis aller
Apprehension schon mit (nicht i ) die-
sen [raum-zeitlich, sinnlichen] Anschau-
ungen zugleich gegebe .
Diese synthetische Einheit aber kann1065
keine andere seyn, als die der Verbi -
dung des Mannigfaltigen einer gegebe-
nen Anschauung überhaupt in einem ur-
sprünglichen Bewußt eyn, den Categori-
en gemäß, nur auf unsere sin liche1070
Anschauung angewandt. Folglich steht
alle Synthesis, wodurch selbst Wahrneh-
mung möglich wird, unter den Categori-
en; und da Erfahrung Erkenntniß durch
verknüpfte Wahrnehmungen ist, so si d1075
die Categorien Bedingungen der
Möglichkeit der Erfahrung und g lten
also a priori auch von allen Gegenstän-
den der Erfahrung.
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[…] Unity of synthesis of the manifold
outside or within us, hence also a
connection with whi h must accord
ev rything which shall be represented
determinately within space or time,
[is] given at onc  a priori as condition
of the synthesis of all apprehension
a ready with (not in) these [sensible,
spatio-temporal] intuitions.
However, this synthetic unity can
be non  oth  than the binding of the
manifold of a given intuiti n as such
in an original consciousness accord-
ing to the categories, applied solely t
our sensible ntuition. Consequ ntly
all synthesis, by which even percep-
tion i  possible, stands under the cat-
egories; and since experience is cog-
nitio  through con ected percep-
tions, the categories are thus condi-
tio s of the possibili y of experience
and are thus valid a priori also of all
obj cts of xperience. […]
*   *   *
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B161 (ll. 1056–79): Insofar as particulars (of whatever sort or scale) are s n ed by or pre-
sented to us via our senses and so are sen d by or presented to us spatio-t mporally, the
two a priori oncepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ ertain to them; whatever is s pr sented to us falls
within the intension (scope) of those two concepts. How ver, these conditi ns as such do
not at all suffice to individuate, discriminate or identify any se sed particular whatever. Nei-
ther do these conditions suffice to specify a y instance of any a priori categorical feature(s)
of our concept of an object as su h. Hence th se sensory, intuitive, spatio-temporal, conce -
tual and judgmental conditions do not suffice to specify any complement to any (atte pted)
apperceptive ‘I think …’. Actually to think any instance f ‘I think …’ involves thinking
about some particular(s) or others now sensorily pres nted (here or there). Any suc  humanly
possible thought must be structured and facilitated by judgmental use of categories, which
we must be able to use to di criminate som sensorily pres nted particular(s). This does en-
tail constraints on humanly identifiable particulars, bu  thos constraint  are t e topic of the
Analytic of Principles. K nt’s point i  th  Deduction is hat anyone wh  can t ink ‘I think
…’ must think by using the categories in making judgment , however approximate, tentative
or inaccurate, by which s/he c n identify and discriminate, at least presu ptively, some
spatio-temporal sensed particular(s), so as to be able to think tha  s/he p rceives that or them,
now (and there), so as to realise t  incomplete thought ‘I think …’ by ascribing that thought
to oneself in the context of be g able to identi y, individua e and correctly (if p rhaps
crudely) identify some feature(s) of some p rceived particular(s), and only thus being able to
think and to correctly conceive oneself as perceiving that or thos  particular(s). Wit ut us-
ing the categories in presumptiv  cognitive judg ents about some particular(s) or other(s),
one could neither think nor say ‘it is (such-and-so)’; indeed, not even to think or t  say ‘it
seems to me to be (such-and-so)’, because even this thought and judgmen  require discrimi-
nating by localising the relevant ‘it’, in part by delimiting the region (spatial scop ) within
which one now (period) perceiv s it, by ascribing at lea t some feature(s) to it. Kant’s Deduc-
tion focuses on the highest onceptual and judgmental conditions which must be satisfied
for any actual instance of any humanly possible ‘I t ink …’. The Analytic of Principl s ex-
amines the correlative co straints upon sensed, perceived particulars such that we can t all
identify them.
Kant’s point in the deduction is that any humanly po sible discrimination f specific regions
of space and of specific periods of time r quire discriminating particulars which one identifies
within some perceptual-experiential context, on some occasion, as having their specific sp tial
configuration and temp ral duration, bo h of which c n be specified only by conjointly speci-
fying some features of those particul rs by which one can at all discriminate them from one a -
other, and contrast it or them to onself and one’s perceiving of it or them. All these specific, par-
ticular discriminations require competent judgmental use of the categories and the concepts
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[B162] Wenn ich also z. B. die empirische
Anschauung eines Hauses durch Appre-
hension des Mannigfaltigen derselben
zur Wahrnehmung mache, so liegt mir
die no twend ige  E inhe i t  des Raumes1085
und der äußeren sinnlichen Anschauung
überhaupt zum Grunde, und ich zeichne
gleichsam seine Gestalt, dieser syntheti-
schen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen im
Raume gemäß. Eben dieselbe syntheti-1090
sche Einheit aber, wenn ich von der
Form des Raumes abstrahiere, hat im
Verstande ihren Sitz, und ist die Catego-
rie der Synthesis des Gleichartigen in ei-
ner Anschauung überhaupt, d. i. die Ca-1095
tegorie der Größe , welcher also jene
Synthesis der Apprehension, d. i. die
Wahrnehmung, durchaus gemäß sein
muß.*
* Auf solche Weise wird bewiesen: daß1100
die Synthesis der Apprehension, welche
empirisch ist, der Synthesis der Apper-
zeption, welche intellektuell und gänzlich
a priori in der Categorie enthalten ist,
nothwendig gemäß sein müsse. Es ist1105
eine und dieselbe Spontaneität, welche
dort ,  unter  dem Namen der
Einbildungskraft, hier des Verstandes,
Verbindung in das Mannigfaltige der
Anschauung hineinbringt.1110
*   *   * [… B163]
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If, e.g., I make the empirical intu-
ition of a house through apprehen-
sion of its manifold into perception,
fundamental to my so doing is the
necessary unity of space and outer sen-
sible intuition as such, and I as it
were draw its figure in accord with
this synthetic unity of the manifold in
space. However, this very same syn-
thetic unity, if I abstract from the
form of space, is rooted in the under-
standing, and is the the category of
synthesis of the uniform in an intu-
ition as such, i.e., the category of
quntity, with which that synthesis of
apprehension, i.e., the perception,
must therefore entirely accord.*
* In this way is proven: that the syn-
thesis of apprehension, which is em-
pirical, must necessarily accord with
the synthesis of apperception, which
is intellectual and is contained entirely
a priori in the category. It is one and
the same spontaneity which there,
under the name of imagination, and
here under the name of understand-
ing, brings conjunction into the man-
ifold of intuition.
*   *   *
‘space(s)’ and ‘time(s)’ to identify by classifying (specifying) conjointly all of these discriminated
features, particulars, relations and occasion. Without such possible competent use of categories
in prospectively cognitive judgments within perceptual contexts we never could be able merely
to judge (or to say), this particular IS such-and-so; indeed, we could never merely judge (or say),
‘I think ... this particular appears to me such-and-so’, because such hesitant reports of sensory
appearances require identifying that which so appears to oneself as some particular which so
appears. This much, at least, Kant proves in his Deduction of the Categories.
B162 (ll. 1081–1099): Mercifully, Kant illustrates his point with an example which can only be
fully explicated in the ‘Analogies of Experience’ (N.B.: all three Analogies conjointly! KCE
§§44–61): perceiving a house (B162, cf. B235, 237). Recalling the previous comments, the key
points are these: Perceiving (e.g.) a house presupposes the necessary unity of space within
which the house is located. That presupposition, however, does not suffice to specify any region
of space occupied by the house. Specifying this region requires arbitrarily delimiting the con-
cept ‘space’ to conceive this specific region of space, by ‘as it were’ outlining the boundary of
the house, which requires identifying some structural features of the house: Its foundation (at
ground level), walls and roof, at least approximately. Here Kant anticipates exactly Evans’
(1975) point about the mutual interdependence of identifying the spatial boundaries of any
perceived thing and ascribing to that thing some manifest features (by which alone the relevant
boundaries can be identified). Here Kant stresses that identifying and discriminating (differen-
tiating) that spatial region occupied by that house uses (inter alia) the category of quantity to
identify the house’s spatial quantity (size, shape, place), and that the sensory synthesis required
to perceive this house must also accord with this same quantitative, categorial synthesis and the
conceptual specification it affords of the location and dimensions of the house.
B162 (ll. 1100–10): Kant notes (*) that this illustration, together with the previous main text
of §26, prove that the empirical synthesis of sensory apprehension (sensory binding) must
necessarily accord with the intellectual, categorial synthesis which affords any explicit
(apperceptive, prospectively accurate) recognition of that space occupied by that house. Kant
reiterates the two-fold spontaneous use of the categories, one sub-personal by transcenden-
tal power of imagination, which affords sensory synthesis (binding) required to perceive any
particulars; the other explicit by understanding, exercised in explicit judging of whatever
particular(s) one localises within one’s surroundings, which can be judged in overt cognitive
judgments. That these are one and the same ‘spontaneity’ does not entail token identity of
particular conjunctions, combinations or syntheses effected in these two fundamental re-
gards: one sensory-perceptive, the other intellectual.
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[B162] Wenn ich also z. B. die mp rische
Anschauung eines Hauses d rch Appre-
hension des Mannigfaltigen derselbe
zur Wahrnehmung mache, so liegt mir
die no twend ige  E inhe i t  des Raumes1085
und der äußeren sinnlichen Anschauung
überhaupt zum Grunde, und ich zeichne
gleichsam seine Gesta t, dieser y theti-
schen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen im
Raume gemäß. Eben dies lbe syntheti-1090
sche Einheit aber, wenn ich von der
Form des Raumes abstrahiere, hat im
Verstande ihren Sitz, und ist ie Catego-
rie der Synthesis des Gleichartigen in ei-
ner Anschauung überhaupt, d. i. die Ca-1095
tegorie der Größe , welcher also jene
Synthesis der Apprehension, . i. die
Wahrnehmung, durchaus ge äß sein
muß.*
* Auf solche Weise wird bewies n: daß1100
die Synthesis der Apprehension, welche
empirisch ist, der Synthesis der Apper-
zeption, welche intellektuell und gänzlich
a priori in der Categorie enthalten ist,
nothwendig gemäß sein müsse. Es ist1105
eine und dieselbe Spontaneität, w che
dort ,  unter  dem Namen der
Einbildungskraft, hier des Verstandes,
Verbindung in das Man igfaltige der
Anschauung hineinbringt.1110
*   *   * [… B163]
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If, .g., I make the empirical intu-
ition of a hous  through apprehen-
sion of its manifold into perceptio ,
fundamental to my so oing is the
necessary unity of space and outer sen-
sible intuition as such, and I as it
were draw its figure in accord with
his synthetic un ty of the manifold i
space. However, this very same syn-
th tic unity, if I abstract from the
form of space, is ooted in the under-
stand ng, and is the the category of
synthesis of the uniform in an intu-
ition as such, i.e., the category of
q ntity, with which that s nthesis of
apprehension, i.e., the perception,
must therefore entirely accord.*
* In this way is proven: that the syn-
thesis of apprehension, which is em-
pirical, must n cessarily ccord with
th  synthesis of apperception, which
is int llectual and is contained entirely
a priori in the category. It is one and
the same spontaneity which there,
under th  name of imagina ion, nd
here under the name of understand-
ing, brings conjunctio  into the man-
ifold of intuition.
*   *   *
‘space(s)’ and ‘time(s)’ to identify by classifying (spec ing) conjointly all of these discriminated
features, a ticulars, relations and occasion. Without such po sible compe ent use f cat g ries
in prospe tively cognitive judgments within perceptual contexts we never could b  able mer ly
to judge (or to say), this particular IS such-and-so; indeed, we ould never m rely judge (or say),
‘I think ... this particular appears o me such-and-so’, becaus   hesitant reports of sensory
appearances require identifying that wh ch so appears to oneself as som  particular which so
appears. This much, at least, Kant proves in his Deduction f the Categories.
B162 (ll. 1081–1099): Mercifully, Kant illustrat s his point with an example which can only be
fully explicated in the ‘Analogies of Experience’ (N.B.: all thr e Analogies conjointly! KCE
§§44–61): perceiving a house (B162, cf. B235, 237). Recalling the previous commen s, the key
points ar  thes : Perceiving (e.g.) a hous  presupposes the necessary unity of space within
which the h use is located. That presupposition, howeve , does not suffice to specify a y region
of space occupied by the house. Specifying is region requ res arbitra ily delimiting the con-
cept ‘space’ to c nceive this specific region of space, by ‘as it were’ outlining the boundary of
t e house, which requir s identifying some structural eatures of the house: Its foundation (at
ground level), walls and roof, at least approximately. H re Kant anticipates exactly Ev s’
(1975) point about the mutual erdependence of identifying th  spatial boundaries of any
perceived thing and ascribing to at thi g some manifest features (by which alon  the relevant
boundaries can be identifie ). Here Kant stresses that id ntifying and discriminating (differen-
tiating) that spatial region occupied by that h use uses (inter ali ) the category of quantity to
identify the house’s spatial quantity (siz , shape, place), and that the sensory sy thesis required
to perceive this house must also accord with this s me quantitative, categorial synthesis and the
conceptual specification it affords of the location and imensions of the house.
B162 (ll. 1100–10): Kant notes (*) that this illustration, together with he previous main ex
of §26, prove that the empirical synt esis of sensory apprehension (sensory binding) must
necessarily accord with the intellectual, categorial synthesis which affords any expl it
(apperceptive, prospectively accurate) recognition of that space occupied by that house. Kant
reiterates the two-fold spon aneous use f the ca egorie , one sub-personal by transcenden-
tal power of imagination, which affords sensory synt esis (bindi g) required to perceive any
particulars; the other explicit by understanding, exercised in explicit judging of whatever
particular(s) one localises within one’s surroundings, which can be ju ged in overt cognitive
judgments. That these are one and the same ‘sp taneity’ does not entail token id ntity of
particular conjunctions, combinations or syntheses effected in these two undame tal re-
gards: one sensory-perceptive, the other intell ctual.
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Categorien sind Begriffe, welche den
Erscheinungen, mithin der Natur als
dem Inbegriffe aller Erscheinungen (na-
tura materialiter spectata) Gesetze a priori1115
vorschreiben; und nun frägt sich, da sie
nicht von der Natur abgeleitet werden
und sich nach ihr als ihrem Muster rich-
ten (weil sie sonst bloß empirisch seyn
würden), wie es zu begreifen sei, daß die1120
Natur sich nach ihnen richten müsse, d.i.
wie sie die Verbindung des Mannigfalti-
gen der Natur, ohne sie von dieser ab-
zunehmen, a priori bestimmen können.
Hier ist die Auflösung dieses Räthsels.1125
B164] Es ist um nichts befremdlicher,
wie die Gesetze der Erscheinungen in
der Natur mit dem Verstande und seiner
Form a priori, d.i. seinem Vermögen das
Mannigfaltige überhaupt zu verbinden,1130
als wie die Erscheinungen selbst mit der
Form der sinnlichen Anschauung a priori
übereinstimmen müssen. Denn Gesetze
existiren eben so wenig in den Erschei-
nungen, sondern nur relativ auf das Sub-1135
ject, dem die Erscheinungen inhäriren,
so fern es Verstand hat, als Erscheinun-
gen nicht an sich existiren, sondern nur
relativ auf dasselbe Wesen, so fern es
Sinne hat. Dingen an sich selbst würde1140
ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit nothwendig auch
außer einem Verstande, der sie erkennt,
zukommen. Allein Erscheinungen sind
nur Vorstellungen von Dingen, die nach
dem, was sie an sich seyn mögen, uner-1145
kannt da sind. Als bloße Vorstellungen
Categories are concepts which pre-
scribe laws a priori to appearances,
hence to nature as the totality of all
appearances (natura materialiter specta-
ta); and now the question is, since
they are not derived from nature and
so would address it as their exem-
plary instance (because they would
thus be merely empirical), how is it
comprehensible that nature must ad-
dress them, i.e. how can they deter-
mine a priori the connection of the
manifold of nature, without being
derived from it. Here is the solution
to this riddle.
It is no more baffling, how the laws
of the appearances within nature
must as such be connected with the
understanding and its a priori form,
i.e., with its capacity to connect the
manifold as such, than how appear-
ances themselves must agree a priori
with the form of sensible intuition.
For laws exist just as little within ap-
pearances, but rather only relative to
the subject in which appearances in-
here, so far as it has understanding,
as appearances do not exist in them-
selves, but rather only relative to that
same being, insofar as it has senses.
To things in themselves would nec-
essarily be ascribed their lawfulness,
also apart from any understanding
which knows them. However appear-
ances are only representations of
things, which are there, altogether
B163 (ll. 1112–16): Kant again states that the categories prescribe laws to nature (as the sum
total of appearances) a priori. This may appear to affirm the generative sense of ‘constitution
of objects’ (above, §2.15), but it need not be so interpreted: It may suffice to affirm the sec-
ond, presuppositional sense, that only those sensed particulars which can be judged using
the categories can be ‘anything for me’, as Kant says earlier in the Deduction (§16), when
recognising that sensory states may well occur within oneself, of which one would or could
never become self-consciously aware (above, §3.4). Kant’s term ‘appearances’ can be used,
and is used by Kant, in several senses. Caution is required to discern which senses of
‘appearance(s)’ is or is not ruled in, or ruled out, by various aspects of Kant’s transcendental
reflections on possible experience and its conditions.
B163 (ll. 1116–25): Kant poses the puzzle about how our a priori categories can (even appear
to, ‘as it were’) prescribe laws to (or constraints upon) nature, if they are a priori and not
taken from nature.
B164–5 (ll. 1126–70): Kant’s solution to the puzzle appeals to transcendental idealism, ac-
cording to which ‘appearances’ ‘inhere in the subject’ (ll. 1131–40). Accordingly, whatever
structure(s) inhere in appearances depend upon the subject in which those appearances in-
here. Hence there is no particular surprise that appearances must exhibit whatever structures
are required by that subject’s forms of sensibility (receptivity) and forms of intellect (judg-
ment). ‘Appearances, however, are only representations of things’, and these representations
are structured by the representing subject (ll. 1143–50).
Kant’s solution is not entirely satisfactory, in part because it is too convenient. I have
argued elsewhere (KTPR) that Kant’s transcendental idealism requires (as he insists) a radical
dichotomy between the formal structures of experience (which alone are said to be ‘legis-
lated’ by our human form of cognisance) and the material content(s) of experience, includ-
ing quite specific sensory contents. Kant’s transcendental idealism is designed to account for
formal a priori conditions of possible human apperceptive experience which are either con-
ceptual or intuitive. Yet Kant’s probing examination of the formal a priori conditions neces-
sary for the possibility of our apperceptive experience also identifies a key formal a priori
condition which is neither conceptual nor intuitive but rather is material: The humanly iden-
tifiable kinds and degrees of similarity and variety amongst the contents of sensory intake.
Such humanly identifiable kinds and degrees of similarity and variety amongst the contents
of sensory intake, and likewise at a richer level of integration such sensory intake affords,
also amongst the objects of sensory intuition and perception (Kant makes the point at both
these levels), in principle cannot be generated by the structure and functioning of our human
sensibility or intellect, whether singly or conjointly. The matter of sensation itself, must be
given us ab extra (from without), not generated by the human subject; this thesis is (partly)
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Erscheinungen, mithin d r Natur als
dem Inbegriffe aller Erscheinungen (na-
tura materialiter spectata) Ges tze a priori1115
vorschreiben; und nun frägt sich, da sie
nicht von der Natur abgeleitet werden
und sich nach ihr als ihrem Muster rich-
ten (weil sie sonst bloß empirisch seyn
würden), wie es zu begreife  sei, daß die1120
Natur sich nach ihnen richten müsse, d.i.
wie sie die Verbindung des Mannigfalti-
gen der Natur, ohne sie von dieser ab-
zunehmen, a priori bestim  können.
Hier ist die Auflösung dieses Räthsels.1125
B164] Es ist um nichts befremdlicher,
wie die Gesetze der Erscheinungen in
der Natur mit dem Verstande und seiner
Form a priori, d.i. seinem Vermögen das
Mannigfaltige überhaupt zu verbinden,1130
als wie die Erscheinungen selbst mit der
Form der sinnlichen Anschauung a priori
übereinstimmen müssen. Denn G setze
existiren eben so wenig in den Erschei-
nungen, sondern nur relativ auf das Sub-1135
ject, dem die Erscheinung n inhäriren,
so fern es Verstand hat, als Erscheinu -
gen nicht an sich existire , sondern nur
relativ auf dasselbe Wesen, so fern es
Sinne hat. Dingen an sich selbst würde1140
ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit nothwendig auch
außer einem Verstande, der si  erkennt,
zukommen. Allein Erscheinungen sind
nur Vorstellungen von Dingen, die nach
dem, was sie an sich seyn mögen, uner-1145
kannt da sind. Als bloße Vorstellungen
Categories ar  concepts which pre-
scribe laws a priori to appearances,
hence to nature as t  totality of all
appearances (natura materialiter pecta-
ta); and now th  questio  is, since
they are not derived from nature and
so would address it as their exem-
plary instance (because they would
thus be merely mpirical), how is it
comprehen ible that nature must ad-
dress them, i.e. how can they det r-
mine a priori the connection of the
manifold of nature, with ut bei g
d rived from it. Here is the solution
to this riddle.
It is no more baffling, how the laws
of the appeara ces wit in nature
must as such b  connected with the
understanding nd its a priori form,
i.e., with its capacity to connect the
manifold as such, than how appear-
ances themselves must agree a priori
with the form of sensible intuition.
For laws exist just as little ithin ap-
pearances, but rather only relative to
the subject in which appearances in-
here, so far as it has understanding,
as appearances do not exist in th m-
selves, but rather only relative o that
ame being, insofar as it has sense .
T  things in themselves would nec-
essa ily b  ascribed their lawfulness,
also apart from any understanding
which knows them. However appear-
ances are o ly repres ntations of
things, which are there, altoget er
B163 (ll. 1112–16): Kant again states that the c tegories prescribe laws to nature (as the sum
total of appearances) a priori. This m y appear t  affirm the gener tive sense of ‘constitution
of objects’ (above, §2.15), but it need not be so interpret : It may suffice to affirm the sec-
ond, presuppositional sense, that nly those sensed particulars which can be judged using
the categories can be ‘anything for me’, as Kant says earlier in the Deduction (§16), when
recognising that sensory states may well occur wi hin oneself, f which o e would or could
never become self-co sciously aware (above, §3.4). Kant’s term ‘appearances’ can be used,
and is used by Kant, in everal senses. Caution is requir d to discern which senses of
‘appearance(s)’ is or is not ruled in, or ruled ou , by various asp cts of Kant’s transcendental
reflections on possible experience and its conditions.
B163 (ll. 1116–25): Kant poses the puzzle about how our a priori categories can (even app ar
to, ‘as it were’) prescribe laws to (or constraints upon) nature, if they are a priori and not
taken from nature.
B164–5 (ll. 1126–70): Kant’s solution to the puzzle appeals to transcendental idealism, a -
cording to which ‘appeara ces’ ‘in ere in the subject’ (ll. 1131–40). Accordingly, whatever
structure(s) inhere in appearances dep nd u on the subject i  which ose appearances in-
here. Hence there is no particular surprise that appearances mus  exhibit whatever structures
are required by that subject’s forms of sensi ility (receptivity) and forms of intellect (judg-
ment). ‘Appearances, however, ar  only representations of things’, and these representations
are structured by the representing su ject (ll. 1143–50).
Kant’s solution is not e irely satisfactory, in part because it is too conv nient. I have
argued elsewhere (KTPR) that Kant’s transcendental idealism requires (as he insists) a radical
dichotomy between the f rmal structures of experience (which alone ar  said to be ‘legis-
lated’ by our human form of c gnisance) and the mater al conte t(s) of experience, includ-
ing quite specific sensory contents. Kant’s transce dental ideali m is d signed to account for
formal a priori conditions of possible human apperceptive experience which are either con-
ceptual or i tuitive. Yet Kant’s probing examin tion of the formal a pri ri conditions neces-
sary for the possibility of ur apperceptive experience also identifies a key formal a pr ori
condition which is neither c ceptual nor intuitive but rather is mater al: The humanly iden-
tifiable kinds and degrees of similarity and variety a ongst the cont nts of sensory intak .
Such humanly identifiable kinds and egrees of s milarity and variety a ongst the cont nts
of sensory intake, and lik wise at a richer level of integration such sensory intake afford ,
also amongst the objects f sensory intuition and percept on (Kant mak s the point at both
these levels), in principl  cannot be generated by the structur  and functioning of our human
sensibility or intellect, whether singly or onjointly. The matter of sensation itself, must be
given us ab extra (from without), not generated by the human subject; this t esis is (partly)
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aber stehen sie unter gar keinem Gesetze
der Verknüpfung, als demjenigen, welc-
hes das verknüpfende Vermögen vor-
schreibt. Nun ist das, was das Mannigfal-1150
tige der sinnlichen Anschauung ver-
knüpft, Einbildungskraft, die vom Ver-
stande der Einheit ihrer intellectuellen
Synthesis und von der Sinnlichkeit der
Mannigfaltigkeit der Apprehension nach1155
abhängt. Da nun von der Synthesis der
Apprehension alle mögliche Wahrneh-
mung, sie selbst aber, diese empirische
Synthesis, von der transscendentalen,
mithin den Categorien abhängt, so müs-1160
sen alle mögliche Wahrnehmungen, mit-
hin auch alles, was zum empirischen Be-
wußtseyn immer gelangen kann, d.i.
[B165] alle Erscheinungen der Natur, ihrer
Verbindung nach unter den Categorien1165
stehen, von welchen die Natur (bloß als
Natur überhaupt betrachtet) als dem ur-
sprünglichen Grunde ihrer nothwendi-
gen Gesetzmäßigkeit (als natura forma-
liter spectata) abhängt. Auf mehr e r e 1170
Ges e t ze  aber als die, auf denen eine
Na t u r  übe rhaup t  als Gesetzmäßig-
keit der Erscheinungen in Raum und
Zeit beruht, reicht auch das reine
Verstandesvermögen nicht zu, durch1175
bloße Categorien den Erscheinungen a
priori Gesetze vorzuschreiben. Besonde-
re Gesetze, weil sie empirisch bestimmte
Erscheinungen betreffen, können davon
nicht vollständig abgeleitet werden, ob1180
sie gleich alle insgesammt unter jenen
stehen. Es muß Erfahrung dazu kom-
regardless of what they may be in
themselves. However, as mere repre-
sentations they stand under no other
laws of connection than those which
the connecting capacity prescribes.
Now that which connects the mani-
fold of sensible intuition is the power
of imagination, which depends upon
the understanding for the unity of its
intellectual synthesis and upon sensi-
bility of the manifold of apprehen-
sion. Now since all possible percep-
tion depends upon the synthesis of
apprehension, which itself, this em-
pirical synthesis, depends upon the
transcendental [synthesis], hence up-
on the categories, so must all possible
perceptions, hence also everything
which can ever enter empirical con-
sciousness, i.e., all appearances of na-
ture as regards their conjunction,
must stand under the categories, up-
on which depends nature (regarded
merely as nature as such) as the origi-
nal ground of their necessary lawful-
ness (as natura formaliter spectata).
However, to the many laws, other than
those upon which rests a nature as such
as lawfulness of appearances in space
and time, even the pure capacity of
understanding is insufficient by mere
categories to prescribe a priori laws to
appearances. Particular laws, because
they concern empirically determined
appearances, cannot be completely
derived from [those categories], al-
constitutive of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and is required to distinguish his idealism
from unmitigated subjective idealism. If the matter of sensation itself is given us ab extra,
then whatever similarities and varieties that matter of sensation has, it has. Which of these
may be humanly recognisable is a distinct issue, but whichever of them may be or are hu-
manly recognisable, those varieties and similarities are not ‘legislated’ by the human mind in
the sense of generating them. Our mind can only set constraints, constraints which Kant ac-
knowledges cannot be specified a priori on philosophical grounds, upon there being some
minimal, humanly recognisable degree of similarity and variety amongst the content of our
sensory intake, such that we can at all integrate our sensory intake (binding) so as to be able
to perceive our surroundings, and so to be able to judge at least some particulars to be such-
and-so, such that we can at all think ‘I think …’ that those particulars there and then or now
and here are such-and-so, and only thus to be able to apperceptive them (and ourselves).
This minimum degree of humanly recognisable similarity and variety amongst the contents
of sensations is the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold. I have argued (KTPR Ch.
3) that Kant justifies this requirement by sound transcendental proof in KdrV, that this
sound proof demonstrates that Kant’s key arguments for transcendental idealism are invalid,
and that this sound proof exhibits exactly the structure and provides exactly the model re-
quired for sound versions of the ‘neglected alternative’ objection to Kant’s arguments for
transcendental idealism. Remarkably, paying more careful attention to Kant’s own distinc-
tions and relations between the two distinct uses of the categories, one in sub-personal sen-
sory binding and object-discrimination (productive imagination), the other in making any
cognitive judgments, whether explicit or implicit (understanding), and to Kant’s own distinc-
tions and relations between issues of cognitive process and issues of cognitive validity, pro-
vides a sound and sufficient basis for his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts
of the Understanding, without appeal to his transcendental idealist account of objects as
(mere) appearances to us. This vindicates the presuppositional rather than the generative
sense of ‘constitution of objects’ (above, §2.15). Kant’s account of sensation, sensory intu-
ition and the ‘matter of appearance’ are in fact more subtle and sophisticated than this pas-
sage allows; see §5.
B165 (ll. 1170–87): Without specifying them, Kant merely states that his Deduction can dem-
onstrate no more laws than those required for the lawfulness of nature as such. These ‘laws’
are specified in the ‘Analytic of Principles’ (and anticipated in the Schematism; KCE §30).
Particular laws of nature, Kant avers, must be specifications of these a priori principles,
which we can only learn through empirical inquiries. This leaves open many questions re-
garding Kant’s ‘Analytic of Principles’ and its relations to empirical physics, only some of
which are addressed in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, others are considered in Kant’s Meta-
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aber stehen sie unter gar keinem G setz
der Verknüpfung, als demjenigen, welc-
hes das verknüpfend  Vermögen vor-
schreibt. Nun ist das, was das Ma nigfal-1150
tige der sinnlichen Anschauung ver-
knüpft, Einbildungskraft, die vom Ver-
stande der Einheit ihrer int llectuell n
Synthesis und von der Sinnlichkeit der
Mannigfaltigkeit der Apprehens on nach1155
abhängt. Da nun von der Synthesis der
Apprehension alle möglic  Wahrneh-
mung, sie selbst aber, diese mpirische
Synthesis, von der trans cendentalen,
mithin den Categorien abhängt, so müs-1160
sen alle mögliche Wahrnehmungen, mit-
hin auch alles, was zum empirischen Be-
wußtseyn immer gelangen kann, d.i.
[B165] alle Erscheinungen der Natur, ihrer
Verbindung nach unter den Categorien1165
stehen, von welchen die Natur (bloß als
Natur überhaupt betrachtet) als dem ur-
sprünglichen Grunde ihrer nothwendi-
gen Gesetzmäßigkeit (als natura forma-
liter spectata) abhäng . Auf mehr e r e 1170
Ges e t ze  aber als die, auf denen eine
Na t u r  übe rhaup t  ls Gesetzmäßig-
keit der Erscheinung n in Raum u d
Zeit beruht, reicht auch das reine
Verstandesvermögen nicht zu, durch1175
bloße Categorien den Erscheinung a
priori Gesetze vorzuschre ben. Besonde-
re Gesetze, weil sie empirisch bestimmte
Erscheinungen betreffen, kö nen davon
nicht vollständig abgelei et werden, ob1180
sie gleich alle insge ammt unter je en
stehen. Es muß Erfahru g dazu kom-
regardless of what they may be in
themselv s. However, as mer  repre-
sentations they stand u der o other
l ws of co ection than those whi h
the connecting capacity prescribes.
Now that which connects the mani-
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of magination, which depends upon
the understanding for the unity of its
intellectual synthesis and upon sensi-
bi ty of the manifold of apprehen-
sion. Now s n e all p ssible percep-
tion d pends upon he synthesi of
apprehensi n, which itself, this em-
pirical synthesis, depends upon the
transcendental [synthesis], hence up-
on the categories, so must all possible
perceptions, ence also everything
which can ever enter empirical con-
sciousness, i.e., all appearanc  of na-
tur  as regards their conjunction,
must stand u er the categories, up-
on which depends nature (regarded
merely as nature as such) as the origi-
nal grou d of their necessary law ul-
ness (as natura formaliter spect a).
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constitutive of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and is requ red to distinguish his i ealism
from unmitigat d subjective idealism. If the matter of ensation itself is given us ab extra,
the  whatever similariti s and varieties that matter of sensation has, it has. Which of these
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Particular laws of nature, K nt avers, must be specifications of these a priori principles,
which we can only learn through empirical i qui ies. This leaves open many questions re-
garding Kant’s ‘Analytic of Principles’ and ts relations to empir cal physic , only some of
which are addressed in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, others are considered in Kant’s Meta-
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men, um die letztere überhaupt kennen
zu lernen; von Erfahrung aber überhaupt
und dem, was als ein Gegenstand dersel-1185
ben erkannt werden kann, geben allein
jene Gesetze a priori die Belehrung.
§ 27. Resultat dieser Deduction der
Verstandesbegriffe.
Wir können uns keinen Gegenstand1190
denken, ohne durch Categorien; wir kön-
nen keinen gedachten Gegenstand
erkennen, ohne durch Anschauungen,
die jenen Begriffen entsprechen. Nun
sind alle unsere Anschauungen sinnlich,1195
und diese Erkenntniß, so fern der
Gegenstand derselben gegeben ist, ist
empirisch. Empirische Erkenntniß aber
[B166] ist Erfahrung. Folglich ist uns ke i -
ne  Er kenn tn iß  a priori möglich, als1200
lediglich von Gegens t änden  mög l i -
che r  Er f ah rung .* 
* Damit man sich nicht voreiliger Weise
an den besorglichen nachtheiligen Fol-
gen dieses Satzes stoße, will ich nur in1205
Erinnerung bringen, daß die Categorien
im Denken  durch die Bedingungen
unserer sinnlichen Anschauung nicht
eingeschränkt sind, sondern ein
unbegrenztes Feld haben, und nur das  1210
Erkennen  dessen, was wir uns denken,
das Bestimmen des O b j ec t s , Anschau-
ung bedürfe; wo beim Mangel der letzte-
ren der Gedanke vom Objecte übrigens
though they all stand under them. 
Experience too must be considered 
to discover these latter in any regard; 
only regarding experience as such, 
and that which can be cognized as an 
object of experience, do those a priori 
laws [of the understanding] instruct 
us.
§ 27. Result of this Deduction of the 
Concepts of the Understanding. 
We cannot think any object, if not 
through categories; we cannot cog-
nise any object thought, except 
through intuitions which correspond 
to those concepts. Now all our intu-
itions are sensory, and this cognition, 
so far as its object is given, is empiri-
cal. However, empirical cognition is 
experience. Consequently no cognition 
is possible for us a priori, except of 
objects of possible experience.*
* So that no one prematurely stum-
bles over the worrisome disadvanta-
geous consequences of this proposi-
tion I wish to recall that in thinking, 
the categories are not limited by the 
conditions of our sensible intuition, 
but have an unlimited field, and only 
the cognition of that which we think, 
the determining of the object, requires 
intuition; so that in absence of this 
latter the thought of an object always 
still can have its true and useful con-
physical Foundations of Natural Science. None of these issues should be addressed within Kant’s 
Deduction, so it is unsurprising that here they are no more than mentioned by Kant.
3.15 §27: Result of this Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding.
B165–6 (ll. 1190–1202): Surprisingly, most of Kant’s results in the Deduction are justified, 
even if his transcendental idealism be set aside. Setting aside his transcendental idealism re-
quires acknowledging that we might well sense or even perceive some particulars which we 
cannot comprehend using our categories and whatever more specific concepts we might 
devise (specify) on their basis, in which case we could not apperceive such irregular particu-
lars; they would be ‘nothing for me’. Even if so, Kant’s Deduction is focussed primarily on 
the minimal sensory and perceptual constraints which must be fulfilled if ever one is to be 
able to think ‘I think …’, which can only be thought (by us human beings) in connection 
(reference) to some perceived particular(s) we can perceptually discriminate and localise on 
some occasion in some spatio-temporal, perceptual context, and so can judge them (accu-
rately enough) to be such-and-so. Such occasions only can be provided us by spatio-tempo-
ral particulars which we can localise within space and time by perceptually discriminating 
them by identifying and integrating at least some of their manifest features, all of which we 
can classify and judge to be these features of that particular in some sufficiently accurate cog-
nitive judgment. This conditional thesis is a bit of a priori knowledge about necessary condi-
tions for the very possibility of human apperception: We can, and we can only, use our basic 
conceptual categories to judge sensed, perceived particulars within our surroundings. Hence 
we can only use our categories in (referential, ascriptive) connection to such particulars we 
can experience. These are Kant’s epistemic modalities of possible experience and some of 
its necessary a priori conditions. If such results seem meagre for all this effort, they suffice to 
undercut Cartesian, Humean, Pyrrhonian and global perceptual scepticisms – no trivial re-
sult! It also provides the cognitive semantics of singular reference required to undercut all 
global perceptual ‘hypotheses’ as mere thoughts with no possible reference to particulars, 
hence no cognitive status whatsoever; hence they do not undermine or ‘defeat’ cognitive justi-
fication. (For detailed discussion, see KCE.)
B166–7 (ll. 1203–22): Kant hastens to stress (*) that his Deduction concerns the use of 
categories in knowledge. That their intension (conceptual content) is not limited to sensory 
particulars entails that they have a much broader semantic scope (intension), which Kant 
here indicates is important to using categories in practical philosophy, which is another
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noch immer seine wahre und nützliche1215
Folgen auf den V ernunf t geb r auch
des  Sub j ec t s  haben kann, der sich
aber, weil er nicht immer auf die B e -
s t immung  de s  O b j ec t s , mithin aufs
Erkenntniß, sondern auch auf die des1220
Subjects und dessen Wollen gerichtet ist,
hier noch nicht vortragen läßt. [… B168]
[…] daß in solchem Falle [eines Präfor-
mationssystem] den Categorien die
Nothwend igke i t  mangeln würde, die1225
ihrem Begriffe wesentlich angehört.
Denn z.B. der Begriff der Ur s ache ,
welcher die Nothwendigkeit eines Er-
folgs unter einer vorausgesetzten Bedin-
gung aussagt, würde falsch seyn, wenn er1230
nur auf einer beliebigen uns eingepflanz-
ten subjectiven Nothwendigkeit, gewiße
empirische Vorstellungen nach einer sol-
chen Regel des Verhältnißes zu verbin-
den, beruhte. Ich würde nicht sagen kön-1235
nen: die Wirkung ist mit der Ursache im
Objecte (d.i. nothwendig) verbunden,
sondern ich bin nur so eingerichtet, daß
ich diese Vorstellung nicht anders als so
verknüpft denken kann; welches gerade1240
das ist, was der Sceptiker am meisten
wünscht; denn alsdann ist alle unsere
Einsicht durch vermeinte objective Gül-
tigkeit unserer Urtheile nichts als lauter
Schein, und es würde auch an Leuten1245
nicht fehlen, die diese subjective Noth-
wendigkeit (die gefühlt werden muß)
von sich nicht gestehen würden; zum
wenigsten könnte man mit niemanden
über dasjenige hadern, was bloß auf der1250
sequences for the subject’s use of reason,
which cannot be considered here be-
cause they do not always concern the
determination of the object, and so cogni-
tion, but rather concern the subject
and its will. […]
[…] that in such a case [of a system of
preformation] the categories would
lack necessity, which belongs essentially
to their concept. For the concept of
cause, e.g., which expresses the neces-
sity of a consequence under a presup-
posed condition, would be false, if it
rested only upon an arbitrary subjec-
tive necessity, implanted in us, by
which we connect certain empirical
representations according to such a
regular relation. I would not be able
to say: the effect is connected within
the object (i.e., necessarily), but rather
only that I am so constituted that I
cannot think this representation oth-
erwise than as so connected; which is
exactly what the sceptic most wants;
for then all our insight through pre-
sumed objective validity of our judg-
ment is nothing but mere appearance,
and there would not fail to be people
who would not themselves corrobo-
rate this subjective necessity (which
must be felt); at the least one could
not argue with anyone about that
which merely depends upon how his
subject[ivity] is organised.
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topic (though the Transcendental Dialectic has important discussions of the regulative use 
of experience-transcendent ideas of reason to organise our empirical enquiries and knowl-
edge).
B168 (ll. 1222–52): I have omitted most of Kant’s discussion of a possible alternative to his 
Deduction, that there might be some sort of pre-established harmony by preformation of 
our human cognitive capacities, such that these be suited to knowing nature as it is, and as it 
is manifest to us. Kant rightly rejoins that no such explanatory hypothesis can address the key 
normative issues of whether any judgments so formed using our most basic concepts are or 
can be objectively valid, i.e., sufficiently accurate and justified to constitute knowledge. This 
holds for any and all sorts of ‘innateness’ hypotheses. Insofar as such hypotheses (merely) 
explain how we can or must think, they are open invitations to sceptics to rejoin, so much 
the worse for how we must or do think; none of that proves anything about whether our 
thinking can or does ever count as knowledge of particulars in our surroundings. Kant’s ex-
ample and his comments on it, namely, the concept ‘cause’, directly recall his earlier com-
ments on the ‘dignity’ (B124, l. 171), the modal intension and justificatory status of this con-
cept, which in principle contrasts to the subjective contingencies of our empirical (or rather: 
our empiricist) evidence, and that to these subjective contingencies contrasts, in principle, 
the apparently non-modal assertoric judgment, ‘it (the object) IS such-and-so’ (B141–2, l. 
610–21). Fully examined and reconstructed, Kant’s analysis of our perceptual judgments (in 
the ‘Analytic of Principles’) shows that they are discriminatory, and that they can be discrim-
inatory (of particulars) only by identifying (however approximately) some of their causal in-
tegrity. (This is the main burden of KCE, PART 2, especially Ch. 8.)
3.16 [no §] Brief Concept of this Deduction.
B168–9 (ll. 1254–65): Kant cannot be more clear or concise about his Deduction than this 
brief paragraph! Recall that ‘determine’ or ‘determination’ often means, and does here mean, 
‘specify’ or ‘specification’.
One key point is that Kant is correct about the parallel of the Transcendental Deduction of 
the Categories to the Transcendental Deduction of (the Concepts of) Space and Time: Particu-
lars cannot be sensed by us, or presented to us by or in sensory perception, except insofar as 
they are spatio-temporal, so the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ must pertain to them. Sensed par-
ticulars cannot be at all thought by us except insofar as we judge them using the categories, be-
cause the categories are required for any judging of any particulars whatsoever, and because we 
cannot even think ‘I think …’ except as part of actively integrating some plurality of concepts 
of particulars or their features (presumptively) identified (classified) by those concepts, all of 
which concepts can only be specifications of our categories. Any instance of the analytical
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Art beruht, wie sein Subject organisirt 
ist.
Kurzer Begriff dieser Deduction.
Sie ist die Darstellung der reinen Ver-
standesbegriffe (und mit ihnen aller1255
theoretischen Erkenntniß a priori) als
Principien der Möglichkeit der Erfah-
rung, dieser aber als Bestimmung der
Erscheinungen in Raum und [B169] Zeit
überhaupt, – endlich dieser aus dem1260
Princip der ursprünglichen synthetischen
Einheit der Apperception, als der Form
des Verstandes in Beziehung auf Raum
und Zeit als ursprüngliche Formen der
Sinnlichkeit.1265
*   *   *
90 
Brief Concept of this Deduction.
It is the presentation of the pure 
concepts of the understanding (and 
with these of all a priori theoretical 
cognition) as principles of the possi-
bility of experience, of this, again, as 
determination of appearances in 
space and time as such, – and finally 
of these from the principle of the 
original synthetic unity of appercep-
tion as form of the understanding in 
connection to space and time as orig-
inal forms of sensibility.
*   *   *
unity apperception expressed by the ‘I think …’ requires as its necessary complement, some
synthetic unity of apperception which is the integrated judging of this (sensed, specified) partic-
ular, now within this spatio-temporal sensory-perceptual context.
Kant’s Deduction need not, and does not, prove that any such humanly sense-able, intu-
itable, perceptible, judgable particulars exist or occur; it need not, and does not, prove that any
and all particulars are such as can be sensed, intuited and judged by us. It proves that no hu-
manly possible instance of the analytical unity of apperception (expressed by ‘I think …’)
can occur without its complementary synthetic unity of apperception, and that this cannot
occur without sensory-perceptual presentation of some particular(s) which can be (accu-
rately if approximately) judged by us, in part by delimiting the spatial region of the particu-
lar(s) when sensed and perceived by ‘me’ in this spatio-temporal perceptual context, in part by
using (accurately enough) the determinable a priori concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’, which Kant
claims are not amongst the categories (see below, §4). The scope and aim of Kant’s Deduc-
tion is not trivial, yet it is much more restricted than often supposed. His chapter brings in
so many wide-ranging issues that readers understandably have lost track of many guiding
threads Kant provides, in particular, how he uses questions of process to raise and address
issues of cognitive validity.
Why such elaborate contextualisation? Because the Deduction has a quite specific role
within a very complex Critique of Pure Reason, and Kant must make plain how and why this
Transcendental Deduction (§26) matters, and why there are good reasons to think it is true
of us finite human beings – even if not all of Kant’s reasons for so thinking are, can or
should be provided within the chapter on the Transcendental Deduction itself.
As for the comprehensive scope of apperception and the use of ‘I think …’ (§§16, 17),
any actual extent within anyone’s apperceptive life will depend directly upon how exten-
sively anyone can chart her or his course through the world during his or her life. Kant’s
point in the Deduction is only that any plurality of experiences can be thought to be one’s
own only so far as one can identify each and all as belonging within the scope of what one
can ascribe to oneself by thinking of them all ‘I think …’.
To contemporary readers, who are happy to use logic as much as possible, though with-
out much considering how we are at all able to use logic as such (pure logic), nor how we are
at all able to use logic to think about whatever we can and do perceive (applied logic), the
sticking point will be Kant’s purported dependency of any instance(s) of the analytical unity
of apperception upon some instance(s) of a synthetic unity of apperception. Perhaps ironi-
cally, Kant’s case for this dependency – that it holds true of us homo sapiens sapientes – is
clinched by his probing analysis of the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold and
its counter-factual failure, ‘transcendental chaos’, the very principle and phenomenon which
undercuts his transcendental idealism.
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4 THE CONCEPTS ‘SPACE’, ‘TIME’ & THE CATEGORIES
4.1 Attentive readers may query whether I have too glibly highlighted Kant’s con-
cepts of ‘space’ and ‘time’ whilst discounting his transcendental idealist account of 
space and time, and so have lost or gravely jeopardised Kant’s distinction between 
the categories and the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ and their roots in our human sensi-
bility (above, §§3.11, 3.12); as concepts, the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ would be as 
discursive or descriptive as any of the categories. Such queries are germane, but have 
satisfactory answers. Thorough answers would require detailed examinations, not 
only of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, but of his philosophy of applied mathe-
matics and the very possibility of empirical measures of spatial and temporal dimen-
sions, including (though not limited to) his ‘Axioms of Intuition’. Here I indicate 
only the key points, because they suffice to buttress Kant’s view of the distinctive 
character and role of the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’, and to reinforce his appeal to 
them in the Deduction, and in accord with my elucidations and suggestions.
The query arises in connection with Kant’s illustration in §26 of the ubiquitous 
relevance of the categories to any and all sensory experience of particulars within 
space and time: Perceiving a house, which requires using the category ‘quantity’ to 
recognise and identify the size, shape and location of this perceived building. The 
category ‘quantity’, Kant there reiterates, pertains to units which can be identified 
solely as quanta produced by successive addition of utterly uniform, homogenous (if 
also specious) elements within a sensory intuition (B162, cf. B115, A142–3, 162–6/
B181–2, 202–8).
Does such perceptual use of the category ‘quantity’ obviate any role for the con-
cept ‘space’? Consider what distinguishes mere quanta from any others sorts of ho-
mogeneity. All concepts as classifications (sortals) aim to identify kinds of homoge-
neity, however general or specific. This much can be said, too, of the concepts of 
‘spaces’ and of ‘times’, though not of the concepts ‘space’ or ‘time’ themselves! Per 
Kant’s Tr. Aesth., spaces are regions within space; times are periods within time. 
Space itself is singular, time itself is singular; there is only one of each and each is infi-
nite or (rather) unbounded (cf. above, §3.5). These two unbounded singularities are 
each more basic than, or ‘prior to’, any segments or divisions within them: any spe-
cific space is but an arbitrarily delimited region within space; any specific time is but 
an arbitrarily delimited period within time. Space contains within itself any and all 
specific regions of space; time contains within itself any and all specific periods of 
time. These relations of containment or inclusion – formally: that space and time are 
each continuous, unbounded, infinitely dense magnitudes (and nothing else) – are in
principle distinct to those relations of comprehension (classification, class inclusion)
typical of discursive concepts, whereby more general concepts include within their
scope by omitting from their intension (specification) all more specific concepts of
that kind (e.g., colour, red, vermillion). In these regards, space and time are altogether
formal and extensive. Space is an unbounded manifold consisting in continuous, in-
definitely divisible, concurrent, specious (unreal, merely notional) sub-regions; time is
an unbounded manifold consisting in continuous, indefinitely divisible, successive,
specious (unreal, merely notional) sub-periods. To be concepts (respectively) of space
or of time, the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ must pertain to these distinctive structural
features of space and any regions delimitable within it, and likewise of time and any
periods delimitable within it. Designation of such structural features is constitutive of
the respective intensions of these two concepts. We can use the term ‘classify’ in con-
nection with ‘time’ and ‘times’, and in connection with ‘space’ and ‘spaces’, but we
must not thereby neglect the very distinctive kinds of constitutive, purely formal rela-
tions involved in ‘space’, ‘spaces’, space, regions of space, nor in ‘time’, ‘times’, time
or periods of time. Kant’s issue about the very concepts ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘spaces’ and
‘times’ concerns the most basic, elementary intension (with the ‘s’) of these four con-
cepts, by which alone any sophisticated formal analyses can be constructed, and by
which they can presume any relevance, i.e.: referrability in principle (via proper inten-
sions) to spatial or temporal phenomena; e.g., any real use of real number analysis in
application to spatial or temporal phenomena. The most basic issues of interest to
Kant within this very basic, circumscribed, semantic and empirical domain are more
fundamental and elementary than are the apparently competing (point- or interval-
based) formalisations of these domains.1 (For this reason, too, these most basic
points about the most fundamental intensions of the concepts of ‘space’ and of
‘time’ are indifferent to those metrical issues which distinguish Euclidean from non-
Euclidean geometries, or also ‘absolute’ from ‘relativistic’ temporal orders.)
To use the category ‘quantity’ in connection with spaces or times requires specify-
ing units of space or of time which, as homogenous quantities, can be successively
added together (whether by perceptual estimation or by formal measures is here in-
different). Hence Kant’s illustrating the relevance of the category ‘quantity’ in §26
neither supplants nor obviates the role of the concept ‘space’, nor the concept
‘spaces’ in designating the relevant kind of (spatial) quantity. (Mutatis mutandis, the
1 Important reminders of these basic points regarding spatial or temporal continua are
provided by Arsenijević & al. (2003–2014). These issues are technical; they are summarised
clearly and non-technically in Arsenijević & Adažić (2014), §§1, 6. For a careful account of
Kant’s treatment of magnitude in KdrV see Sutherland (2004a, b).
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same points hold regarding the concepts ‘time’ and ‘times’, as in that period of time
during which one perceives that building there and now or then).
Finally, Kant rightly highlights the distinctive roles of our use of the concepts of
‘space’, ‘spaces’, ‘time’ and ‘times’ in connection with our spatial and temporal forms
of intuiting (forms of sensory receptivity) in our capacity to orient ourselves within
our surroundings (Buroker 1981, Rusnock & George 1995, Bernecker 2012, KCE
§57.2).2 These capacities and roles are quiet distinct to those of classifying particulars
or their features, to which pertains the categories. This suffices for Kant’s appeal to
the distinctive character, relevance and use of the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ in the
Deduction noted above. Even if these brief considerations may not exhaust his rea-
sons for this distinctive status of these concepts, they suffice to support Kant’s ac-
count of ‘absolute’ space (or likewise time) in terms of arbitrarily large reference
frames (Carrier 1992). (All the issues discussed herein are independent of issues
about non-Euclidean spaces; Kant’s specific view about Euclidean space = human
space = nature’s space requires his transcendental idealism.)
4.2 The sticking point for many readers will be the empiricism about meaning (ap-
parently) embedded in first-order predicate calculus, where the most basic terms are
names of individuals or of monadic predicates designating non-relational properties,
which inevitably suggests that our concepts ‘space’ or ‘time’ must be defined, ac-
quired or constructed by logical conjunctions of terms indicating particular spaces or
times, exactly as Hume proposed, though without contemporary logical syntax. This
point challenges Kant’s claim that these two concepts are and must be a priori, be-
cause space and time are each unbounded wholes which are more basic than any spe-
cious ‘parts’ or regions within them (A23, 30, 144, 182–3/B38, 46, 183, 225–6).
The most careful attempt to account for ‘time’ on such an empiricist basis is
Carnap (1928); it fails on strictly internal grounds (Westphal 1989, 230–2). Empiri-
cists have been less careful about ‘space’, but the relevant view was developed by
Descartes and decisively criticised by Newton (ca. 1684), as noted by Stein (1967).
Descartes expressly states an atomistic conception of time as nothing but successive
moments (Med. 3, AT 7:49, Replies I, 7:109, 111, II, 7:164–5), as does Hume (T
1.2.2.4, 1.2.3.8). Hume’s concept empiricist accounts of the ideas ‘space’ and ‘time’
fail on strictly internal grounds (Westphal 2013). Descartes problems with ‘space’
arise from his proposed ‘strict’ sense of ‘location’ solely in terms of relations of spa-
tial contiguity, a view also required by concept empiricism. Briefly, the key issues are
these.
A fundamental problem is that reducing spatial relations to no more than sets of
contiguity relations is insufficient to specify merely kinematically any trajectory, whe-
ther orbital, or resulting from impact or percussion. Newton detailed this problem in
‘De Gravitatione …’ (ca. 1684), criticising Descartes’ account of ‘space’ in terms solely
of contiguity. Though this manuscript was first published only recently (Newton
1962, 90–156), the problems with equating space with contiguity relations have been
there in Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy (1644), where sufficient difficulties in treat-
ing space solely in terms of contiguity relations can be brought out easily enough on
the basis of Descartes’ own purported physics, which equates space and matter or
body, without appeal to Newton’s physics; indeed, Newton’s (2007, 14–21) criticisms
of Descartes’ treatment of space are based directly upon Descartes’ views, cited by
Newton. The quite general significance of Newton’s criticisms of Descartes’ view of
space and location was highlighted by Stein (1967, 184–7), and noted (with reference
to Stein) by Laymon (1978, 412–3). Stein is succinct:
What Newton points out in the passage I have quoted is the need for what I called,
in yesterday’s lecture, a “kinematical connection,” to allow one to discuss trajecto-
ries, velocities, and so forth. The point of central philosophical interest is that such
a “connection” is indeed required for the formulation of the principles of mechan-
ics, and that it cannot—as Newton quite clearly indicates—be defined in terms simply of
the spatial relations of bodies. (Stein, 1967, 187/1970, 271)
Note that Stein speaks of a kinematical connection; kinematics is one branch of New-
ton’s mechanics, the other is dynamics, though the causal explanations dynamics
provides of kinematical phenomena (motions of bodies) is not required, nor is appeal
to it made, by Newton’s criticisms of Descartes’ conception of space solely as conti-
guity relations.
Contiguity relations do not suffice to specify any path of motion of any one par-
ticular within any array or field of particulars, if these latter, too, may or do move.
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2 There is much merit in the positive view developed by Rukgaber (2009), but his positive
proposal and his opening critical comments on my own work (and upon Longunesse’s) are
misguided because he ignores quite standard distinctions regarding aspects of Kant’s views
of space and of time (KTPR 19+n.9, 121), about which I follow Paton (1936, 1:101ff.) and
Allison (1983, 6–7, 96–7), and also the quite specific kind of ‘sensationism’ I ascribe to Kant,
expressly following George (1981, KTPR 13, 44), expressly distinct to Condillac’s. By sheer
negligence, Rukgaber ascribes to me the very sensationism developed by Condillac which I
take pains to distinguish and set aside! Everything Rukgaber ascribes to the (purported)
‘ontology’ of space and time is captured by my account of the formal structures of our
spatial and temporal forms of intuiting = forms of sensory receptivity. His ‘ontological’ con-
siderations do not suffice to justify, nor even precisely to state, Kant’s distinctive transcen-
dental idealism. Regrettably, these blunders indicate what are now common failures of in-
struction, supervision and refereeing within the field. They are uncorrected in Rukgaber
(2020), 226.
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count of ‘absolute’ spa e (or likewise time) in terms of arbitrarily larg  reference
frames (Carrier 1992). (All the issu s discussed herein are independent of issues
about non-Euclidean spaces; Ka t’s specific view about Euclidean space = human
space = nature’s space requires his tran cend ntal idealism.)
4.2 The sticking point for many readers will be the empi icism about meaning (ap-
parently) embedded in first-order predicate calculus, where the most basic terms are
names of individuals or of monadic predicates designating non-rel ional properties,
which inevitably suggests that our concepts ‘ pace’ or ‘time’ must be defined, ac-
quired or constructed by logical conjunctions of terms indicating particula  spaces or
times, exactly as Hume proposed, hough without c ntemporary logical syntax. This
point challenges Kant’s claim that th e two concepts are and must be a riori, be-
cause space and time are each unbou ed whol s w ich are more basic than any spe-
cious ‘parts’ or regions w thin them (A23, 30, 144, 182–3/B38, 46, 183, 225–6).
The most careful attempt to account for ‘ i e’ on su h an empiricist basi  is
Carnap (1928); it fails on strictly internal grounds (Westphal 1989, 230–2). Em iri-
cists have been less careful about ‘spac ’, but the relevant view was developed by
Descartes and decisively criticised by Newton (ca. 1684), as noted by Stein (1967).
Descartes expressly states an a omistic concep ion of ime as nothing but successive
mom nts (Med. 3, AT 7:49, Replies I, 7:109, 111, II, 7:164–5), as does Hume (T
1.2. .4, 1.2.3.8). Hume’s concept empiricist accounts of the idea  ‘space’ and ‘tim ’
fail on strictly internal grou d  (Westphal 2013). De cartes roblems with ‘spac ’
arise from his proposed ‘strict’ sense of ‘location’ solely i  terms f relations of spa-
tial cont guity, a view also required by concept empiric sm. Briefly, the key ssues are
t ese.
A fundamental problem is that reducing spatial relations to no more than sets of
contiguity relations is insufficient to specify merely k nematically any trajectory, whe-
ther rbital, or resulting from impact o  percussion. Newton detailed th s problem in
‘D  Gravitatio e …’ (ca. 1684), cr ic sing Descartes’ ac ount of ‘space’ in terms solely
of contiguity. Though this man script was first published only recen ly (Newton
1962, 90–156), the problems with equa ing spac  with contigui y relations have been
there in Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy (1644), where sufficient difficulties in treat-
ing spac  solely in terms of contiguity relations can be brought out ea ily enough on
the basis of Descartes’ own purported physics, hich equates space and matt r or
body, without appeal to Newton’s physics; indeed, Newton’s (2007, 14–21) criticisms
of Descartes’ treatment of space are based directly upon Descartes’ views, cited by
Newton. Th  quite general sig ificance of Newton’  cr t isms D scarte ’ view of
space d location was highlighted by Stein (1967, 184–7), and noted (with reference
to Stein) by Laymon (1978, 412–3). Stein is succinct:
What Newton points out in the passage I have quoted is the ne d for what I called,
in yesterday’s lecture, a “kinematic l connection,” to allow one to discuss traject -
ries, velocities, and so forth. The po nt of central p ilosophical inter st is that such
a “conn ction” is indeed required for the formulation of the principles of mechan-
ics, and that it cannot—as Newton quite clearly indicates—be defined in terms simply of
the spatial relations of bodies. (Stein, 1967, 187/1970, 271)
Note that Stein speaks of a kinematical connecti n; kine i s is o  bra ch of New-
ton’s mechanics, the o her is dyn mics, thoug  the causal explanations dyn mics
provides of kinematical henomena (motions of bodies) is not required, n r is appeal
to it made, by Newton’s criticisms of D scarte ’ con eption of space solely as conti-
guity relations.
Contiguity relations do n t suffice to specify any path of m tion of  one par-
ticular within any array or field of particula s, if these latter, oo, may or do move.
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2 There is much merit in the positive view developed by Rukgab r (2009), but his positiv
proposal and his opening critical comments o  my own work (and up  Longu esse’s) are
misguided because he ignores quite standard disti ctions regardi g aspects of Kant’s views
of space and of time (KTPR 19+n.9, 121), about which I follow Paton (1936, 1:101ff.) and
Allison (1983, 6–7, 96–7), and also the quite specific kind of ‘sensat onism’ I ascribe to Kant,
expressly following George (1981, KTPR 13, 44), expressly distinct to Condillac’ . By heer
negligence, Rukgaber ascribes to me the very sensationism d veloped by Condillac which I
take pains to distinguish nd set aside! Everything Rukgaber ascrib s o the (purported)
‘ontology’ of space and time is captured by my account of the formal stru tures f our
spatial and temporal form  of intuiting = forms of ensory receptivity. His ‘ontol gical’ con-
siderations do not suffice to justify, n r even precisely to state, Kant’s distinctive transcen-
dental idealism. Regrettably, hese blunders indicate w at are now common failures of in-




same points h ld regarding t e concepts ‘tim ’ and ‘times’, as in that period of time
during which one perceives that buildi g there and now r t n).
Finally, Kant rightly highlights the distinctive roles of our use of he c ncepts of
‘space’, ‘spaces’, ‘time’ and ‘times’ in connecti n with our s atial a d temporal forms
f int iting (forms of sensory eceptivity) in our capacity to ori nt ourselves within
our surroundings (Buroker 1981, Rusnock & Geo ge 1995, B rnecker 2012, KCE
§57.2).2 These capacities and roles are quiet distinct to those of lassifyi g p rticulars
or their features, to which pertains the c tegories. This suffices for Kant’s app al to
th  dis inctive character, rel vance and us  f the co cepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ in the
Deduction noted abo . Even if these brief con iderations may not xhaust hi  rea
s ns for this distinctive status of these concepts, they suffic  o suppor  Kant’s a -
count of ‘absolute’ space (or likewise time) in terms of arbitrarily large referenc
frames (Carrier 1992). (All the issues iscussed herein are independ nt of issues
about non-Euclide n spaces; Kant’s specifi  view about Euclid an sp ce = human
space = nature’s space requi es his transcendental idealism.)
4.2 Th  sticking point for many readers will be the empiricism about meaning ( p-
p rently) embedded in first-order predicate calculus, where the most basic terms are
names of individuals or of mo adic predicates designating n -rela ional proper ies,
which inevitably suggests that our concepts ‘space’ or ‘time’ must be defined, ac-
quired or onstructed by l gical conjunctions of term  indicating particular spaces or
times, ex ctly a  Hume roposed, though i hout con emporary logical syntax. This
point ch llenges Kant’s cl im that these t o concepts re and must be  priori, b
ause space and time are each unbounded wholes whic  are more basic than any spe-
cious ‘parts’ or regions within them (A23, 30, 144, 182–3/B38, 46, 183, 225–6).
The most careful attempt to account for ‘time’ on such an empiricist basis is
Carnap (1928); it fails on trictly int rnal grounds (W stphal 1989, 230–2). Empiri-
cist  have been les  careful bout ‘spac ’, but the relevant view was developed by
 and decisively criticised by Newton (ca. 1684),  ed by S ein (1967).
D scartes expressly states an atomistic conception of time as nothing but successive
moments (Med. 3, AT 7:49, Replies I, 7:109, 111, II, 7:164–5), as do s Hume (T
1.2.2.4, 1.2.3.8). Hume’s c ncept empiricist ccounts of th  ideas ‘space’ and ‘tim ’
fail on stric ly internal grounds (W stphal 2013). D scart s problems with ‘space’
arise from his proposed ‘strict’ s nse of ‘location’ solely in te ms of r lation  of spa-
ial contiguity, a view also r quired by concept empiricism. Briefly, the key issues are
these.
A f ndam ntal problem is that reducing spatial relations to no mo e than sets of
contiguity relations is insufficient to specify merely kin m tically any trajectory, whe-
ther o bit l, r resulting from impact or per ussion. Newton detailed this problem in
‘De Gravitatione …’ (ca. 1684), criticising Descartes’ account of ‘spac ’ i  terms ol ly
of conti uity. T ough this manuscrip  wa  first publish d only recently (Newto
1962, 90–156), the p oblems wit  equating spa e with contiguity relations have b en
there in Descartes’ P inciples of Phil sophy (1644), wher  sufficient difficulti s in t eat-
ing space solely in terms of contigui y rel tion  can be br ught out ea ily enough n
the basis of Descartes’ own purp rted hysics, which equates pace and ma ter or
body, without appeal to Newton’s physics; inde d, Newton’s (2007, 14–21) criticisms
of Descartes’ treatme t of pace ar  based dir ctly upon De cartes’ views, it d by
Newto . Th  quite general si ificance of Newton’s criticisms of Descartes’ view of
spac  and loc tion was highlighted by Stei  67, 184 7 , and noted (with reference
to Stein) by Laymon (1978, 412–3). Stein is succinct:
What Newton points out i  the passage I have quoted is he ed for what I cal ed,
i  yesterday’s lecture, a “kinemati al con ecti n,” to all w ne to discu s traject -
ries, velo ities, and so forth. Th  poin  of centra  philosop ical i terest is that such
a “co nection” is indeed required for he fo mulat on of th pri iples of mechan-
ics, and that t cannot—as N w on quite clearly indicates—be defined in terms simply of
the spatial relations of bodies. (Stein, 1967, 187/1970, 271)
Note that Stein speaks of a kinematical onn ction; kinematics is one bra ch of New-
ton’s mechanics, the other is dyna ics, though th  causal explanatio s dynamics
provides of kinematical phenomena (motions of b die ) i  ot r qui ed, n r is appeal
to it made, by Newton’s criticisms of Descartes’ conception of space solely as conti-
guity relations.
Contiguity relations do not suffice to specify any path of m tion of any ne par-
ticular within any array or field of particulars, if these latter, too, may or do move.
95
2 There is much merit in the positive vi w developed by Ru gab r (2009), but his po itiv
proposal and his opening c itical comments on my ow  work (  upon Longu ess ’s) are
misguided because he ignores quite standard distinctions regarding aspec s of Kant’s views
of space and of time (KTPR 19+n.9, 121), about which I ollow Paton (1936, 1:101ff.) d
Allison (1983, 6–7, 96–7), and al o the quite specific kind of ‘sensa ionism’ I ascribe to Ka t,
expressly following George (1981, KTPR 13, 44), expres ly istinct to Co dillac’s. By sh er
negligence, Rukgaber a cribes to me the very sensationism d veloped b  Condillac which I
take pains to distinguish a d et aside! Everything R kgaber ascri es to the (purpor ed)
‘on ology’ of s ace and time is cap ured by my accou  of the al structures of ur
pati l and temp ral form  f in uiting = forms of sensory rec ptivity. His ‘ontologic l’ o
sider tions do not suffice to justify, nor ven precisely to state, Kant’s isti ctive tr nsce
dental idealism. Regrettably, thes  bl nder  indicat  what are now common failures of in-
struction, supervision and refereeing within the field. They are uncorrected in Rukgaber
(2020), 226.
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Whether the particulars in question are physical objects, tropes or sense data is irrele-
vant to the basic problem of specifying the origin, terminus and intervening path of
any mobile particular, if space = contiguity relations (only).
Descartes realised that a body might have many different motions, depending on
various points of comparison (Prin. II.31); he discusses the man walking on a ship
which moves with respect to shore (Prin. II.24). Accordingly, Descartes distinguished
a strict sense of ‘motion’ from the ordinary sense of motion:
Motion, in the ordinary sense of the term, is simply the action by which a body
travels from one place to another. By ‘motion’, I mean local motion; for my
thought encompasses no other kind, and hence I do not think that any other
kind should be imagined to exist in nature. (Prin. II.24, CSM 1:233)
If … we consider what motion ought to mean … we may say that it is the transfer
of one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in immediate
contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies. (Prin.
II.25; CSM 1:233)
Motion in the strict sense is to be referred solely to the bodies which are contiguous
with the body in motion (Prin. II.28), and is to be referred only to those contiguous
bodies which are regarded as being at rest (Prin. II.29). The reasons for this account
lie in the difficulty of comprehending all the motions of a body, and in the tradition
of viewing the earth as at rest:
Now all the motions will really exist in the wheels of the watch [which is in the
pocket of the man walking on the ship, etc.], but it is not easy to have an under-
standing of so many motions all at once, nor can we have knowledge of all of
them. So it is enough to confine our attention to that single motion which is the
proper motion of each body. (Prin. II.31, CSM 1:236)
… if we wished to characterize motion strictly in terms of its own nature, with-
out reference to anything else, then in the case of two contiguous bodies being
transferred in opposite directions, and thus separated, we should say that there
was just as much motion in the one body as in the other. But this would clash
too much with our ordinary way of speaking. For we are used to standing on the
earth and regarding it as at rest; so although we may see some of its parts, which
are contiguous with other smaller bodies, being transferred out of their vicinity,
we do not for that reason think of the earth itself as in motion. (Prin. II.29, CSM
1:29)
According to Descartes, true motions can only be identified or specified as motion
with respect to contiguous bodies. Descartes explained motions of the planets with
respect to the fixed stars (he carefully picked neither the Earth nor the Sun as points
of reference) in terms of their being carried by vortices in the subtle matter that fills
the universe. This generates a problem. Given Descartes’s strict definition of motion
as motion with respect to contiguous bodies, this entails that the planets, strictly
speaking, do not move! They are stationary with respect to the contiguous bodies of
subtle matter of the vortex which – what? – transports them around their orbits. No-
tice that Descartes does and must be able to make this last statement, that the planets
move in their orbits, and that they move with respect to the fixed stars (Prin. III.26–
29, cf. 140). However, neither of these statements can be made using Descartes’ offi-
cial, ‘strict’ sense of motion; they require the ordinary sense of motion Descartes
eschews. To have an astronomical theory at all requires a sense of motion which
Descartes sought to replace with his technical, strict sense of the term (contiguity
relations). Descartes’ focus upon motions only with respect to contiguous bodies
makes most natural phenomena literally incomprehensible, indeed, indescribable, un-
specifiable (Newton 1962, 92–5, 125–7/2007, 15–8)! As Newton (1962, 97–8, 129–
31/2007, 19–20) points out (inter alia): If spatial locations and changes of spatial loca-
tion are specified solely by reference to spatially contiguous particulars, at the end of
most trajectories – specifically: any motions involving more than a few sequences of
spatial continuity relations – the beginning point literally no longer exists!3
Phenomenalisms (e.g., Mach 1922) and trope theories (e.g., Williams 1953), too,
must (re-)construct space and all, even local mid-scale, spatial phenomena on the
basis of nothing but motions specified by reference solely to contiguous particulars.
Whether these particulars be physical objects, sense data or tropes is irrelevant to this
problem. Neither phenomenalisms nor trope theories can re-construct physical kine-
matics, the minimal type of physical theory admitted by empiricism.
Regarding the insufficiency of total state descriptions specified only by local con-
tiguity coördinates to specify any kinematical connections, and commenting directly
upon the passage quoted above, Stein notes:
For Newtonian space-time as I have presented it, this is just the remark that the
mapping upon time and the Euclidean metric on each instantaneous slice of
space-time do not determine a unique four-dimensional affine structure. (Stein
1967, 187/1970, 271)
Put otherwise, the temporal and spatial specification of each occurrence, forming a
state description of the world at each time, and so for all moments of time, solely by
3 Indeed, even this may be too generous: If the initial point of departure = the specific set of
contiguity relations any one particular has to those immediately surrounding it, as soon as
that particular departs for other neighbours, that first set of contiguity relations vanishes.
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Whether the particulars in question are physical objects, tropes or sense data i  ir ele-
vant to the basic problem of specifying the origin, terminus and inte ve ing path of
any mobile particular, if space = contiguity relations (only).
Descartes realised that a body might have many different motions, depending on
various points of comparis n (Pri . II.31); he discusses the man walking on a s ip
which moves with respect to shore (Prin. II.24). Accordingly, Descartes distinguished
a strict sense of ‘motion’ from the ordinary sense of otion:
Motion, in the ordinary sense of the t rm, is simply the action by which a body
travels from one place o another. By ‘motion’, I mean local motion; for my
thought encompasses no ther ki d, and hence I do not think that any other
kind should be imagined to exist in nature. (Prin. II.24, CSM 1:233)
If … we consider what motion ought to mean … we may say that it is the transfer
of one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the other b dies wh h are in immediate
contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies. (Prin.
II.25; CSM 1:233)
Motion in the strict sense is to be referred solely to he bodi s which are contigu us
with the body in motion (Prin. II.28), a d is t  be eferred only to th se contiguous
bodies which are regarded as being at r st (P in. II.29). The reasons for this account
lie in the difficulty of comprehen ng all the m tions of a body, and in the tradition
of viewing the earth as at rest:
Now all the motions will really exist in the whee s of th  watch [whic  is in the
pocket of the man walking on the ship, etc.], but it is ot asy to have an under-
standing of so many mo ions all at once, or can we have k owledge of all of
them. So it is enough to confine our attention to that single motion which is the
proper motion of each body. (Prin. II.31, CSM 1:236)
… if we wished to characterize motion s rictly in ms of its own nature, with-
out reference to anything els , the  in the case of two contiguous bodies being
transferred in opposite directions, and thus separated, we should say that here
was just as much motion in the one body as in the other. But this would clas
too much with our ordinary way of speaking. For we are used to standing on th
earth and regarding it as at rest; so although we may see me of its parts, which
are contiguous with othe  smaller bodies, being t ansferred ut of their vicinity,
we do not for that reason think f the ear h itself as  motion. (Prin. II.29, CSM
1:29)
According to Descartes, true motions can only be identified or specified as motion
with respect to contiguous bodies. Des artes explaine  motions of the pla ts with
respect to the fixed stars (he arefully picked neither the Earth nor the Sun as points
of reference) in terms of th ir being carried by vortices in the subtle matter that fills
the universe. This generat s a problem. Given Desc rtes’s strict defi ition of motion
as motion with respect to contiguous bodi s, this e ails that the planets, str ctly
speaking, d  not move! They are stati nary with respect to he contiguous bodies of
subtle matter of the vortex which – wha ? – transports t em around their rbits. No-
tice hat Descartes does and must be bl  to make this last st tement, that e plane s
move in their orbits, and that they move with respect to the fixed stars (Prin. III.26–
29, cf. 140). However, neither of these stateme ts can be made using Des rtes’ offi-
cial, ‘strict’ sense of motion; they r quire the ordinary sense of moti n Descartes
eschews. To have an astronomical t eory at all requires a s nse of motion which
Descartes sought to replace with his technical, strict sense of t e term (contiguity
relations). Descartes’ focus upon motions only with respect to contiguous bodi s
makes most natural phenomena li erally incompreh sible, indeed, indescribable, un-
specifiable (Newton 1962, 92–5, 125–7/2007, 15–8)! As Newton (1962, 97–8, 129–
31/2007, 19–20) points out (inter alia): If spatial locations and changes of spatial loca-
tion are specified solely by referenc  to spatially contiguous particul rs, at the end of
most trajectories – specifically: any motion  involving more than a few sequences of
spatial continuity relations – the beginning po nt literally no lo ger ex sts!3
Phenomenalisms (e.g., Mach 1922) and trope theories (e.g., Williams 1953), too,
must (re-)construct space and all, even local mid-scale, spatial phenomena on the
basis of nothing but motions specified by reference solely to contiguous particulars.
Whether these particulars b  physical objects, sense data or tr pes is irrelevant to this
problem. Neither phenomenalisms nor trop  theories can re-construct physical kin
matics, the minimal type of physical theory admitted b  empiricism.
Regarding the insufficiency of total state des riptions specified only by local con-
tiguity coördinates to specif any ki ematical connections, a d comme ting directly
upon the passage quoted above, Stein notes:
For Newtonian space-time as I have pre ent d it, thi is just th  r mark that the
mapping upon time and the Euclidean tric on ach insta tan ous slice of
space-time do not determin  a unique f ur-dimensional affine structure. (Stein
1967, 187/1970, 271)
Put otherwise, the temporal and spatial specification of each occurrence, forming a
state description of the world at each time, and s  for all moments of time, solely by
3 Indeed, even this may be too generous: If the initial p int of departure = the s ecific set of
contiguity relations any one part cular has to those immediately surr unding it, as soon a
that p rticular departs for other neighbours, that first set of contig ity relations vanishes.
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Whether the particulars in question are physical objects, tropes or sense data is irrele-
vant to the basic problem of specifying the origin, terminus and intervening path of
any mobile particular, if space = contiguity relations (only).
Descartes realised that a body might have many different motions, depending on
various points of comparison (Prin. II.31); he discusses the man walking on a ship
which moves with respect to shore (Prin. II.24). Accordingly, Descartes distinguished
a strict sense of ‘motion’ from the ordinary sense of motion:
Motion, in the ordinary sense of the term, is simply the action by which a body
travels from one place to another. By ‘motion’, I mean local motion; for my
thought encompasses no other kind, and hence I do not think that any other
kind should be imagined to exist in nature. (Prin. II.24, CSM 1:233)
If … we consider what motion ought to mean … we may say that it is the transfer
of one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in immediate
contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies. (Prin.
II.25; CSM 1:233)
Motion in the strict sense is to be referred solely to the bodies which are contiguous
with the body in motion (Prin. II.28), and is to be referred only to those contiguous
bodies which are regarded as being at rest (Prin. II.29). The reasons for this account
lie in the difficulty of comprehending all the motions of a body, and in the traditi
of viewing the earth as at rest:
Now all the motions will really exist in the wheels of the watch [which is in the
pocket of the man walking on the ship, etc.], but it is not easy to have an under-
standing of so many motions all at once, nor can we have knowledge of all of
them. So it is enough to confine our attention to that single motion which is the
proper motion of each body. (Prin. II.31, CSM 1:236)
… if we wished to characterize motion strictly in terms of its own nature, with-
out reference to anything else, then in the case of two contiguous bodies being
transferred in opposite directions, and thus separated, we should say that there
was just as much motion in the one body as in the other. But this would clash
too much with our ordinary way of speaking. For we are used to standing on the
earth and regarding it as at rest; so although we may see some of its parts, which
are contiguous with other smaller bodies, being transferred out of their vicinity,
we do not for that reason think of the earth itself as in motion. (Prin. II.29, CSM
1:29)
According to Descartes, true motions can only be identified or specified as motion
with respect to contiguous bodies. Descartes explained motions of the planets with
respect to the fixed stars (he carefully picked neither the Earth nor the Sun as points
of reference) in terms of their being carried by vortices in the subtle matter that fills
the universe. This generates a problem. Given Descartes’s strict definition of motion
as motion with respect to contiguous bodies, this entails that the planets, strictly
speaking, do not move! They are stationary with respect to the contiguous bodies of
subtle matter of the vortex which – what? – transports them around their orbits. No-
tice that Descartes does and must be able to make this last statement, that the planets
move in their orbits, and that they move with respect to the fixed stars (Prin. III.26–
29, cf. 140). However, neither of these statements can be made using Descartes’ offi-
cial, ‘strict’ sense of motion; they require the ordinary sense of motion Descartes
eschews. To have an astronomical theory at all requires a sense of motion which
Descartes sought to replace with his technical, strict sense of the term (contiguity
relations). Descartes’ focus upon motions only with respect to contiguous bodies
makes most natural phenomena literally incomprehensible, indeed, indescribable, un-
specifiable (Newton 1962, 92–5, 125–7/2007, 15–8)! As Newton (1962, 97–8, 129–
31/2007, 19–20) points out (inter alia): If spatial locations and changes of spatial loca-
tion are specified solely by reference to spatially contiguous particulars, at the end of
most trajectories – specifically: any motions involving more than a few sequences of
spatial continuity relations – the beginning point literally no longer exists!3
Phenomenalisms (e.g., Mach 1922) and trope theories (e.g., Williams 1953), too,
must (re-)construct space and all, even local mid-scale, spatial phenomena on the
basis of nothing but motions specified by reference solely to contiguous particulars.
Whether these particulars be physical objects, sense data or tropes is irrelevant to this
problem. Neither phenomenalisms nor trope theories can re-construct physical kine-
matics, the minimal type of physical theory admitted by empiricism.
Regarding the insufficiency of total state descriptions specified only by local con-
tiguity coördinates to specify any kinematical connections, and commenting directly
upon the passage quoted above, Stein notes:
For Newtonian space-time as I have presented it, this is just the remark that the
mapping upon time and the Euclidean metric on each instantaneous slice of
space-time do not determine a unique four-dimensional affine structure. (Stein
1967, 187/1970, 271)
Put otherwise, the temporal and spatial specification of each occurrence, forming a
state description of the world at each time, and so for all moments of time, solely by
3 Indeed, even this may be too generous: If the initial point of departure = the specific set of
contiguity relations any one particular has to those immediately surrounding it, as soon as
that particular departs for other neighbours, that first set of contiguity relations vanishes.
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contiguity relations, constrains but cannot specify the 4-D affine structure required to
identify and to describe any motion (kinematics) – dynamic explanation quite aside.
Whether what occurs at, or occupies, each coördinate point in space at any one time
is a physical object, a trope or a sense datum is altogether an independent issue; this
problem with the very concept of space, its intesion, hold independently of any pre-
ferred examples (ontology) of spatial particulars. Complete, momentary state descrip-
tions of the universe in terms of nothing but tropes and their spatial and temporal
contiguities are insufficient for kinematics, whether astronomical, or tossing a wad
into a bin. The trope theorist’s ideal description of the universe cannot account for
(very) elementary kinematics; Williams was mistaken to claim that tropes and the re-
lations of contiguity and qualitative similarity suffice, even in principle, to ‘account’
for the world we occupy and experience. (These same limits also hold of Carnap’s
Aufbau, although these problems can only be specified precisely within the terms of
the Aufbau with respect to time, because his rudiments for specifying spatial
positions and relations are so very sketchy.) As the fundamental resources and strat-
egies of trope theory remain unchanged (otherwise they would not be trope theories),
subsequent versions fare no better than Williams’. This is yet another indication that
(putative) ‘simplicity’ is neither a constraint nor an initial premiss; it is only a princi-
ple of choice between two otherwise equally adequate explanations – a rare circum-
stance!
The strength of Kant’s Critical epistemology in the Critique of Pure Reason lies in
how acutely it identifies a host of sub-personal cognitive functions and a host of im-
plicit and explicit cognitive judgments we can and do make with sufficient reliability,
accuracy and justifiedness so that we can think at all using logic, and can use logical
syntax and semantics in (referential, deictic) connection with whatever particular(s)
we experience within space and time. All of these achievements result from thinking
through this observation:
That which is presupposed in any and all knowledge of objects cannot itself be
known as an object. (KdrV A402)
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding is but
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ual belief, and how Kant contrasts to them the distinctive cognitive (‘epistemic’) mo-
dality involved in distinguishing between the tentative ‘this stone seems to me warm’ 
and the assertoric ‘this IS a warm stone’, and how such cognitive modalities are dis-
tinct to, yet parasitic upon identifiable causal modalities constitutive of perceptible 
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Kant’s Deduction of the Categories and to his demonstration in the ‘Analytic of Prin-
ciples’ that we can only perceptually identify particulars which unto themselves have 
sufficient causal integrity to be discriminated from our various sensory experiences of 
them, or discriminated within and through their various sensory appearances to us, 
on any occasion in which we sense, circumscribe, localise and identify it (or them), 
during the period of time and within the surrounding context within which we per-
ceive it (or them). This Kant demonstrates by examining the most general conditions 
particulars must satisfy if we are at all to be able to identify them, by distinguishing 
them from one another, from ourselves and from our sensory experiencing of them.
The contrast between Hume’s customary, merely psychological modalities and 
any actual human perception of spatio-temporal particulars is central already to 
Reid’s (1764) Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense, in ways 
which help clarify and substantiate important, unfamiliar features of Kant’s Deduc-
tion. These brief remarks cite Reid’s second, corrected edition (1765), this being the 
closest available to me to the first edition (1764), which is known to have been avail-
able in Northern Germany and accessible to Tetens and to Kant, either in English or 
in French (1768).4 It precedes Kant’s KdrV, whereas Reid’s Essays (1785, 1788) are 
contemporaneous to its second edition. My concern here is not with historical routes 
of access and influence, but with systematic points regarding the sophisticated alter-
natives to Hume’s theories of ideas and of perception provided by Reid, Tetens and 
Kant. Some of the most important basic points are clearly and emphatically stated by 
Reid in the Inquiry. There are excellent studies of Reid’s epistemology and theory of 
perception; I claim no originality, but Hume’s empiricism remains such a common 
default presumption that it must be countered, and can be countered by selective
4 Reid (1764) was held in the Universitätsbibliothek Kiel (Sig.: K 2943); Reid (1768) was held
in the Landschaftsbibliothek Aurich (Sig.: O 747 (1)), Universitätsbibliothek Rostock (Sig.:
Ec-3122(1)), Eutiner Landesbibliothek (Sig.: Rc 247:1) and in Königsberg in Hamann’s li-
brary (Immendörfer 1938, 108); my thanks to Kuehn’s (1987, 168n.4) reference to Immen-
dörfer, which I have again consulted.
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focus.5
In reply to Hume’s copy theory of impressions and ideas and his use of that the-
ory to account for human perception and belief, Reid emphatically distinguished be-
tween mere sensory response to stimuli and perception (6.21, 301, 305), between the
act and the object of perception (6.33; 6.20, 289, 290), and between the fleeting,
scarcely conscious sensations involved in perception (6.3) and the (comparatively)
sustained attention to perceived particulars and the (comparatively) perduring, stable
character of the particulars we perceive. If these contrasts are typically unfamiliar to
most of us, they are known (e.g.) to painters (6.3; 6.8, 165–7; 6.22, 315–6; 6.23, 328–
9).
In the complex chain of events transpiring between any particular object and any-
one who sees it (6.12, 200; 6.22, 301), Reid carefully distinguishes:
(i ) sensation and (ii ) perception (6.21, 301, 305);
(i ) impressions upon our sensory receptors (our body) and (ii ) any (mental) sensa-
tion of which we are aware (6.8; 6.22, 303); we are not conscious of impressions
upon our receptors (6.8, 163);
(i ) objects and (ii ) their appearance to the eye (6.2, 123; 6.3);
(i ) colours of particular objects and (ii ) the sensory appearances of these colours to us
in various conditions (6.4, 6.5);
within visible appearances of objects, (i) their colour(s) are quite different to (ii ) the
appearance of their extension, figure and motion (6.2, 124; cf. 6.5, 147; 6.8, 164);
(i ) sensations as such and (ii ) dimensional images of bodies or their qualities (6.5,
147, 148; 6.20, 288ff; );
(i ) direction, distance and position (6.8, 161; 6.11, 191; 6.21, 308–9) are visible,
though (ii ) not (strictly speaking) sensible;
e.g., cataracts can reduce the retina to (i ) mere sensory reception (6.8, 162), thus fail-
ing to indicate (ii ) any direction, location or shape.
(i ) sensory appearance and (ii ) what is ‘suggested’ or indicated by sensory appear-
ance (6.2, 123), what is inferred from it (6.2, 126, 128–9; 6.20, 297), judgments
based upon it (6.3, 130), or (likewise) ‘that knowledge of the objects of sense
which is got by reasoning’ (6.20, 297).
The (i ) ‘material impressions’ upon our sensory receptors are effects upon our bodies,
not (ii ) sensory effects upon our minds. This point underscores Reid’s emphatic dis-
tinction between (i ) the act and (ii ) the object (of perception), and his view that typi-
cally (i ) visual sensations are sub-personal components or aspects of acts of (ii ) visual
perception of our surroundings:
It is necessary that the impression be made upon our organs, but not that it be
known. Nature carries on this part of the process of perception, without our con-
sciousness or concurrence. (Reid 1765, 6.22, 304)
A thousand such instances might be produced, in order to show that the visible ap-
pearances of objects are intended by nature only as signs or indications; and that the
mind passes instantly to the things signified, without making the least reflection
upon the sign or even perceiving that [i.e., noticing] there is any such thing. (Reid
1765, 6.2, 128–9; cf. 6.3; 6.4, 137)
The hobby horse of Modern indirect theories of perception, the alleged ‘resem-
blance’ between sensory ideas and physical objects, is irrelevant: There is none (6.5,
148–9; 6.12, 202). Reid’s careful attention to the details of sensation and perception,
and his refusal to over-simplify them, result in an account of perception (6.3, 131–5;
6.5) directly converse to that of Russell’s Problems of Philosophy (1912, Ch. 1), as is clear
from Reid’s remarks upon Berkeley (6.8, 168, 192, 194; 6.11, 197–8) and upon Hume.
Reid is emphatic about the utter inadequacy of Hume’s official theory of ideas
and its cornerstone, the ‘copy theory’ of ideas and impressions (6.8, 159; cf. En.1
§§1–7, 12). Reid has no alternative to it, nor any account of how the ‘language of na-
ture’ (4.2, 76) can be so much as learnt or understood by us. Under the headings of
‘instinct’ and of our ‘natural constitution’, Reid emphasises the pervasive natural reg-
ularities which enable us to be at all intelligent or cognisant (6.12, 208; 6.20, 297–8;
6.21, 304, 308, 6.24, 343). He is quite right that our failing to understand how these
reliabilities hold or function, or specifically what are these regularities, is no proof
that they do not hold, or that they are unimportant (6.12, 202; 6.22, 302). Reid re-
peatedly describes sensory perception as providing us information about our surround-
ings (6.1, 121; 6.3, 135; 6.7, 155; 6.20, 292, 293; 6.20, 321; 6.24, 331, 334, 341, 346).
In this way Reid develops a reliabilist alternative to the sceptical (justificatory, ‘ac-
cess’) internalism characteristic of so much Modern philosophy (de Bary 2002, cf.
Nichols 2007, Copenhaver 2010).
Yet Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) is right that Reid leaves much of the issue just where the
sceptical Hume wants. Regarding induction Reid granted frankly:
101 
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In this way Reid develops a reliabilist alternative to the sceptical (justificatory, ‘ac-
cess’) internalism characteristic of so much Modern philosophy (de Bary 2002, cf.
Nichols 2007, Copenhaver 2010).
Yet Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) is right that Reid leaves much of the issue just where the
sceptical Hume wants. Regarding induction Reid granted frankly:
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5 Reid (1765) is cited by Ch.§, p.; lack of page number indicates the whole § is cited. His
spelling and typography have been modernised.
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However, we agree with the author of the Treatise of human nature in this, That our be-
lief in the continuance of nature’s law is not derived from reason. It is an instinctive
prescience of the operations of nature, very like to that prescience of human actions
which makes us rely upon the testimony of our fellow-creatures: and as, without the
latter, we should be incapable of receiving information from men by language; so,
without the former, we should be incapable of receiving information of nature by
means of experience. (Reid 1765, 6.24, 346)
Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) is also right that Hume’s problem lies in challenging us to figure
out how are human reason and reasoning possible, such that we can be at all cognis-
ant?
Tetens’ Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Development (1777) note many
distinctions Reid highlighted regarding the psychological complexities involved in
human thought, representation, feeling, sensation and judgment; that the concept of
causality connotes more and other than psychological associations can provide; that
relations cannot be reduced to those required by Hume’s separability thesis (briefly,
that any distinction requires real separability into numerically distinct instances); and
that rational cognition involves modalities (of ‘necessity’) which cannot be accounted
for by merely sensory, empiricist considerations.6 Tetens discusses the form of judg-
ments, and the origins of the most basic concepts of the understanding; he questions
Reid’s reliance upon instinct, because knowledge requires objective modalities which
contrast to merely subjective (psychological) modalities. However, Tetens’ rambling
Versuche (essays) lack Kant’s logical acumen and inadvertently serve to underscore
how crucial is the contrast between merely psychological modalities and the modali-
ties involved in even the simplest forms of perceptual experience and knowledge –
the ‘dignity’ (B124, l. 171) or status Kant notes is constitutive of causality or (also) of
any assertoric judgment about what something IS, in contrast to how it may merely
appear to onself. Paradoxically, Tetens’ Versuche miss altogether the prospect of any a
priori justification of objective cognitive or (also) causal modalities, and yet prompted
Kant (GS 23:57) to recognise exactly this prospect.
When Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) credits Hume with challenging the powers of pure rea-
son, we must avoid hearing merely a rationalist’s rejoinder to empiricist scepticism. At
the time he is reading Tetens’ (1777) Versuche (ca. 1776–78), Kant notes that ‘meta-
physics’ is not knowledge of objects, but rather of principles (Refl. 4853) – inter alia,
principles by which objects can be known; he also describes ‘metaphysics’ in terms
closely anticipating KdrV (Refl. 4849, 4851). Note in this regard that, although Reid
speaks of sensory experience as providing us ‘information’ (per above), he has no ac-
count of information channels; Dretske (1981) has such an account, yet lacks an ade-
quate account of information decoding or extraction. Dretske cleaves close to basic
perceptual claims so as to maximise their obvious justificatory externalism (cf. Dret-
ske 1998, 81–3, 87). Those basic perceptual claims, however, cannot suffice for the
natural sciences, to which Reid rightly draws attention.7 In these regards Kant is cor-
rect that our understanding human knowledge requires a cogent Critique of human
reason and reasoning.
This is not over-blown: Sensory-perceptual discrimination is modally rich! The
apparent justificatory deficit of mere sensory appearances, stressed by Hume, as
compared to any assertoric claim about how anything (in fact) is, instead marks the
insufficiency of ‘access internalism’ in regard to sensory-perceptual justification! This
Reid had clearly recognised; this is the insight of his justificatory externalism. Preoc-
cupation with Kant’s transcendental idealist contrast between noumena and phenom-
ena has obscured Kant’s development of a very sophisticated justificatory externalism
regarding sensory perception, an externalism Kant details by his very sophisticated
functionalist account of sub-personal cognitive functions (KCE §§30, 43) which must
be fulfilled if ever we are to think in any instance ‘I think … [I now see that house
there]’ (above, §4.1). Whatever may be Kant’s transcendental idealist distinction be-
tween noumena and phenomena, Kant has a very rich and subtle taxonomy of dis-
tinct factors pertaining to sensory-perceptual experience and its objects, marking
many of the same distinctions Reid stressed. Kant distinguishes, inter alia, ‘sensation’
as the effect of an object upon the human capacity of representation (A19–20/B33–
4); ‘the matter of appearance’ as that ‘in the appearance’ of some particular which ‘cor-
responds to sensation’ (A20/B34; emphasis added); and the ‘real of sensation’ as ‘a
merely subjective representation’ by which ‘one can only be conscious that the sub-
ject is affected’, and which ‘one relates to an object in general’ (A165/B207–8). In
this provisional, analytical context, this ‘object in general’ is some as yet unspecified
particular object perceived. Accordingly, the matter of sensation – its sensory quality or
character, as distinct to the matter of appearance (the character of whatever appears
within space and time) – can be generated by and within the subject as its qualitative
sensory response to stimulation, although this sensory matter relates to some object
empirically intuited. These distinctions all hold within Kant’s ‘empirical realism’,
which is also to say they hold independently of his transcendental idealism. Yet they6 I forego specific references to Tetens’ ungainly Versuche; the points relevant here can be
gleaned from his table of contents (to the first volume). Some sample excerpts are translated
in Watkins (2009, 356–91), though these do not include those of Tetens’s views cited here or
above (§3). (Anyone excerpting Tetens (1777) deserves mercy.)
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However, we agree with the autho  of the Treatise of human nature in this, That o r be-
lief in the continuance of nature’s law is ot derived from re son. It is an instinctive
prescience of the operations of nature, very like to that prescience of human actions
which makes us rely upon t e testimony of our fellow-cr a ures: and as, with ut the
latter, we should be incap ble of receiving information from men by langu ge; so,
without the former, we should be incapable of receiving information nature by
means of experience. (Reid 1765, 6.24, 346)
Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) is also right that Hume’s problem lies in chall nging us to figure
out how are human reas n and reasoning possible, such that we can be at all ognis-
ant?
Tetens’ Philosophical Essays o  Human Nature and its Development (1777) no e many
distinctions Reid highlighted regarding t e psychological complexities inv lved in
human thought, representation, feeling, s nsation and judgment; th t the concept of
causality connotes more nd other than psychological association  an provide; that
relations cannot be reduced to those required by Hume’s parability thesis (briefly,
that any distinction requires real separability into numerically dist nct instances); and
that rational cognition involves modalities ( f ‘necessity’) which cannot be accounted
for by merely sensory, empiricist considerations.6 Tetens discusses the form of ju g-
ments, and the origins of the most basic concepts of the understanding; he questions
Reid’s reliance upon instinct, because knowledge requires objective modalities which
contrast to merely subjective (psychological) modalities. However, Tetens’ rambling
Versuche (essays) lack Kant’s logical acumen and inadvertently serve to u derscore
how crucial is the contrast between mer ly psychological modalities and the modali-
ties involved in even the implest forms of perceptua  experience and knowledge –
the ‘dignity’ (B124, l. 171) or status Kant notes is con i tive of causality or (also) of
any assertoric judgment about what something IS, in contrast to how it may merely
appear to onself. Paradoxically, Tetens’ Versuche miss altogether the prospect of any a
priori justification of objective cognitive or (also) ausal modalities, nd yet prompted
Kant (GS 23:57) to recognise exactly this prospect.
When Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) credits Hume with challenging the powers of pure rea-
son, we must avoid hearing merely a r ti nalist’s rejoind r to empiricist sc pt cism. At
the time he is reading Tetens’ (1777) Versuche (ca. 1776– 8), Kant notes that ‘meta-
physics’ is not knowledge of objects, but rather of principle  (Refl. 4853) – inter alia,
principles by which objects can be known; he also describes ‘metaphysics’ in terms
closely anticipating KdrV (Refl. 4849, 4851). Note in this regard that, al houg  Reid
speaks of sensory experience as providing us ‘information’ (per above), he has no ac-
count of information channels; Dretske (1981) s such an account, yet lacks an ade-
quate account of information decoding or extrac i . Dretske cleaves close to basic
perceptual claims so as to maximise their bvious just ficatory externalism (cf. Dret-
ske 1998, 81–3, 87). Thos  basic perceptual claims, howev , cannot suffice for the
natural sciences, to which Reid rightly draws attention.7 In these regards Kant is cor-
rect that our understanding uman knowledge requires a cogent Critiqu  of human
reason and reasoning.
This is not over-blown: Sensory-perceptual discrimination is modally rich! The
apparent justificatory deficit of mere sensory appearances, str s ed by Hume, as
compared to any assertoric claim about how anything (in fact) is, instead marks the
insufficiency of ‘access internalism’ in regard to se sory-perceptu l justificati n! This
Reid had clearly recognised; t is is the insight of his ju t ficatory externalism. Preoc-
cupation with Kant’s transcendental idealist contrast between noumena and phenom-
ena has obscured Kant’s development of a very sophisticated justificatory externalism
regarding sensory perception, an externalism Kant details by his very sophisticated
functionalist account of sub-personal ognitive functions (KCE §§30, 43) which must
be fulfilled if ever we are to think in any inst nce ‘I think … [I now see tha  house
there]’ (above, §4.1). Whatever may be Kant’s tr nscendental ide list distin tion be-
tween noumena and phenome a, Ka t has a v ry rich and subtle t xonomy of dis-
tinct factors pertaining to sensory-perceptual experience and its objects, marking
many of the same distinctions Reid stresse . Kant di tinguishes, inter alia, ‘sensation’
as the effect of an object upon the human capacity f represent tion (A19–20/B33–
4); ‘the matter of appearance’ as that ‘in the appearance’ of some particul  which ‘cor-
responds to sensation’ (A20/B34; emphas s added); and the ‘real of sensation’ as ‘a
merely subjective representation’ y which ‘one can ly be conscious that the sub-
ject is affected’, and whi h ‘one relates to an object in g neral’ (A165/B207–8). I
this provisional, analytical context, this ‘objec  in general’ is some as yet unspecified
particular object perceived. Accordingly, the matter of sensation – i s sensory quality or
character, as distinct to the matter of appearance (the character of whatever appears
within space and time) – can be generated by and within the subject as its qualita ive
sensory response to stimulation, although this sensory ma ter relates to some objec
empirically intuited. These d stinct ons all hold within Ka t’s ‘empirical realism’,
which is lso to say they old ndependently of his transc ndental idealism. Yet they6 I forego specific references to Tetens’ ungainly Ver uche; the points relevant here can be
gleaned from his table of contents (t  the first volume). Some sample excerpts are translated
in Watkins (2009, 356–91), though these do not include those of Tetens’s views cited here or
above (§3). (Anyone excerpting Tetens (1777) deserves mercy.)
102 
7 Re d (1765), 1.1, 3; 3, 65; 6.1, 120; 6.2, 94–5; .13, 231–2; 6.19, 281–5; 6.24, 50–1; 7,
370–83. (There are no §§ in Reid’s Chs. 3 o  7).
103 
However, we agree with th  author of the Treatise of human nature n th , That ou  be-
lief in the c n inuance of ature’s law is not d rived fr m reason. It is an i s inctive
prescience of the operations of natur , very ike t  that presci nce h man ac ions
which makes s rely upon th  testimony of our fellow-creatures: a d as, without the
lat er, we should be incapable of receiving information from men y language; so,
without the former, we should be incapable of receiving information of nature by
means of experience. (Reid 1765, 6.24, 346)
Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) is also right that Hume’s pr blem li s in challenging us to figure
out how are human reason and reasoning possible, such that we can be at all cognis-
ant?
Tetens’ Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Develop ent (1777) ote many
distinctions Reid highlighted regardi  the psychol gical compl xities inv lv d in
hum n th ught, repres ntation, feeling, ensation and judgment; th t the concept of
causality o tes more and ther than psychological as ciations can provide; that
relations can ot be d c d to those required by Hume’  sep rability thesis (b iefly,
t t any distinction requires real sep rability into numerically disti ct i stan es); an
that rational cog ition involves modaliti s (of ‘necessity’) which cannot be accounted
for by merely sensory, e piricist considerations.6 T tens discu ses th  form of judg-
ment , and the origins of the most basic concepts of th  understanding; he estions
Reid’s reliance upon instinct, because knowledge requires objective modalities which
contrast to merely subjective (psychological) modalities. However, Tetens’ r mbling
Versuche (essays) la k K nt’s logical acumen and inadv rtently serve to underscore
how crucial is the contrast between mer ly psychological m dalities and the modali-
ties involved in even the simplest forms of perceptual experien e and kn wledge –
the ‘dignity’ (B124, l. 171) or tatus Kant not s is c stitutive f causality or (also) of
ny assert ric judgment about what something IS, in contrast to how it may mer ly
appear to onself. Paradoxically, Tetens’ Versuche miss ltogether the pr spect f any 
priori justification f objective cognitive or (als ) causal modalities, and yet prompted
Kant (GS 23:57) to recognise exactly this prospect.
When Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) credits Hume with challenging the powers of pur  rea-
son, we must avoid hearing mer ly a rationalist’s rejoinder to empiricist s epticis . At
the time he is reading Tetens’ (1777) Versuche (ca. 1776–78), Kant notes that ‘met -
hysics’ is not knowledge of objects, but rather of principles (Refl. 4853) – i ter alia,
principles by which objects can be known; he also describes ‘metaphysics’ in terms
closely anticipating KdrV (Refl. 4849, 4851). Note in this regard that, although Reid
speaks of sensory experience as providing us ‘informatio ’ (per above), he has o ac-
count of information channels; Dretske (1981) has such an account, yet lacks an ade-
quat  account of information decoding or extraction. Dretske cleaves close to basic
perceptual claims so as to maximis  their obvious justificatory externalism (cf. Dret-
ske 1998, 81–3, 87). Those basi  perceptual claims, however, cannot suffice for the
natural sciences, to which Reid rightly draw  tte tion.7 In these regards Kant is cor-
r ct that our understanding human kn wledge requires a cogent Critique of human
reason and reas ning.
This is not over-blown: Sensory-perceptual discrimi ation is modally rich! The
apparent justificatory defi it of mere sen ory appearances, stressed by Hume, as
compared to any a ertoric claim about how anything (in fact) is, in tead marks th
insufficiency of ‘acc ss i ternalism’ in egard to nsory-perceptual justification! This
Reid had clearly recognised; this is t e insight of his justificatory exter li m. Preoc-
cupation with Kant’s transcendental id alist contrast betwe  n umena and phe om-
ena has obscured Kant’s developm t of a very s phisticated justificatory externalism
regardi g sensory perception, an externalism Ka t d tails by his very sophisticated
functionalist account of sub-personal cognitive functions (KCE §§30, 43) w ic  m st
be fulfilled if ever we are to think in any i stance ‘I think … [I now see that house
there]’ (abov , §4.1). Whatever may be K nt’s transc dent l ide list distincti n be-
tween noumena and phe ome a, Kant h s a v ry rich and subtle taxonomy of dis-
tinct factors pertaining to sensory-perc ptual experie ce and its objects, marking
many of the same distinctions Reid stressed. K nt distinguishes, i ter alia, ‘sensation’
as the effect of an object upon t e human ca acity of representation (A19–20/B33–
4); ‘the matt r of appearance’ as that ‘in the appearance’ of some particular which ‘cor-
responds to s nsation’ (A20/B34; emphasis add d); and the ‘real of sens tion’ as ‘a
merely subjective repres ntation’ by which ‘o e an ly be conscious that the sub-
ject is affected’, d which ‘one relates to an object in general’ (A165/B207–8). In
this provisional, analytical context, this ‘object in general’ is some as yet unsp cified
particular object perceived. A cordingly, the matter of sensation – its sensory quality or
character, as distinct to the matter of appearance (the character of whatever ppears
within space a d time) – can be generat d by and withi  the subject a  its qualitative
sensory response to stimulation, although t is sensory matter relates to some object
empirically intuited. These istinctio s ll old withi  Ka t’s ‘empirical realism’,
which is also to say they hold independently of his transcendental idealism. Yet they6 I forego spec fic referenc s to Tetens’ ungainly V rsuche; the points relevant here can be
gleaned from his table of contents (to the first volume). Some sampl excerpts are translated
in Watkins (2009, 356–91), hough these d  ot include those of Tetens’s vi ws cited here or
above (§3). (Anyone excerpting Tetens (1777) deserves mercy.)
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Howeve , we agree with t e author of the Treatise of human nature in this, That our be-
lief in the conti uance f ature’s l w is not derived fr m reason. It is an i stinctive
prescience f the p rations of nature, very like to that prescience of human actions
w ich makes s rely upon the testimony of our fell w-cr atures: and as, without the
l tt r, we should be incapable of receiving inform tion from en by language; so,
without the former, we should be incapable of receiving information of nature by
means of experience. (Reid 1765, 6.24, 346)
Kant (P ol. 4:258–9) i  also right t t Hum ’  problem lies in challenging us to figure
ut how re human reason and reasoning possible, su h that we can be at all cognis-
ant?
Te e s’ Philosophica  Essays on Human Nature a d its Develop ent (1777) note many
distinctions Reid highl ghted regarding the psychol gical complexities inv lved in
huma  th ugh , r presentation, feeling, sensati n and judgment; that the concept of
c usali y o tes more and ther than psycholog cal as ociations can provide; that
relations can ot be red c d to tho required by Hume’s separabili y thesis (briefly,
t t any distinction requir  real separability into numerically disti ct instances); an
that rationa  cog iti n involv s modal ti s (of ‘necessity’) which cannot be accounted
or by merely sensory, empiricist con d ra ons.6 Tetens iscu ses the form of judg-
ment , and the origins of the most asic concepts of th  u d rstanding; he questions
Reid’s relianc  upon instinct, b cause knowledge requires objective modalities which
ontrast to merely subjective (psycho ogical) m daliti s. However, Te ens’ rambling
Versuche ( ssays) ack Kant’s logical acumen and i advertently s rve to underscore
how crucial is the cont ast between merely psychological modalities and the modali-
ties involved i  even the simples  forms of perceptu l exp rien e and knowledge –
the ‘dignity’ (B124, l. 171) r atus Kant n tes is constitu ive of causal y or (also) of
ny ssert ric judgment about wha  om thing IS, in c tr st to how it may merely
appear to onself. Paradoxically, Tetens’ V rsuche mis  altog ther the prospect f any a
priori justification of obje tive cognitive or (also) causal modalities, and yet prompted
Kant (GS 23:57) to recognise exactly this rospect.
Wh n Kant (Prol. 4:258–9) credits Hume with challenging the powers of pure rea-
son, we must v i  hearing mer ly a ratio ali ’  r joinder to empiricist scepticis . At
t  time he is reading T tens’ (1 77) Versuche (ca. 1776–78), Kant notes that ‘met -
hysics’ is not knowl dge of object , but rather f principl  (Refl. 4853) – ter alia,
prin iples by which objects can be known; he also desc ibes ‘metaphysics’ in terms
clos ly anticipating Kd V (Refl. 4849, 4851). No e in his regard that, although Reid
speaks of sensory experie ce as providing us ‘inform ti ’ (per above), he has o ac-
count of information channels; (1981) has uch an a count, yet acks an de-
quate acc un  of information de oding or extraction. Dre ske cleaves close to basic
perceptual claims so as to m x mis  their obvious justifica ory externalism (c . Dret-
sk  1998, 81–3, 87). Those basic p ceptual claims, h wev r, cannot uffice for the
natural sciences, to which Reid rightly draws attention.7 In these regards Kant is cor-
r ct th t our understanding human knowledge r quires a cogent Critique of human
reason and reas ning.
This is not ove -blown: Sensory-pe ceptual discri ination is modally rich! The
apparent justificat ry defic t of mere s nsory appeara ces, stressed by Hume, as
comp red to any assertoric claim about how anyth ng (in fact) is, in ead marks the
insufficiency of ‘access int rnalism’ in reg rd o sen ry-per eptual justification! This
Reid ad clearly recog ised; this is the in ight of his justifi atory externalism. Preoc
cupation with Kan ’s t anscendental idealist ont ast b ween noumena and phenom-
ena has obscu ed Kant’s developm nt of a very sophisticated ju tificatory extern lism
regardi g ensory perception, an externalism Ka t details by his very sophisticated
functionalist a cou t of sub-per onal cog itive functions (KCE §§30, 43) w ich must
be fulfilled if ver we are to think in any i stance ‘I think … [I now see that house
th re]’ ( bove, §4.1). Wh tev r may be Kant’s t a s endental idealist distincti n be-
tween n ume a and ph nom , Kant has  v ry rich and subtle taxonomy of dis-
tinct fac ors p rtaining o sensory-p rceptual experie ce and its objects, m rki g
many o  the sa e istin ions Reid tressed. Kan  distinguishes, inter alia, ‘sensation’
s the effect of  object up n e hum n ca acity of representation (A19–20/B33–
4); ‘the mat er of appearance’ as at ‘in the appearance’ of some particular which ‘cor-
responds to sensation’ (A20/B34; emphasi  add d); a d the ‘real of sens tion’ as ‘a
merely su jective representatio ’ y which ‘one c n only be conscious that the sub-
ject is affected’, and which ‘one r lates to an obj ct in g eral’ (A165/B207–8). In
this provisional analy ical c ntext, this ‘object in general’ s some as yet unspecified
particula object p rceiv d. Ac ordingly, he matter of sensation – its sensory quality or
c racter, as distinct to the matt r of appear nc  (the character of whatever appears
within space and time) – can be generated by and within h  subject as its qualitative
sensory resp se to stimulatio , al hough t is sensory matter relates to some object
mpirically intuited. These istinctions al  hold within Kant’s ‘empirical r alism’,
w ich is also to say they hold ind pendently of his transcendental idealism. Yet they6 I forego specific reference  to Tetens’ ungainly Versuche; the points relevant here c n be
gleaned fr m his table of contents (to the first volume). Some sample excerpts are translated
in Watkins (2009, 356–91), though these do not include thos  of Tetens’s views cited here or
above (§3). (Anyone excerpting Tetens (1777) deserves mercy.)
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raise the question, How if ever can or do we sort mere sensory appearances to us
from any actual manifestations of spatio-temporal particulars?
Kant’s answer puts paid to the empiricist dogma of non-modal observation
terms; there are none, because perceptual discrimination is episodic – it takes some
period of time and transpires within some spatial context – by which alone we can
identify any actual perceived particular(s) (or states of affairs) by discriminating the
present, actual case from causally possible alternatives, which we can only do by iden-
tifying spatio-temporal particulars with sufficient material (i.e., causal) integrity that
we can distinguish them from our own perceptual-motor activity – even if this activ-
ity be no more than how we can alter the direction in which we gaze, even momen-
tarily (or, sub-consciously, the eyes’ saccadic movements). Any and all such elemen-
tary perceptual discriminations require using – competently and accurately, if approx-
imately, fallibly or implicitly – the principles of cognitive judgment Kant identifies
and justifies in the ‘Analytic of Principles’, each of which derives from his Table of
Categories; likewise their use is informed by those formal aspects of judging Kant
identifies in his Table of Judgments. This is but a brief indication of how Kant, in
the ‘Analytic of Principles’, articulates and justifies a host of constraints upon spatio-
temporal particulars required so that we can at all perceive and identify any of them
(KCE, Pt. 2). Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ fulfills the aim already anticipated in the
‘Deduction’, that only if we do successfully identify some particulars by perceiving
them (thus affording any instance of a synthetic unity of apperception), can any of us
finite, dependent homo sapiens be sufficiently sapientes ever to think ‘I think …’ about
anything, on any occasion (KTPR, esp. §§62, 63).
Consider, then, how different might have been 20th-century Anglophone philoso-
phy, if not for Berkeley Russell (1912) had instead opted for Reid? Pace Quine (1969,
72, cf. 74, 76), the Humean predicament is not the human predicament. This was dem-
onstrated by Reid (1764). There may have been no occasion for Rorty (1979); Reid
(1764) is much more perceptive, also about the metaphor of our ‘mirror’ of nature
(6.6, 146). For his part, Kant did not neglect our embodied, perceptual-motor dis-
criminations, nor their material preconditions, though Humean ego-centric proclivi-






























2 KANT’S DEDUCTION: BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR ITS UNDERSTANDING. 
2.1 Kant’s dual use of categories: sensory binding and judgmental conjunction. 
2.2 A pointer about ‘transcendental’.
2.3 The structure of Kant’s text.
2.4 Kant’s KdrV examines both cognitive process and of cognitive validity. 
2.5 A diagnostic clue from Ryle: beware of ‘para-mechanical hypotheses’.
2.6 Ryle’s second clue: beware of systematically misleading expressions.
2.7 A fourth systematically misleading expression: ‘analytic truth’.
2.8 Kant’s Vorstellung or vorstellen often concerns sensory presentation(s).
2.9 ‘Determine’ (bestimmen): cause to be as it is, or specify.
2.10 Kant’s Deduction concerns cognitive semantics, humanly possible singular
reference.
2.11 Two distinct, distinctive roles of sensory intuition and intellect.
2.12 Kant’s Deduction focuses on the key intellectual conditions required to think
any specific, determinate thought.
2.13 Kant’s Deduction of the categories parallels the transcendental Deduction of
the a priori concepts of ‘space’ and of ‘time’.
2.14 Two senses of the ‘constitution’ of objects of experience.
2.15 Whether Kant’s Deduction requires transcendental idealism can be ascer-
tained only by scrutinising the prospect that it may not be required at all.
3 TEXT, TRANSLATION (verso) & ELUCIDATIONS (recto).
3.1 §13: Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction as such.
3.2 §14: Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.
3.3 §15: Of the Possibility of a Combination as such.
3.4 §16: Of the Original-Synthetic Unity of Apperception.
3.5 §17: The Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception is the Highest
Principle of the Use of the Understanding.
3.6 §18: What is Objective Unity of Self-Consciousness.
3.7 §19: The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of
the Concepts they Contain.
3.8 §20: All sensory Intuitions stand under the Categories as Conditions under
which alone their Manifold can coalesce in one Consciousness.
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 Immanuel Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Categories’ addresses issues centrally debated today in philosophy and in cognitive sciences, especially in epistemology, and in theory of perception. Kant’s insights 
into these issues are clouded by pervasive misunderstandings of Kant’s 
‘Deduction’ and its actual aims, scope, and argument. The present edition 
with its fresh and accurate translation and concise commentary aims to 
serve these contemporary debates as well as continuing intensive and 
extensive scholarship on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Two surprising 
results are that ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is valid and sound, and it holds 
independently of Kant’s transcendental idealism. This lucid volume is 
interesting and useful to students, yet sufficiently detailed to be 
informative to specialists.
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